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INTRODUCTION

Racial discrimination and the death penalty has been a matter of
scholarly interest since the 1930s. The nation's legal system has been
aware of the issue since the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Every
court that has addressed the issue has condemned the idea of race
influencing the administration of the death penalty. The courts agree
that this practice has no place in a society dedicated to the rule of law.
Nevertheless, in this century, no American court has upheld a legal
claim alleging racial discrimination in the use of the death penalty.'
Only one American legislative body has adopted a law that would give
murder defendants the right to advance claims of racial discrimination in the same manner available to racial minorities in the employ2
ment, housing, and public accommodations contexts.
This Article focuses on the following four issues related to racial
discrimination in the use of the death penalty in post-FurmanAmerica:
(1) the link between discretion and discrimination; (2) ethical, moral,
and legal concerns associated with racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty; (3) evidence of this discrimination with
special reference to recent empirical findings from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; and (4) judicial and legislative responses to claims of
racial discrimination.
I
DIscRETioN AND DISCRIMINATION

The potential influence of race in the administration of the death
penalty takes root in the broad exercise of discretion that state laws
grant prosecutors and juries. State laws give prosecutors and juries
the power to treat similarly situated "death-eligible"3 defendants differently because of either their race or the race of the victim in the
4
case.
1

By contrast, courts have sustained claims of discrimination in the selection of capi-

juries.
tal
2 In 1998, Kentucky passed legislation that permits a capital defendant to challenge a
prosecutorial decision to seek a death sentence on the ground that it was "sought on the
basis of race." 1998 Ky. Acts 252.
3 The term "death-eligible" refers to a case in which the facts are sufficient under
state law to sustain a capital murder conviction and death sentence, whether or not the
state actually seeks a death sentence or the jury actually imposes a death sentence in the
case.

4 During slavery, state criminal codes explicitly authorized stronger punishments for
slaves and for emancipated blacks than for whites. In addition, state laws permitted
stronger punishments for crimes against whites than for crimes against blacks.
In legal parlance, we refer to discrimination that is expressly authorized by state law as
"facial" discrimination. Facially discriminatory laws continued even after the Civil War and
until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Moreover, even after the war,
courts continued to treat crimes against blacks more leniently (if the prosecutor decided to
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The law gives prosecutors complete discretion either to seek a
death sentence in death-eligible cases or to waive the death penaltyunilaterally or by way of a negotiated plea bargain. For cases that advance to a penalty trial, the typical jury exercises virtually complete
discretion on the life or death decision once it finds a statutory aggravating circumstance present in the case. In addition, the governor or
board of pardons and parole generally has complete discretion to
commute a death sentence to either life without possibility of parole
or a term of years.
The scope of prosecutorial and jury discretion in current systems
is illustrated in Figure 1, which presents a flow chart of the capital
charging and sentencing system in Philadelphia during the period
1983-93. The Pennsylvania death-sentencing statute that structures
the Philadelphia system is fairly typical of statutes found in "weighing"
death penalty jurisdictions. 5
The Pennsylvania legislature has listed eighteen statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one of which must be found by the sentencing authority before the Commonwealth can impose a death
sentence. 6 This limitation on prosecutorial and jury discretion satisprosecute at all). This was especially true if the defendant was white. Crimes by black
defendants, on the other hand, received harsher punishment, especially if the victim was
white. A scholar of the reconstruction period, Professor Leon Litwack noted:
The double standard of white justice was nowhere clearer, in fact, than in
the disparate punishments meted out to whites and blacks convicted of similar crimes .... [A] Freedmen's Bureau officer in Georgia despaired of any
early or mass conversion to [the] principle [that killing a black person
amounted to murder). "The best men in the State admit that no jury would
convict a white man for killing a freedman, or fail to hang a negro who had
killed a white man in self-defense."
LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFrERMATH OF SLAVERY 285-86 (1979).
Although the Fourteenth Amendment put an end to facial discrimination, it did not completely sever the link between the death penalty and race, even at the legislative level. The
death penalty's potential for both intimidating and subordinating the black community
was clearly realized and contributed to the strong community support that is still present
today in some parts of the South for the use of the death penalty. See Steven E. Barkan &
Steven F. Cohn, Racial Prejudiceand Supportfor the Death Penalty by Whites, 31 J. oF RES. IN
CRIME AND DEUiNQ. 202, 206-08 (1994). Furthermore, a highly discretionary death penalty
was an effective substitute for lynching, a practice that tarnished the image of many states,
both northern and southern, well into this century. A jury's (usually all white) "lawful"
conviction and sentencing of a black, followed by a swift execution, substituted for the
more unseemly lynching, with the same practical effect. Lawful "executions" also reduced
pressure on Congress to enact federal antilynching legislation in the 1920s.
With the substantial decline of such blatant racism in the 20th century, the link between race and the death penalty has become much more subtle. Nevertheless, the broad
powers of discretion present in the late 19th century systems ofjustice continue to this day
with only slight modification. Therein lies the continuing risk of racial discrimination in
contemporary death-sentencing systems.
5
See infra text accompanying notes 19-20 for a discussion of "weighing."
6 These statutory circumstances are listed in Appendix A.
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fies Furman v. Georgia's7 requirement that death-sentencing systems
must provide standards to guide the exercise of discretion if they are
8
to satisfy the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
Pennsylvania also specifies eight statutory mitigating circumstances that the sentencing authority may consider if it finds a statutory aggravating circumstance present.9 The most important of the
mitigating circumstances is "e8," the catchall factor, which allows the
sentencing authority to consider any additional mitigating circumstances that pertain to the circumstances of the crime or the character
and record of the defendant. 10 The United States Supreme Court
prescribed the broad scope of this mitigating circumstance in a series
of decisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 11
A defendant's conduct and mental state must also satisfy the requirements of the state's law for capital murder. Thus, in Pennsylvania, in addition to the presence of a statutory aggravating
circumstance, a case is not death-eligible unless the facts of the case
are also sufficient to support a finding of liability for first-degree
murder.
Decision points 1 and 2 on Figure 1 indicate two points at which a
prosecutor can choose to eliminate a defendant's risk of receiving a
death sentence. At decision point 1, the prosecutor may either consent to a guilty plea and waive the death penalty or advance the case to
a guilt trial. 12 At decision point 2, the prosecutor may unilaterally
waive the death penalty, meaning that the case advances to trial
strictly on the issue of liability for first-degree murder.' 3 In the remaining cases, which constituted 60% (425/707) of all the death-eligible cases, the case advanced to trial with the Commonwealth seeking a
death sentence. In these cases, the defendant, at decision point 3, will
have the option of waiving a jury trial before the guilt trial has com7 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8 Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens explicitly state this in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 197-98 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
9 Appendix A lists the mitigators that juries are supposed to consider.
10 Mitigator e8, listed in Appendix A, allows ajury to use almost any factor it wants to
as a mitigator.
11 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978).
12 At this stage, 53% of the pleas are to life without possibility of parole (first-degree
murder), 18% are to second-degree murder, which is also without parole, and 29% are to
third-degree murder, which offers the possibility of parole when the minimum is served.
13
Forty-nine percent (61/125) of these trials are before a judge without a jury.
Under Pennsylvania law, the defendant had a right, with the consent of the trial judge, to
waive ajury and to have his case tried to the court. Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 1101. In 1998, the
electorate approved a constitutional amendment granting the Commonwealth the right to
a jury trial.
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menced. 14 A significant number (30-40%) of capital defendants take
this option in the hope of avoiding a capital murder conviction. Also,
when a defendant waives a jury at the guilt stage, prosecutors often
agree not to empanel a penalty-trial jury if the defendant is convicted
of first-degree murder (even though the Commonwealth has the right
to do so).15 For the few jury waiver cases that do advance to a penalty
trial before ajudge, the risk of a death sentence is much lower than it
rate is only 10%
is before ajury, i.e., the bench trial death sentencing
16
(4/41) versus a 30% (114/384) jury trial rate.
Forjury cases that result in a first-degree murder conviction, decision points 4-6 show the jury's penalty-trial decisions. They focus on
three specific issues. The first, at decision point 4, is whether the case
includes one or more aggravating circumstances. If the jury finds
none present, which occurs 23% (90/384)17 of the time, the jury must
sentence the defendant to life without the possibility of parole.
For the cases in which the jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance, the jury then determines whether a statutory mitigating
circumstance is also present in the case (decision point 5). If the jury
finds a mitigating circumstance, which requires the affirmative vote of
only a singlejuror,the jurors move on to the final weighing decision
(decision point 6).18 In spite of this low threshold, the jury failed to
find any mitigation present 21% (63/294) of the time.
At this point the law of Pennsylvania differs from the law of many
other weighing jurisdictions. In Pennsylvania, if the jury fails to find
mitigation at this stage, the court instructs the jury that it must return
a death sentence, whether or not it considers a death sentence appropriate or just.19 Thus, each finding of no mitigation present at decision point 5 resulted in the mandatory imposition of a death
sentence. This decision point is important because 55% (63/114) of
the Philadelphia jury death sentences resulted from this mandatory
imposition.
14 The proportion of cases in which the Commonwealth originally sought a death
sentence is unknown because during most of the period covered by this study, there was no
requirement that the Commonwealth file written notice. This situation is no longer the
case.
15 42 Pa. C. S. Sec. 971(b).
16 Homicide defense practitioners have indicated that, in many instances, their experiences with a particular judge permit them to reliably predict the extent to which a client is
at risk of being convicted of capital murder and receiving a death sentence should the
client choose to waive a jury.
See Figure 1, boxes 4A, 4B.
17
18 Mills v. Maryland,486 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1988), requires individual jurors in weighingjurisdictions to consider any mitigation they perceive to be present in the case, regardless of how other jurors perceive the facts of the case.
19 The Supreme Court has sustained this procedure despite allegations that this limitation on the jury's discretion results in unlawful "mandatory" death sentencing. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990).
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For the cases in which juries find mitigation, the jury weighs, at
decision point 6, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the court
instructs it to return a death sentence if it finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. In 22% (51/
20
231) of the weighing cases, the jury returned a death sentence.
Most striking about the exercise of both prosecutorial and jury
discretion in this process is that the decisions to seek and impose
death sentences are essentially unreviewable with respect to the issue
of discrimination. In the absence of an admission by the prosecutor
or individual jurors that race was a factor in their decision (which is
virtually unheard of), discriminatory behavior by either of these actors
is essentially outside the scope of review in the numerous appeals that
generally follow the imposition of a death sentence.
As noted above, the third possible actor on the life/death issue is
either the governor or another statewide body, such as a board of pardons and paroles. These actors can exercise complete discretionary
power to commute death sentences to either life or a term of years.
This discretion is also beyond any sort of meaningful review by appellate courts. In the not-so-recent past (pre-1970), governors in deathsentencing states routinely commuted up to a third of the death
sentences that they reviewed. 21 Today, however, commutations of
22
death sentences by governors and review boards are rare events.
A.

Early Questions About, and Challenges to, the Scope of
Discretion in Death Cases, Including Furman v. Georgia

In the 1960s, concerns about the link between broad discretion in
the administration of the death penalty and the risk of arbitrariness,
especially racial discrimination, prompted proposals to limit the discretion of sentencing juries. For example, the American Law Institute
("ALI") (a distinguished group of lawyers, judges, and academics)
proposed in the Model Penal Code that the death penalty be limited to
narrow, statutorily-defined categories of cases. 23 The ALI also proposed that juries be empowered to impose death sentences only after
they had first made "factual" findings about the presence of statutory
aggravating circumstances, such as the presence of an armed robbery
20

When the focus is on the total death-sentencing output from all of the jury penalty

trials, the death-sentencing rate is 30% (114/384). Among all of the death-eligible cases,
the jury death-sentencing rate is 17% (114/666).
21 See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
Ray. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255, 262 & 265 tbl.2 (1990-1991); VictoriaJ. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation to EnsureJustice in Death Penalty Cases, 49
VAND. L. REv. 311, 347-48 (1996).
22
See Bedau, supra note 21, at 266; Palacios, supra note 21, at 348.
23
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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or rape, and statutory mitigating circumstances, such as the defen24
dant's youth or the absence of a prior criminal record.
Despite these recommendations, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the Constitution required those procedures.2 5 Nevertheless, in the following year, Furman v. Georgia2 6 invalidated the
death-sentencing systems of every American jurisdiction because of
the "untrammeled" discretion that they delegated to sentencing juries
combined with the arbitrary pattern of death-sentencing decisions
that they produced. 2 7 The Court held this discretion unacceptable
under the cruel and unusual punishments provision of the Eighth
28
Amendment.
Although some perceived Furmanas the end of the death penalty
in America, 29 the decision had the opposite effect. It galvanized state
legislative support for the death penalty, especially in the South.
Within two years of the decision, over thirty states had amended their
statutes in an effort to address the concerns expressed in Furman.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court approved state-law procedures
that either adopted the "weighing" procedures that the ALI had recommended or required the jury to find at least one statutorily-defined
aggravating circumstance as a predicate to the imposition of a death
sentence.a0 The upshot of these procedures was that the jury's discretion was limited to a narrower group of murder cases than before
Furman. The procedures also required the jury to consider any mitigating circumstances that the defendant presented.31 Beyond these
changes, however, the jury's discretion on the question of whether the
defendant should live or die remained unlimited and essentially unreviewable by appellate courts.
The Court did not explicitly consider the issue of prosecutorial
32
discretion in Furman, but four years later, it did in Gregg v. Georgia.
In Gregg, the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution did not reSee id. § 210.6(2)-(4).
See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 202-08 (1971).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring).
See id. at 23940; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, Ji.) (explaining Furman'sholding).
29
See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishmen 109 HAnv. L. REv. 355, 362-63
(1995) ("Some participants in the debate, both on and off the Court, no doubt believed
that Furman was the end, not the beginning, of the Supreme Court's involvement in the
issue of capital punishment.").
30 See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-53 (1976) (discussing Florida's capital-sentencing procedures and comparing them with Georgia's); Gregg; 428 U.S. at 197-98 (opinion of Stewvart, Powell, and Stevens, _U.) (discussing the finding of an aggravating
circumstance as a requirement in Georgia's capital-sentencing procedures).
31
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
32
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24
25
26
27
28
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quire limits on prosecutorial discretion beyond the statutory classifications that defined the classes of cases in which the State could impose
33
death sentences.
By the end of 1976, the Supreme Court had approved a series of
state death-penalty statutes because their newly enacted procedural
standards appeared capable of reducing the risks of arbitrariness and
discrimination to constitutionally acceptable levels.3 4 In none of
those cases, however, did the Court consider empirical evidence about
how the systems actually operated. The big issues at the end of the
1970s, therefore, were whether the post-Furmanreforms had altered
the levels of discrimination that many suspected existed pre-Furman
and whether the new systems were constitutionally acceptable on this
issue.
B.

Ethical, Moral, and Legal Concerns Implicated by Racial
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death
Penalty
1. Ethical and Moral Concerns

The issue of racial discrimination in the administration of the
death penalty is not whether juries sentenced factually innocent defendants to death because of their race. To be sure, there is evidence that
many of these miscarriages of justice both before and after Furman
were racially motivated. For example, in the famous recent case
McMillian v. State,35 Walter McMillian, an African American, was
framed and sentenced to death in Alabama for the murder of a white
woman based on false testimony generated by law enforcement
36
officials.
It is clear that both McMillian's race, his history of dating a white
woman, and his victim's race made him an easier target. Nevertheless, the best research suggests that both white and black defendants
who are factually innocent of any crime are at equal risk of being
37
falsely convicted and sentenced to death.
33 Specifically, the Court explained that "[niothing in any of our cases suggests that
the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution." Id. at 199
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, 11.).
34 See, e.g., Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-53; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197-98 (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
35
616 So. 2d 933 (Ala. Grim. App. 1993) (overturning the defendant's conviction).
36
See Michael L. Radelet et al., PrisonersReleasedfrom Death Rows Since 1970 Because of
Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 T.M. CooLEY L. Rrv. 907, 949-50 (1996).
37
See id. at 917. The author notes that:
[b]lacks today make up about 40 percent of those on death row in America,
and also approximately 40 percent of the cases in which people are released from death row because of doubts about their guilt. In short, the
racial breakdown of [these] cases is quite similar to the racial breakdown of
America's condemned population.

19981

RACTAL DISCRIMINATION IN CAPITAL CASES

1651

In contrast to the factual-innocence issue, the principal concern
about racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty
relates to the unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants who
are in fact guilty of capital murder. The core ethical concern is fairness-treating like cases alike-especially when the consequences of
the decision are so severe. Governments, in particular, have a
profound duty to treat all defendants with equal care and concern
and without regard to factors that have no bearing on their criminal
culpability.3 8 Given the legacy of slavery and race discrimination in
our history, this concern has special force with respect to discrimination based on the defendant's race, a factor over which he has no
control.3 9 However, when a defendant alleges discrimination based
on the victim's race, the claim's moral appeal may weaken with a simple reminder that the defendant, not society, selected the victim.
Concerns about racial discrimination may also resonate at the
group level. Claims of race-of-victim discrimination (for example, that
nonblack-victim cases are treated more punitively than black-victim
cases) raise an ethical concern that the state's failure to allocate resources equally in the prosecution of both black and nonblack cases
denies the black community equitable access to any possible benefits
the death penalty may provide. 40 Even if it were clear that America's
death-sentencing system treated black and nonblack defendants fairly
and consistently, concerns remain about the substantial overrepresentation of blacks on death row in America. While blacks make up only
thirteen percent of the nation's civilian population, blacks make up
forty-one percent of the nation's death row population. 4 1 Many consider it insensitive and unseemly, if not immoral, for a country with
our historical record on slavery and racial discrimination to persist in
using a punishment that whites almost exclusively administer and control, that serves no demonstrated penological function, and has a
profound adverse impact-physically, psychologically, and symbolically-on its black citizens.
Id.
38 Cf. RONALD DWoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977) (stating that "individuals have a right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the
political institutions that govern them").

39 See Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matterif the Death Penalty Is ArbitrarilyAdministered?,
14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 149, 155 (1985) (arguing that officials' andjurors'judgments may be
"influenced by deep-seated racial or social attitudes").
40 See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishment, and the Supreme
Court; 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1391-93 (1988).
41

See KYMBERLY DEBARROS & CLAUD=TT- BENNETr, U.S. DEP'T

OF COMMERCE,

THE

1997 (UPDATE) 1 (1998) ("In 1997, the
Black population was estimated at 34.2 million and represented 12.8 percent of the total
population."); NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, D.ATH Row U.S.A. (1998) (noting
that 41% of those on death row are black).
BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH
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For others, ethical concerns about race discrimination relate
strictly to the extent to which the death-sentencing system treats
equally culpable defendants differently because of either their race or
the race of the victim. Moreover, for some people within this group,
the level of ethical and moral concern depends on the extent to which
the cause of the unequal treatment is the product of conscious racial
animus, the influence of stereotypical or non-conscious perceptions of
the comparative dangerousness of black and nonblack defendants, or
the influence of community perceptions of the heinousness of crimes
that happen to be correlated with the racial aspects of the cases.
Proponents of the death penalty respond to these concerns with
several ethical arguments. Principally, they argue that society's interest in retribution, justice, and concern for the victims of crime and
their families trump equal treatment concerns.4 2 They further argue
that racial discrimination in no way diminishes either the culpability
of the defendants who are sentenced to death or society's justification
43
for executing them.
Proponents of the death penalty offer two additional arguments,
which proceed from quite different premises. First, they assert that
concerns about racial discrimination are misplaced because no con44
vincing evidence suggests that race is an influence in the system.

Second, they argue that racial discrimination is inevitable and endemic in all of our social institutions (the death penalty being no exception), and the law can do nothing about it, short of abolishing the
death penalty, 45 which in their view, cannot be morally justified on
this ground. Advocates of this second argument believe that the costs
of eliminating the death penalty clearly outweigh any harms caused by
racial discrimination. This belief no doubt explains why most citizens
who support the death penalty in opinion polls would maintain that
support even if they believed that the system were racially
46
discriminatory.

42 Cf Ernest van den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165,
166-67 (1985).
43
See id. at 173-74.
44
See David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the "Inevitability"of RacialDiscriminationin
CapitalSentencing and the "Impossibility"ofIts Prevention,Detection, and Correction,51 WASH. &
LEE L. Rx-v. 359, 362 (1994).
45 See id.
46
For example, a 1991 Gallup Poll found that 73% of blacks and 41% of whites
agreed that blacks are more likely to receive the death penalty than whites in similar cases,
yet 76% of Americans favor the death penalty. See WEmDY KAMINER, IT'S ALL THE RAGE:
CIME AND CULTuRE 102-03 (1995); see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, 50J. OF Soc. IssuEs 19, 35-36 (1994)
(reviewing poll results. and concluding that "a large proportion of the American public
already believes the death penalty is unfair, but supports it nonetheless").
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Legal Concerns

At a strictly doctrinal level, the law is less conflicted than ethical
and moral opinion on the question. First, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids "purposeful" discrimination by all public officials, 4 7 which includes
prosecutorial and jury decisions to seek and impose death sentences.
This position rests on the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits consideration of race as a basis for official decisions
unless the consideration can be justified by a compelling state interest. (One could never establish a compelling state interest to justify
race discrimination in the death-sentencing context.)
The Court has explicitly ruled that this standard applies to purposeful race-of-defendant and race-of-victim discrimination. 48 Thus,
even though defendants claiming race-of-victim discrimination may
not be able to show a nexus between their race and the adverse decision in their particular case, they may raise the issue because they are
entitled to decisions that are not influenced by any person's race, including the victim's.
Legal consensus also exists that decisions to either seek or impose
the death penalty that are consciously motivated by racial animus
qualify as purposeful discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. At issue, however, is whether decisions that treat black defendants more punitively than similarly situated nonblack defendants
constitute purposeful discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment when stereotypical ideas about black defendants and white victims drive those decisions. A similar issue arises when the decisions of
prosecutors or juries to seek or to impose the death penalty represent
a response to the community's demand for more punitive action in
cases involving, for example, black defendants and white victims.
The Supreme Court has also implied that purposeful racial discrimination violates the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual
punishments" provision. 49 Indeed, the Court has held that even a
demonstrated "risk" that racial considerations may have influenced a
death-sentencing decision suffices as a basis for judicial relief.50 The
theory underlying this rule is that a decision either to seek or impose a
death sentence that bears a substantial risk of being influenced by the
race of the defendant or victim is arbitrary within the meaning of the
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).
49
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-13 (1987) (rejecting a racial discrimination claim under the Eighth Amendment because "the Baldus study does not demonstrate
a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing
process").
50 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (opinion of White, J.).
47
48
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Eighth Amendment because it is not based on the criminal culpability
of the defendant (the only constitutionally permissible basis for a sentence of death).
II
POST-FuRmA4

EVIDENCE OF ARBITRARINESS

AND DISCRIMINATION

A.

Issues of Proof and Interpretation

It is useful to draw a threshold distinction between claims of purposeful "systemic" racial discrimination and claims of purposeful discrimination in individual cases. A claim of systemic discrimination
alleges that race is a factor in prosecutorial decisions to seek or jury
decisions to impose the death sentence. Normally, one proves systemic discrimination with statistical evidence demonstrating that, on
average, the system treats black defendants or defendants with nonblack victims more punitively than similarly situated nonblack defendants or defendants with black victims. This proof is circumstantial,
and its inferential power depends on (1) the magnitude of the disparities in the treatment of the different, racially defined groups of cases
and (2) the plausibility that the differences in treatment are not the
product of either chance or different case characteristics within the
two racial groups that could reasonably explain the disparities on le51
gitimate grounds.
One proves discrimination in an individual case by establishing
that the race of the defendant or victim was a "motivating factor," a
"substantial or significant factor," or a "but-for factor" in the claimant's case. 52 This proof may be accomplished by presenting (1) "direct," smoking-gun evidence (for example, an admission or racial slur
by a prosecutor or juror) or (2) a combination of both quantitative
and qualitative evidence. Proof of discrimination in individual cases
finds its best illustration in class-wide employment discrimination
cases alleging claims of race or gender discrimination in either hiring
or promotion. Proof in these cases typically commences with a statistical demonstration of systemic discrimination among a large group of
cases (including the cases of the plaintiffs in the particular lawsuit).
The evidence of systemic discrimination supports an inference of purposeful discrimination in the case of each minority or woman who
experienced adverse effects from a decision of the defendant in hiring
51

See DAVID C. BALDus &JAmS W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION §9

L. PAETZOLD &
§ 4.13 (1996); 1 KENT SPRIGGS,
(1980); RAMONA

STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION
REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS IN TITLE VII ACTIONS § 11.9

(1994).
52 See Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 389 & n.126.
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or promotion. At this point, Title VII, 53 a federal law that prohibits
racial and gender discrimination in employment, shifts the focus to
the individual claimants and places on the defendant-employer the
burden of establishing that neither race nor gender was a factor in
each adversely affected case. This final inquiry, therefore, focuses on
the legitimate facts of the individual case that are offered to rebut the
inference of discrimination. In other words, it asks whether these
facts plausibly explain the adverse decision in the plaintiff's case. For
example, if a rejected minority-group member demonstrated very
weak qualifications for the job, the "rival" nondiscriminatory hypothesis would likely appear quite plausible, and a court would deny relief.
On the other hand, if the minority group member demonstrated qualifications exceeding those of most of the whites hired, the rival nondiscriminatory hypothesis would appear implausible, and a court
probably would grant relief.
When considering claims of systemic purposeful discrimination
in the application of the death penalty, one must distinguish between
evidence of "gross unadjusted" racial disparities and "adjusted" racial
disparities. Adjusted disparities account for the presence of aggravating and mitigating factors that clearly influence the decisions of prosecutors and juries. 5 4 Adjusted disparities permit one to compare the
treatment of offenders who share similar levels of aggravation and mitigation, which, when considered together, determine a defendant's
criminal culpability and blameworthiness. The failure of a statistical
analysis to use adjusted disparities introduces a significant risk of erroneous inferences about the influence of race in the system.
A well-known study of sexual discrimination in the graduate programs of a leading university illustrates this risk.55 A large, unadjusted
statistical "disparity" indicated that the university admitted women to
graduate school at a much lower rate than men. This disparity suggested the possibility of sexual discrimination. However, on closer examination, it became apparent that the great bulk of women applied
to departments with very low admission rates (e.g., English and history), while most of the men applied to departments with very high
admission rates (e.g., science and engineering). Thus, the "independent" variable-department of application-was strongly correlated
-

53

Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).

54 Again, aggravating circumstances refer to the particularly serious features of a case.
These circumstances can include evidence of extensive premeditation and planning or
torture. Mitigating circumstances, in contrast, refer to features of a case that help explain
or partially justify the defendant's behavior, even though they do not provide a defense.
These circumstances include things such as the youth, immaturity, or mental retardation
of the defendant. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text; Appendix A, section B.
55 See PeterJ. Bickel et al., Sex Bias in GraduateAdmissions: Datafrom Berkeley, in STATISTICS AND PUBUC Poucy 113 (William B. Fairley & Frederick Mosteller eds., 1977).
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with both the sex of the applicants and the probability of admission.
The failure to "control" for department of application fatally undercut
the validity of the unadjusted disparity as a basis for inferring the presence of systemic gender discrimination. Moreover, when the researchers did control for the department of application, the evidence
showed that, on average, the university was more likely to admit women to graduate school than men applying to the same department.
The moral of the story is that a failure to control for a legitimate case
characteristic introduces a risk of error in the analyses if, and only if,
the omitted variable has the following two properties: (1) it is correlated with the outcome of interest, and (2) it is correlated with either
the gender or race of the affected claimants. The graduate school
example met both of these conditions because the department of application was correlated with both the probability of admission and the
gender of the applicants.
Unadjusted gross racial disparities in death sentence rates are a
highly suspect basis for inferring racial discrimination in the treatment of similarly situated defendants, especially when one bases the
disparities on the entire nation. For example, some occasionally offer
evidence that blacks constitute thirteen percent of the national population, but forty-one percent of the nationwide death row population, 5 6 to prove systemic race-of-defendant discrimination. However,
this unadjusted disparity is highly misleading because it fails to control
for the disproportionately high percentage of blacks (about fifty-five
percent) among citizens arrested for homicide nationally. 5 7 As a result, the comparison fails to control for the differential rates at which
black and nonblack citizens commit death-eligible homicides.
Apologists for the current system make a similarly misleading argument when they assert that the system discriminates nationally
against nonblack defendants because blacks constitute fifty-five percent of homicide arrestees but only forty-one percent of the death-row
population. This argument fails to compare the treatment of similarly
situated black and white defendants in death-eligible cases. (In most
death sentencing states, only about ten to fifteen percent of defendants arrested for homicide have committed death-eligible crimes.)
Moreover, the comparison fails to control for the widely different
levels of criminal culpability among death-eligible defendants. Finally, the argument fails to account for race-of-victim discrimination.
Race-of-victim discrimination also reduces the overall rate of death
sentencing for black defendants because they commit the vast majority of black-victim murders. Only by comparing the differential treatment of black and nonblack defendants whose victims are of the same
56

57

See supra note 41.
See 1996 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 232 (1997).
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race, can one accurately test for race-of-defendant discrimination in
the system.58
Thus, unadjusted disparities are suggestive at best, and one
should use them with caution. Also, experience indicates that when
one adjusts the disparities in death-sentencing rates for legitimate case
characteristics, the unadjusted disparities often, but not always, decline. The most reliable evidence of discrimination, therefore, consists of racial disparities that are adjusted to reflect the different levels
of culpability of the cases in the different racial groups. But, here one
must beware of the "average overall culpability" fallacy, which can be
illustrated with two examples.
First, assume the evidence reveals that the death-sentencing rate
is higher for black defendants than for nonblack defendants. However, some allege that one can refute the suggested inference of discrimination with evidence that, overall, the black-defendant cases are
more aggravated than the nonblack-defendant cases. This difference
in average culpability for the two groups allegedly explains the unadjusted racial disparity in death-sentencing rates. Second, assume there
is evidence that the death-sentencing rate is greater in nonblack-victim cases than in black-victim cases. However, evidence shows that the
nonblack-victim cases are more aggravated than the black-victim cases,
which allegedly explains the unadjusted race-of-victim disparity.
Both of these arguments are flawed because no necessary correlation exists between the average culpability level for the different racial
groups of cases and the extent to which similarly situated defendants
in the different racial groups are treated similarly or differently. For
example, the average culpability level of the black- and nonblack-victim cases may be quite different, but that disparity sheds no light on
the question of whether the system treats similarly or differently blackand nonblack-victim cases with the same level of culpability. Nor does
evidence that black-defendant cases are on average more aggravated
than nonblack-defendant cases tell us anything about the extent to
which the system treats similarly or differently subgroups of black and
nonblack defendants with, for example, high or low levels of
culpability.
Evidence from Georgia clearly revealed that white-victim cases
were, on average, more aggravated than black-victim cases. 59 Nevertheless, when comparing similarly culpable cases, the defendants in
white-victim cases were more likely to receive a death sentence than
58 In the Pennsylvania study, the number of white-on-black death-eligible homicides is
currently too small to permit a similar comparison of black-on-black and white-on-black
homicides.
59
See DAVID C. BALDus ET AL., EQUALJusTiCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 154 tbl.32 &
322 tbl.53 (1990).
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the defendants in black-victim cases. The strongest race-of-victim effects were observed among the cases with average levels of defendant
60
culpability.
Good practice suggests, therefore, that the results of statistically
controlled studies which estimate racial disparities among cases with
similar levels of criminal culpability are the most reliable. Unfortunately, well-controlled studies are expensive and time consuming. As
a result, researchers have conducted relatively few. It is necessary,
therefore, in speculating about the American system as a whole, to
consider all of the available evidence, including unadjusted disparities
and anecdotal testimony provided by the principal participants in the
process-defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges. However, the
small number of systematic studies of any kind encourages skepticism
about sweeping claims concerning the level of racial discrimination,
especially in jurisdictions in which no one has conducted systematic
studies.
B.

An Overview of the Post-FurmanData

The best overview of the post-Furman evidence about race discrimination and the death penalty appeared in 1990. The General
Accounting Office ("GAO"), at the request of the United States Senate, published the results of a systematic review of the empirical stud61
ies conducted by a variety of investigators in the 1970s and 1980s.
The GAO initially considered conducting one or more empirical stud60

See id. at 163"fig.23, 164 fig.24, 321 fig.32 & 322 tbl.53.
See U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., DEATH PENALrY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATS PATTERN OF RACIAL DIsPARmES (1990) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING]. A comparison of pre- and post-Furmandata suggests improvement in the South. Detailed pre-Furman
data are limited. However, a study of southern capital-rape trials from 1945-65 showed
strong race-of-defendant and race-of-victim effects. Specifically, black defendants with
white victims were at much greater risk of receiving a death sentence than any other racial
category of cases. See Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race,JudicialDiscretion, and the
Death Penalty, ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCL, May 1973, at 119, 129-30; Marvin E.
Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Rape, Race, and the Death Penalty in Georgia,45 AM.J. OF ORTHOsYCHIATRY 658, 662 (1975). Those results were consistent with unadjusted data from 19301970 indicating that 89% of the 455 total defendants states executed for rape were black.
Most were executed in the South, which should come as no surprise given the historical
preoccupation in the South with the rape of white women by black men. SeeJOEL WILLAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE.116-17, 183-84 (1984).
The unadjusted data for murder, pre-Furman, indicate that 49% of the 3,334 defendants executed for murder during this same period were black. Indeed, data collected by
Watt Espy indicate that from the 1910s to the 1950s, approximately 60-70% of the people
executed for murder in the South were black. SeeVictoria Schneider &John Oritz Smykla,
A Summary Analysis of Execution in the United States, 1608-1987: The Espy File, in THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT RESEARCH 1, 12 tbl.1.5 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991). Also, a
well-controlled study of Georgia just prior to Furmanreveafed strong race-of-defendant and
race-of-victim effects among defendants convicted of murder. See BALDus ET AL., supra note
59, at 140-49. However, a detailed study of pre-FurmanCalifornia penalty trials in murder
cases showed no race effects of either kind during the 1960s. See id. at 241; David C. Baldus
61
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ies itself, but finally opted for "an evaluative synthesis," which consisted of a review and critique of existing research. 62 Toward that end,
the agency evaluated twenty-eight empirical studies. 63 It sought, in its
review, to assess the extent to which the existing literature supported
claims of (1) race-of-defendant discrimination and (2) race-of-victim
discrimination. On the issue of race-of-victim discrimination, the
agency reported that:
In 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were found
to be more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks. This finding was remarkably consistent across data
sets, states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques. The
finding held for high, medium, and low quality studies.
The race of victim influence was found at all stages of the criminal justice system process, although there were variations among
studies as to whether there was a race of victim influence at specific
stages. The evidence for the race of victim influence was stronger
for the earlier stages of the judicial process (e.g., prosecutorial decision to charge defendant with a capital offense, decision to proceed
to trial rather than plea bargain) than in later stages. This was because the earlier stages were comprised of larger samples allowing
for more rigorous analyses. However, decisions made at every stage
of the process necessarily affect an individual's likelihood of being
64
sentenced to death.
The largest of the studies the GAO reviewed was based on a stratified sample of 1066 cases drawn from a universe of 2484 cases
processed in the Georgia charging and sentencing system in the period 1973-80 ("the Baldus study"). These results, which were the basis
of the petitioner's claim of racial discrimination in McCleskey v.
et al., Identifying ComparativelyExcessive Sentences ofDeath:A QuantitativeApproach, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1980).
Available post-Furman data show possible improvement in the South. In contrast to
the nearly 70% black representation rate among persons executed pre-Furman,the postFurman data from the South reveal the proportion of blacks, both on death row and among
those actually executed, is at the national average of about 40%. See Schneider & Smylda,
supra, at 12 tbl.l.5. Although the pre-Furman data used in this comparison with postFurmandata are not well controlled, it is unlikely that chance could explain differences of
this magnitude (the proportion of blacks in the South has not declined sufficiently in the
post-Furman period to explain this difference). Also, when both race of the defendant and
of the victim were controlled pre- and post-Furman (the 1970s), the Baldus study showed a
marked decline in the evidence of race-of-defendant discrimination. However, the race-ofvictim effects were the same in both periods. See B.Asus ET AL., supranote 59, at 149-50 &
tbl.30.
62 DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, supra note 61, at 1-2.
63
See id. at 2.
64 Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
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Kemp,65 indicated that, after controlling for the presence or absence
of hundreds of legitimate case characteristics, 6 6 defendants with white
victims faced, on average, odds of receiving a death sentence that were
4.3 times higher than the odds of similarly situated defendants whose
victims were black. This study also demonstrated that in Fulton
County, where the jury sentenced McCleskey to death, significant
67
race-of-victim disparities existed.
On the issue of race-of-defendant discrimination, the GAO study
concluded:
The evidence for the influence of the race of defendant on
death penalty outcomes was equivocal. Although more than half of
the studies found that race of defendant influenced the likelihood
of being charged with a capital crime or receiving the death penalty,
the relationship between race of defendant and outcome varied
across studies. For example, sometimes the race of defendant interacted with another factor. In one study researchers found that in
rural areas black defendants were more likely to receive death
sentences, and in urban areas white defendants were more likely to
receive death sentences. In a few studies, analyses revealed that the
black defendant/white victim combination was the most likely to
receive the death penalty. However, the extent to which the finding
was influenced by race of victim rather than race of defendant was
unclear. 68
C.

Geographic Scope of the Post-FurmanRace Disparities

To document the geographic scope of race disparities in the
American death-sentencing system, we examined, on a state-by-state
basis, both (1) the literature published prior to the GAO report 69 and
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
See BALDUS ETrAL., supra note 59, at 319 tbl.52 (showing core model controls for 39
factors related to the defendant and to the circumstances of the offense).
67
See id. at 332-40 & tbls.59-63.
68
DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING, supra note 61, at 6 (footnote omitted).
69
See BALDuS ET AL., supra note 59; SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH &
DIscRiMINATIoN: RACIAL DIsPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBrrR,.RiNESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1987); David C. Baldus et al.,
Arbitrarinessand Discriminationin the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State
Supreme Courts,15 STETSON L. Rxv. 133 (1986) [hereinafter Baldus, Arbitrarinessand Discrimination];Arnold Barnett, Some DistributionPatternsfor the GeorgiaDeath Sentence, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1327 (1985); Leigh B. Bienen et al., The Reimposition of CapitalPunishment in New
Jersey: The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion,41 RUTGERS L. REv. 27 (1988); WilliamJ. Bowers &
Glenn L. Pierce, ArbitrarinessandDiscriminationUnderPost-Furman CapitalStatutes, 26 CRIME
& DELINQ. 563 (1980); Sheldon Ekland-Olson, StructuredDiscretion,RacialBias, and the Death
Penalty: The First Decade After Furman in Texas, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 853 (1988); Linda Foley,
FloridaAfter the Furman Decision: The Effect of Extra Legal Factors on the Processing of Capital
Offense Cases, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 457 (1987); Stephen P. Klein &John E. Rolph, Relationship
65
66

of Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty Sentences in California,32JURIMETRicsJ. 33 (1991);

Elizabeth Lynch Murphy, Application of the Death Penalty in Cook County, 73 ILL. B.J. 90
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(2) the evidence since the GAO report.v0 This survey, the results of
which we present in Appendix B, reveals that relevant data are not
available on charging and sentencing practices for all death-sentencing states. Nevertheless, for 78% (29/37) of the nation's death-sentencing states in which a death sentence has been imposed (no
sentences have been imposed in New Hampshire), we located some
relevant data for at least one period of time since 1973. In 90% (26/
29) of these states, we observed some evidence of race-of-victim disparities and in 55% (16/29) of the states, we observed some evidence of
race-of-defendant disparities (although not all of the disparities were
in the normally observed direction).
As the GAO survey points out, considerable differences exist in
the extent to which empirical studies of racial discrimination control
for legitimate case characteristics. Because reasonably well-controlled7 1 empirical studies are expensive and quite complex, such
studies have been conducted in only nine states (California, Colorado,
Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina).
Additionally, for each of these states, data are available from lesswell-controlled studies. In six states (Colorado, North Carolina, New
Jersey, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina), the racial disparities were stronger in the well-controlled studies than in the less-wellcontrolled studies. In three states (California, Georgia, and Mississippi), the race effects were weaker in the well-controlled studies than
in the less-well-controlled studies, but remained statistically signifi(1984); Raymond iPaternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death Penalty
in South Carolina:Experiences Over the FirstFew Years, 39 S.C. L. Ray. 245 (1988); Michael L.
Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and ProsecutorialDiscretionin Homicide Cases, 19 L. & Soc'
Ray. 587 (1985); M. Dwayne Smith, Patternsof Discriminationin Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case ofLouisiana, 15J. CRIM.Jusr. 279 (1987); Hans Zeisel, RaceBias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The FloridaExperience, 95 HARv. L. REV. 456 (1981); Richard Berk
& Joseph Lowery, Factors Affecting Death Penalty Decisions in Mississippi (June 1985)
(unpublished manuscript described in BALDus Er Ai., supra note 59, at 258-60); Stephen P.
Klein et al., Racial Equity in Prosecutor Requests for the Death Penalty (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Margaret Fae Klemm, The Determinants of Capital
Sentencing in Louisiana, 1979-1984 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
New Orleans) (on file with the University of Iowa Law Library).
70 See State v. Cobb, 663 A-2d 948 (Conn. 1995); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J.
1992); Conference, The Death Penalty in the Twenty-First Century, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 341
(1995) (remarks of Harriet C. Ganson, Assistant Director of Tax Policy and Administration, U.S. General Accounting Office); Scott Anderson, As Fiesto Wanton Boys: Death Eligible
Defendants in Georgia and Colorado, 40 TRAL TALK 9-16 (1991); ThomasJ. Keil & Gennardo
F. Vito, Race and the DeathPenalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: 1976-91, 20 AM. J. CmiM. J. 17
(1995); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the
Death Penalty in Florida,43 FLA. L. Ray. 1 (1991); Ted Rohrlich & Fredric N. Tulsky, Not All
L.A. Murder Cases Are Equal, L.A. TimEs, Dec. 3, 1996, at Al.
71 We define a "reasonably well-controlled" study as one having statistical controls for
ten or more legitimate nonracial case characteristics.
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cant. 72 These results indicate that, while well-controlled studies are a
more reliable basis for measuring race effects in a given jurisdiction,
the results from less-well-controlled studies also can be relevant and
instructive.
III
RECENT FINDINGS FROM PHILADELPHIA

In this section, we present recent findings from our research in
the city and county of Philadelphia, where we initially have concentrated our analysis of the Pennsylvania system as a whole. We compare
and contrast these findings with results from earlier research in other
jurisdictions. We focus first on the pattern of systemic disparities in
the outcomes of both prosecutorial and jury decision making that correlate with the race and socioeconomic status ("SES") of the defendant and of the victim. We then evaluate the most probable causes
and explanations for the documented racial disparities in Philadelphia and elsewhere. Finally, we estimate the practical impact and consequences of systemic racial disparities in Philadelphia and
73
elsewhere.
A.

Background

Our Philadelphia research builds on the accumulated body of research a wide variety of researchers have conducted in the postFurmanperiod. However, the study of the New Jersey capital punishment system, sponsored by the NewJersey Supreme Court since 1989,
has been the most important influence on our methodology. 74
The New Jersey project has four important strengths. First, the
quality of the available data was very high. The researchers had access
72 The reference to the less well-controlled studies is to Baldus et al., supra note 69,
and GRoss & MAURO, supra note 69. The reference to the well-controlled studies are to
State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059 (NJ. 1992) (New Jersey); BALDUs ET AL., supra note 59
(Georgia); NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 69 (North Carolina); Anderson, supra note 70
(Colorado); Berk & Lowery, supra note 69 (Mississippi); Bienen et al., supra note 69 (New
Jersey); Paternoster & Kazyaka supra note 69 (South Carolina); Keil & Vito, supra note 70
(Kentucky); Klein & Rolph, supra note 69 (California); Table 4 (Pennsylvania).
73 In a later phase of this research, we will focus on the risk that the race or SES of the
victim or of the defendant influenced decision making in individual cases. In this Article,
however, our focus is on the evidence of systemic race and SES effects.
74 Professor Baldus served as Special Master for the New Jersey court in the conduct
of that study. See Marshall 613 A.2d at 1063 (noting the court's order appointing Professor
Baldus as the Special Master). Professor Woodworth was the principal statistical consultant
for the study. The Criminal Practice Division of the Administrative Office of the New
Jersey Courts, ("AOC") under the direction ofJohn McCarthy, Jr., Director of the Division,
was principally responsible for collecting the data and for developing the database. The
AOC continues to update and develop the database, with the assistance of Dr. David Wiesburd, an experienced researcher and consultant, who has worked on the project since
1992.
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to all relevant public documents concerning death-eligible cases, including Pre-Sentencing Reports ("PSIs"), which normally are not
available to academic researchers.
The second distinguishing feature of the NewJersey project is the
opportunity that the NewJersey court provided both the prosecutorial
and criminal defense communities to critique the database and methodology as the project evolved. As a result, the researchers tailored
the data collection instrument ("DCI") to the New Jersey system in
response to the suggestions of the parties. The resulting database includes variables for virtually every measurable feature of the cases on
which data were available.
The third strength of the NewJersey project is the close scrutiny
to which the data and methodology have been subjected as death-sentenced defendants have claimed excessiveness and discrimination in
their cases. In addition to the periodic reports of the Criminal Practice Division of the Administrative Office of the New Jersey Courts'
own consultant, both the state and the Public Defender have had access to a regularly updated, machine-readable database and to a file of
detailed narrative summaries for all of the cases. This resource has
enabled the experts for each side to develop extensive analyses on a
continuing basis.
The fourth strength of the project is the care with which the New
Jersey Supreme Court has scrutinized the methodology, data, and results. At one point in 1996, the court, on its own motion, appointed a
special master to undertake a supplementary research project that the
court thought would address some of the concerns about the limits of
logistic regression analysis that the state's experts had raised.75 In
short, no other empirical study of the death penalty's administration
has received such close and sophisticated scrutiny.
For all these reasons, we modeled our Philadelphia research on
the New Jersey project. We also hoped to develop additional approaches to alleviate some of the methodological concerns raised by
76
the New Jersey court concerning the New Jersey research.
75

See Rocco Cammarere, Court FacesBias in Death Penalty, NJ. LAw.,Jan. 20, 1997, at 1

(reporting that in October 1996, the court asked Judge Richard Cohen to "review the
reliability of the evidence that points to racial discrimination by jurors").
76 The New Jersey court has approached the evidence of disparate treatment with
caution for two principal reasons. First, the sample size of death sentences is small, under
50 imposed over the 16 years since the state reinstated the death penalty in 1982. Second,
the researchers have relied almost exclusively on logistic multiple regression analysis involving large numbers of independent variables to control for case culpability.
The latter approach has two drawbacks. First, regression analysis is difficult for both
lawyers and judges without special training to understand, creating an understandable reluctance to rely on its results on such an important issue. Second, statistical experts the
state and the public defenders hired cannot agree on technical issues that may affect the
validity of the inferences the data suggest.
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From a substantive perspective, the New Jersey project is important because it examined death-sentencing decisions in a northern
state during the 1980s and 1990s. Most of the earlier research focused
77
on its administration in the South during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Like the research from the South, the NewJersey results showed raceof-victim effects in prosecutorial decision making. However, the effects are less pronounced than those estimated in the South. 78 In contrast to the early southern research, which revealed only modest
evidence of race-of-defendant discrimination against black defendants, the NewJersey evidence revealed substantial disparate treatment
of black defendants by penalty-trial juries.7 9 First-hand observers of
southern courts have always been surprised that the statistical analyses
of southern jury decisions in this earlier period did not reveal strong,
black-defendant race effects. However, it may be that race effects were

77 See Appendix B.
78 In the latest New Jersey multivariate analyses, which control for all statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus a number of nonstatutory aggravators and mitigators, a logistic regression analysis estimates a white-victim coefficient of .77, with an odds
multiplier of 2.2, significant at the .02 level. (The coefficient for the race of the defendant
was not significant.) These effects are primarily concentrated among the midrange and
least aggravated cases. See Technical Appendix to Defendants' Joint Systemic Brief-Volume I at 69a, 72a, State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301 (N.J. 1997) (No. 40,693). In contrast, in
the Georgia research presented in McCleskey, a comparable, although somewhat less well
controlled, analysis of prosecutorial decision making produced a race-of-victim coefficient
of 1.22, with an odds multiplier of 3.4, significant at the .0001 level. (The race-of-defendant effects were not statistically significant.) See BALDus Ex AL., supra note 59, at 356 n.
tbl.6.
79 The latest NewJersey statewide results from well-controlled logistic regression analyses report a race-of-defendant coefficient of 1.8, with an odds multiplier of 6.0, significant
at the .02 level. These effects are heavily concentrated in the midrange, for which the
average disparity is 30 percentage points (adjusted rates of .52 for black defendants versus
.22 for nonblack defendants). Although the sample size is small among these cases (i.e.
only 33 black-defendant cases and 35 nonblack-defendant cases), the disparity is statistically significant at the .006 level. See Technical Appendix, supra note 78, at 11a, 14a. In
contrast, the Georgia results presented in McCleskey, showed no statistically significant statewide race-of-defendant effects injury decision making. See BAtuus ET AL., supra note 59, at
357 n. tbl.7.
The multiple regression results from the New Jersey research, which the staff of the
New Jersey Supreme Court updates on an on-going basis, see supra note 74, are currently
before the New Jersey court in connection with claims challenging the constitutionality of
the New Jersey death-sentencing system as well as the legality of death sentences imposed
in individual cases. While these cases have been pending, the state's experts have questioned the validity of the methodology that the staff of the NewJersey court relies on. In
addition, the 1997 findings of a new special master, retired judge Richard Cohen, drew
into question the findings based on the regression based research methodology used by
the court's staff. See Kathy Barrett Carter, Study Finds No RacialBias in Death Penalty, STARLEDGER (NewJersey),Jan. 29, 1997, at 13 (noting thatJudge Cohen reported no racial bias
in the New Jersey system). The New Jersey court has not yet ruled on these methodological
claims.
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there, but were obscured because of the less-detailed data that were
available in those early studies.8 0
80

Another important distinction between the earlier southern research and the re-

sults of the NewJersey project is the shift in contrast between black-on-white (defendants
and victims) to a comparison of black versus nonblack (defendants and victims), when
nonblack includes whites, Hispanics, and Asians. Typical southern communities in the
1970s and 1980s were almost exclusively black and white. However, the New Jersey research suggests that in one state at least, the critical distinction for sentencing juries is not
between blacks and whites, or between whites and minorities (racial or ethnic), but rather
between blacks and all others.
Researchers have conducted four other studies outside the South in the 1980s and
1990s. The first, by Keil & Vito, supra note 70, focused on race effects among all Kentucky
death-eligible cases during the period 1976-91 (n = 577). The core analyses were logistic
regressions that controlled for six legitimate case characteristics related to the defendant
and the circumstances of the offense. The analysis of prosecutorial decisions to seek a
death sentence reported an odds multiplier of 1.26 when the case involved a black defendant and white victim (p = .05). The overall analysis, which reflects the combined effects of
both prosecutorial decisions to seek and jury sentencing decisions to impose death
sentences in 158 penalty trials, estimated a 1.41 odds multiplier for black-defendant/whitevictim cases, significant at the .05 level. See Keil & Vito, supra note 70, at 24-27.
The Attorney General of California commissioned the second study as part of the
defense of a race-based claim presented before the Supreme Court decided McCleskey. It
focuses on 874 death-eligible cases prosecuted for murder and tried in Los Angeles County
between August 1977 and January 1986. See Klein et al., supranote 69, at 6. The object of
the study is to evaluate prosecutorial decisions to seek a death sentence or a sentence of
life without possibility of parole (death was sought in 41% of the cases). See id. at 14 tbl.2.
The unadjusted data reveal a 9 point disparity in the rates at which death is sought in
white-versus nonwhite-victim cases (.39- .30). See id. at 14 tbl.3. A similar analysis shows
no race-of-defendant effects. See id. at 14 tbl.4.
The authors report partial results from a logistic regression analysis that controls for
six legitimate factors related to the circumstances of the crime and the victim that were
screened in a stepwise regression from a list of 35 such variables. See id. at 15 tbl.5. The
table reports no regression coefficients but does indicate the level of statistical significance
of the six variables. The variable for the race of the defendant did not enter the analysis,
but the variable for the race of the victim did enter at the .01 level of significance. See id. at
16 tbl.6.
Because of the minimal controls for legitimate case characteristics and the weak fit of
the reported regression results (R = 12.7), the results of this analysis are merely suggestive.
They hardly support the conclusion of the authors that "the available data suggest prosecutor requests for the death penalty in Los Angeles County were not influenced by racial
considerations." Id. at 12. For a similarly skeptical observation about this conclusion by
one of the GAO researchers who prepared the GAO report noted above, see Conference,
supra note 70 (remarks of Ganson). The data also contain no basis for assessing
prosecutorial decisions in death-eligible cases that were not tried because they terminated
in a negotiated plea bargain.
The California Attorney General also commissioned the third study, Klein & Rolph,
supra note 69, which focuses on 496 California jury penalty trials conducted between 1977
and sometime before 1984. See id. at 37. Juries returned death verdicts in 29% of these
cases. See id app. a at 46. Because the study is limited to penalty trials, the authors make
clear that their findings cannot be generalized to prosecutorial decision'making. See id. at
34 ("This study addresses possible racial bias only in the [death-sentencing] step and does
not speak to possible racial biases at earlier stages.").
The unadjusted data show no race-of-defendant effects, but they reveal a 10 percentage point race-of-victim disparity (.33 - .23) in the rates at which a death penalty is imposed, significant at the .024 level (by our calculations). See id. at 38 tbl.1.
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The authors do not present regression results, relying instead on (1) two different
clusters of cases defined as similar because they share similar death-sentencing rates and
(2) a multivariable case classification system known as Classification and Regressions Trees
("CART"). The results of the cluster analysis show race-of-victim effects in one subgroup of
cases that are not trivial (a 13 percentage point difference in death-sentencing rates), but
the disparity is not significant because of small sample sizes (only 15 nonwhite-victim
cases). See id. at 43 tbl.3. The CART analysis, which controls simultaneously for 15 variables related to the defendant, the victim, and the circumstances of the offense, measures
the impact of race in terms of the extent to which the inclusion of the race variables in the
analysis increases the accuracy of the model in predicting correct sentencing outcomes.
The race of the defendant had no effect and the inclusion of the race of victim increases
the number of correctly predicted death sentences by only 10% and the number of correct
predictions overall by only 1%. See id. at 43 ("The full unpruned tree achieved a 91%
accuracy rate with victim race included and a 90% rate without it."). On the basis of this
evidence, the authors conclude that penalty-trial outcomes in California are "not systematically related to victim or defendant race." Id. at 44.
It is regrettable that the authors did not use logistic regression, which would have
provided a basis for comparing their results with the results reported in the broader literature. This concern is particularly true because there is a fMllacy in using the increase in
correct predictions as a measure of the impact of adding a factor such as race as a predictor. The reason is that the CART measure of the impact of race based on the extent to
which race improves predictions has the potential to mask significant race effects that are
detectable in a multiple regression analysis. Specifically, under the CART analysis, cases
falling in a category for which the death rate is less than .50 are predicted to be life cases
and cases falling in a category for which the death rate is greater than .50 are predicted to
be death cases. Adding, say, race of defendant as a predictor to a classification system
based on nonracial factors involves splitting each (nonracial) category into subcategories
with black and nonblack defendants. This split will increase the number of correct predictions only if a category (e.g., murder-rapes) splits into one racial subcategory (viz., murderrapes with nonblack defendants) with an under .50 death-sentencing rate and the second
racial subcategory (viz., murder-rapes with black defendants) has a death-sentencing rate
of more than .50. In other words, for the split, which occurs as a result of adding race to
the model, to improve predictive power the death-sentencing rates for the two racial subgroups must straddle .50. Thus, there can be a substantial increase of the risk of death (say
from .05 to .15 or from .80 to .95) for black defendants compared to nonblack defendants
in a particular category, without any improvement in the prediction rate; in other words, as
a metric, change in the correct prediction rate ignores increased risk of death associated
with race, unless one race has a death-sentencing rate under .50 and the other has a deathsentencing rate over .50 in one or more (nonracial) categories. In Klein and Rolph's analysis, this scenario apparently happened in five of the over 140 death-sentenced casds in the
analysis, but any other race effects that did not meet this test were ignored. See id. at 43
("Including victim race therefore generated five more correct classifications.").
The fourth article, Rohrlich & Tulsky, supra note 70, focuses on more than 9000 intentional homicides processed through the Los Angeles criminal justice system from 1990
through 1994. The analysis starts deep in the system, with a potential to test the discrimination hypothesis at each stage of the process. The weakness of the study is that it has no
controls for the death eligibility of the cases or through relative criminal culpability, and it
is likely that only a small fraction of the cases included in the study are actually death
eligible. See id.
The results show no race-of-defendant effects, but there is a strong suggestion that
white-victim cases and other cases involving middle or upper socioeconomic victims are
pursued more aggressively, including first-degree murder charges and requests for the
death penalty. See id. ("In raw numbers, charges were filed about 10% more often when
whites were the victims than when blacks or Latinos were."). There is also compelling
evidence that media publicity, which correlates with the race and socioeconomic status of
the victim, is a big influence in the system. See id. ("[C]ases were more likely to receive
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B. A Methodological Overview of the Philadelphia Research
Like the New Jersey research, the Philadelphia project embraces
all death-eligible defendants, regardless of how the prosecutor
charged them and whether or not their cases advanced to a penalty
trial. Second, the DCI is a modified version of the NewJersey instrument, containing two additions. First, it includes considerably more
detail on jury decision making, which allows us to model the following
three distinctjury decision points: (1) the finding of statutory aggravation, (2) the finding of statutory mitigation, and (3) the weighing of
statutory aggravation and mitigation.
The Philadelphia DCI includes quantifiable measures of the
strength of evidence for each of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 8 ' These measures allow us to explore the possibility that the jury's "factfinding" concerning the presence or absence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances reflects deathworthiness
judgments and/or race effects. These measures also enable us to
model prosecutorial pretrial decisions and jury penalty-trial decisions
based on findings that aggravating and mitigating circumstances are
not present in the case (findings that determine a life or death sentence in a large proportion of the cases).
Like the NewJersey project, our research utilizes multiple logistic
regression to measure defendant culpability and estimate race effects.
It also employs three supplemental measures of defendant culpability
that are more intuitively understandable. The first is a count of the
number of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances found
in each case.8 2 The second is a "salient factors" measure, which classifies cases qualitatively in terms of the principal aggravating factors
either found or present in the case as well as other relevant statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.8 3 The third is a "murder
severity index." This index is based on the results of a "murder sever-

tougher treatment in the court system if there was [media] coverage."). However, it is not
possible to estimate race-of-victim effects with precision because of the absence of controls
for defendant culpability. Nevertheless, the analysis continues in the hands of Professor
Richard Berk, an experienced sociologist who did the statistical work for the Rohrlich &
Tulsky article. See id. (noting that Professor Berk "analyzed the data").
81 In each case to date, we evaluated the strength of this evidence. We classified the
evidence supporting the aggravating factors on a four-point scale, while we classified the
evidence supporting the mitigating circumstances on a three-point scale. The code for this
classification system appears in Appendix C, notes 234-35.
82 This measure builds upon a similar measure researchers used in the New Jersey
project.
83 The NewJersey project employs a similar measure based on the special features of
NewJersey's death penalty legislation.
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ity" study, in which respondents qualitatively ranked by order of severity a sample of small groups of cases in the study, 4
Each of these supplemental measures of defendant culpability is
based on a different, but legally relevant, foundation. A comparison
of the race disparities estimated with each supplemental measure provides an additional basis for estimating the scope and magnitude of
racial disparities in the system. The measures also provide a basis for
validating the race effects estimated with the regression-based
methods.
Finally, the Philadelphia research goes beyond the New Jersey
project by focusing on the racial composition of the penalty-trial juries. This additional variable allows us to estimate the extent to which
the racial composition of the juries affects (1) the probability thatjuries will impose death sentences and (2) the level of disparate treatment in the juries' decisions based on the defendant's or victim's
85
race.
1.

Sampling and Case Screening Plan

We identified the potential universe of Philadelphia death-eligible cases through two master case lists. The first is a list of Pennsylvania first-degree murder cases the Administrative Office of the
Pennsylvania Courts ("AOPC") maintains for the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.8 6 The second is a master list of murder convictions
that the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County maintains.
Our first step was to identify all of the cases that advanced to a
penalty trial, all of which we designated as death eligible. This pool

84 The study calls for each respondent to rank 15 cases described on cards in which
we had purged the racial characteristics. In this Article, we report the results of our first
pilot study in which law students, from Iowa and Temple law schools conducted the rankings. In a later publication, we will report the results of ratings conducted by a sample of
death-qualified venire persons in the penalty-trial cases used in the 1983-93 Philadelphia
research. The murder severity study builds upon the research that New Jersey Special

Master Richard Cohen undertook, which called on NewJersey trial judges to rank a series
of death-eligible cases in terms of their perception of the degree of defendant culpability.
85 However, the results of this aspect of our research are not sufficiently developed to
report at this time. The Philadelphia research also focuses on the exercise of peremptory
challenges by prosecutors and defense counsel in the penalty-trial cases. This inquiry enables us to estimate (1) the extent to which the racial characteristics of the cases influence
the parties' use of peremptories and (2) the impact that the Commonwealth's and the
defense attorneys' use of peremptories has on the racial composition of the juries. We will
report the results of this analysis in later publications.
The court uses these cases in the conduct of comparative proportionality reviews of
86
death sentences.
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included 425 cases, 90% (384/425)87 of which were sentenced by a
88
jury.
We classified the non-penalty-trial cases and the cases in which it
was unknown whether the court had held a penalty trial into three
time periods as follows: 1983-85, 1986-89, and 1990-93. We then developed a file of information on each of these cases that would enable us
to determine which ones advanced to a penalty trial. For the nonpenalty-trial cases, we determined whether they were death eligible
under Pennsylvania law (i.e., whether the elements of first-degree
murder were present and whether one or more statutory aggravating
circumstances was present in the case). This data collection effort produced files on 992 cases.
With this information, we developed a sampling plan that aimed
to include all of the death-sentenced cases,8 9 eighty percent of the lifesentenced penalty-trial cases, and sixty percent of the non-penalty-trial
cases. Except for the death-sentenced cases, the sampling ratios were
slightly higher in the more recent years. On the basis of this information, we developed random sets of case lists for each of the three time
periods, distinguishing between the three categories of cases.
We selected life-sentencing penalty trials by creating a randomly
ordered case list. We checked to see if sufficient available data on a
case existed. If so, we coded it. Otherwise, we passed it over and examined the next case. We repeated this procedure until we met, for
each time period, the quota of life-sentenced penalty-trial cases.

87 The number 384 comes from Box 3A in Figure 1, and the number 425 comes from
Box 2A, also in Figure 1.
88 Of the 41 cases sentenced by ajudge, 10% (4/41) received a death sentence. See
Figure 1, note a. These defendants waived their right to ajury before the guilt trial. The
principal focus of this research is on prosecutorial decisions to seek and jury decisions to
impose death sentences. See infra note 128 for data on racial effects in bench-trial
sentencing.
89 The total number of jury death-sentenced cases was 114. This figure includes 4
cases that were excluded from our analysis because the defendant "volunteered" for a
death sentence by failing to present mitigating evidence. See Table 1, note f for detail on
volunteers.
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For the non-penalty-trial cases, the selection of a case triggered a
screening decision on its death eligibility. However, if we had insufficient data to make that assessment, 90 we moved to the next case. 9'
As a result of this screening process we brought into the study
100% (118/118) of the death-sentenced cases, 86% (230/270) of the
life-sentenced penalty-trial cases, and 62.1% (176/284) of the nonpenalty-trial cases.
2.

Data Sources

A major challenge in this type of research is obtaining reliable
data on the cases. The amount of data available generally depends on
the level of judicial procedure that the courts devote to the defendant's case.
For all penalty-trial cases, a crucial document is the jury verdict
sheet. These sheets were available in the court records of the case or
in the files of the AOPC for a substantial number of cases. Also, the
AOPC's computerized database, which is based on reports that trial
courts file, was helpful in filling gaps. However, in twelve percent of
unanimously decided penalty-trial cases, we lack some detail on the
precise statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances that the
92
system charged or found.
For death-sentenced cases, the most important data sources were
the appellate record (especially the notes of testimony at the penalty
trial), the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the briefs
of the Commonwealth and the defendant. For the life-sentenced pen90 We deemed a non-penalty-trial case death eligible only if the evidence of guilt for
capital murder and the presence of a statutory aggravating circumstance was "strong," with
"the elements clearly made out and no issue as to reliability of evidence." Even if these
conditions were met, the case entered the study only if the defendant was convicted of firstdegree murder at trial, with the death penalty waived by the Commonwealth, or the defendant entered a guilty plea with the death penalty waived by the Commonwealth. In short,
we deemed a non-penalty-trial case death eligible for the purposes of this research only if
the defendant avoided the risk of a death sentence solely because of a prosecutorial
decision.
Our screen of guilty plea cases included all first-degree murder and second-degree
murder cases, both of which carry a mandatory life sentence, and third-degree murder
cases that received the highest possible punishment of 10 to 20 years.
91 This screening process provided the basis for our ultimate estimate of the number
of death-eligible, non-penalty-trial cases there were processed during the period of our
study, even though we did not examine the facts of each case. For example, if we screened
100 cases, on which data were available (which was also randomly determined) and found
that 25% were death eligible, we used that determination to estimate the proportion of the
cases on each list, that we did not review, that were death eligible.
92
The source of the problem is incomplete court files and gaps in the AOPC's data
base, particularly the failure of the reports the trial courts file to indicate whether mitigating factors that were charged were actually found by the jury. Also, 62 penalty-trial cases
resulted in a hung verdict. In Appendix C, we describe in detail the missing data issue and
our treatment of hung juries.
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alty-trial cases, the best sources of information were the penalty-trial
notes of testimony and the trial court's opinion on post-trial
motions. 93

For guilty-plea cases, the data sources included indictments, notes
of testimony at sentencing, and affidavits of probable cause, which
may include witness accounts and confessions. 94 Moreover, newspaper accounts, obtained on-line, were often helpful.
For the first-degree murder cases, the AOPC database generally
contained information on the race of both the defendant and victim.
The death certificates the Commonwealth maintains usually include
information on both the race and occupation of the victim. When
feasible, we examined and copied all of this information.
3.

Data Coding and Entry

The case files described above provided the basis for the dataentry process teams of four to six law students undertook during the
summers of 1995 and 1996. We trained the students and supervised
them on a daily basis.
The DCI is a modification of the NewJersey instrument, with the
addition of "strength of evidence" measures for each statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstance. 95 It contains over 500 entries for
each case and takes an experienced student coder an average of two
to four hours to complete. Each student completed a detailed narrative summary and a five to eight line "thumbnail sketch" for each
case. 96 Also, a law trained staff member verified the procedural coding for each statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstance and its
strength of evidence measure. The Defender Association of Philadelphia handled all data entry for both the DCI and the narrative
summaries.
93 The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require the trial court to write an
opinion explaining the bases of its ruling on all matters raised on appeal. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42 § 1925 (1990). Even though most murder defendants who are convicted and
sentenced to life challenge their guilt-trial conviction on appeal, the opinions and briefs
filed in these cases generally give only scant attention to the penalty trial as any error at
that stage in the proceedings would be moot.
94 One potentially valuable source of information on pled cases is the pre-sentencing
report filed by a county probation officer. It usually contains police reports and the defendant's statement of the case. In many cases, however, the judge waived the pre-sentence
report because the law pre-ordains the sentence. Also, the availability of the reports was
limited by the Philadelphia administrative judge's decision denying us access to them even
upon assurances of confidentiality.
95 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
96 These narrative descriptions are an invaluable resource for cleaning (detecting and
correcting errors in) the machine-readable database created from the data entered in the
DCI.
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4. Measures of Defendant Culpability
As noted above, one's confidence in the inferences a study of this
type suggests depends on the validity of the measures of defendant
culpability that define categories of similarly situated defendants. For
that reason, we developed four measures that allow for comparisons of
the estimated race effects. Some refer to this procedure as
"triangulation."
a. Regression-Based Measures
Logistic multiple regression measures allow estimation of the impact of legitimate, illegitimate, and suspect case characteristics on
both capital charging and capital sentencing decisions. In this research, we developed a series of logistic regression analyses that focus
on outcomes that are the product of more than one prosecutorial or
jury decision ("input-output" models). For example, one model estimates race effects in all cases in which the jury imposed a death sentence in death-eligible cases. The race disparities estimated in this
analysis reflect the impact of the entire series of decisions taken by
both prosecutors and juries.
We also developed a series of "decision-point" 97 regression models that focus on the successive stages at which prosecutors and jurors
advance the cases through the system. For example, did the prosecutor waive the death penalty pretrial (either as part of a plea bargain or
unilaterally)? Did the jury weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances that it earlier found to be present in the case?
In each of these models, we first examined the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances (Model 1). We then conducted systematic screening procedures to determine what other legitimate
aggravating and mitigating case characteristics included in the DCI
improved the predictive power of the analyses (Model 2).98 We then
added variables for the race and SES of both the defendant and victim
(Model 2RS). The regression coefficients estimated for the race and
SES variables (after controlling for all of the other variables included
in the analysis) provided the first measure of their average impact on
outcomes. For example, the estimated "odds multiplier" for the race
of the defendant indicated that, on average, a defendant's odds of
97 In the parlance of statistics these are referred to as "continuation" models.
98 We screened hundreds of variables drawn from the DCI for possible inclusion in
the models. In such a procedure, there is a risk that some variables will enter the models at
statistically significant levels, by chance, even though they do not impact the decisions. To
reduce this risk, we excluded variables that entered with a sign that was not in the expected
direction (e.g., a nonstatutory aggravator that entered the model with a negative sign, suggesting that it had a mitigating effect).
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receiving a death sentence in a penalty trial are enhanced by a factor
of 9.3 if he is black. 99
One may depict the results of the logistic-regression analysis with
a plot that estimates death-sentencing rates for defendants from different racial subgroups of cases with varying levels of criminal culpability. The results provide a useful insight into the magnitude of and
relationship between multiple race effects, and how the magnitude of
the effects interacts with the defendant's level of culpability. 10 0
Finally, one may depict the results of the regression with scales
that indicate, for example, the magnitude of the race-of-victim effects
observed among six to eight subgroups of cases with ascending levels
of culpability (estimated without regard to the race or SES of the defendant or of the victim). The results will also indicate the overall
average difference in death-sentencing rates (e.g., eight percentage
points) between two subgroups (such as black and nonblack defendants) after controlling for the defendant culpability that we estimated
in the regression analysis. This approach will also indicate the ratio
between the death sentencing rates for the two groups of cases after
adjustment for the levels of defendant culpability. 1 1 An advantage of
this measure is that it is both easier to interpret than the "odds multi10 2
plier" referred to above.
b.

The Number of Statutory Aggravating and Mitigating
CircumstancesFound by Juries in the Cases

Our first supplemental measure of defendant culpability, drawn
in part from the proportionality decisions of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in the 1980s,10 3 is the number of statutory aggravating
99 For a presentation of the model on which this estimate is based, see Table El of
Appendix E. The other principal models we used in this research appear in Tables 5 and 6
and in Table E2 of Appendix E.
100 Plots of the four principal models used in the research are presented in Figures 2 &
3 and F1 & F2 (Appendix F).
101 The method we used to produce comparable, standardized rates for different subgroups (e.g., black- and nonblack-victim cases) is called direct adjustment and the resulting
rates are said to be directly standardized. See YvoNNE M.M. BISHOP ET AL., DiscRETE MULTIVARIATE ANALYss, § 4.3.1, at 131-32 (1975). We report these standardized rates in the

applicable tables as "Adjusted rates." See, e.g., Table 7, the last line.
102 The scales for the four principal regression models in this research are presented
in Tables 7 & 8 and Tables Gi & G2 (Appendix G).
103 As used by the Pennsylvania court, this measure defines similar cases as those in
which the sentencing jury found the same aggravator or the same combination of aggravators. See Commonwealth v. Pirela, 507 A.2d 23, 32 (Pa. 1986) ("Our review of cases
wherein the aggravating circumstance set forth in § 9711(d) (10) and mitigating circumstance in § 9711(d) (4) were present discloses that the death penalty has been imposed in
six of eight cases."); Commonwealth v. Morales, 494 A.2d 367, 379 (Pa. 1985) ("Our review
of cases wherein the aggravating circumstance set forth in subsection (d) (10) was
presented discloses that the death penalty has been imposed in seven of seven cases.").
The New Jersey court in State v. Marshal 613 A.2d 1059 (NJ. 1992), expanded the mea-
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and mitigating circumstances found by the penalty trial jury in each
case. 10 4 As noted above, the NewJersey Supreme Court uses this scale
as a supplemental measure in its comparative proportionality reviews
of death sentences. Once one classifies the Cases using this measure,
it is possible to estimate a race effect within each subgroup of cases, as
well as an average overall effect that controls for the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances found in the cases. This classification system is easily understood, is firmly grounded in the
substantive law, and rests on none of the technical assumptions of
multiple regression analyses that have attracted criticism.
c.

The Salient FactorsMeasure

Another supplemental measure of culpability state courts commonly use in their proportionality reviews of death-sentenced defendants is the "salient factors" measure. This straightforward measure
classifies the cases in terms of their most prominent statutory aggravating circumstance(s) and other relevant aggravators and mitigators.' 0 5
Unfortunately, most courts use the measure in an ad hoc manner,
giving little insight into the operation of the system as a whole. 10 6 This
measure also enables courts and researchers to estimate race effects
within subgroups of cases and overall.
d.

The Murder Severity Index

Building upon the New Jersey Supreme Court's recent effort to
conduct a qualitative evaluation of offender culpability, 0 7 we have
designed a comparable study that calls on respondents to rank, in
terms of defendant culpability, groups of fifteen Philadelphia deatheligible cases. The respondents base their judgments on narrative descriptions of the cases from which we have redacted all references to
the race and SES of each defendant and victim. We ranked a total of
sure to embrace a count of both the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances
found by the jury.
104 Table 9 shows the results based on this measure.
105
See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1077-78 (N.J. 1992) (describing the salientfactors measure). Table 10 presents the results based on this measure.
106 The New Jersey court is an exception.
107
As noted above, the NewJersey Supreme Court recently conducted, through a special master, a qualitative study of New Jersey death-eligible cases. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text. Specifically, the special master called on a group of New Jersey trial
judges to rank a series of cases in terms of defendant culpability. The special master then
used these rankings to produce an alternative measure of defendant culpability. The New
Jersey Court appears to have conducted this study partly because it was concerned about
the continuing "battle of experts" concerning the validity of logistic regression analysis as a
measure of defendant culpability.
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184 cases in this study. In this Article, we report the results of a pilot
study in which law students ranked the cases.' 0 8
C.

The Results
1.

Unadjusted Race and Socioeconomic Effects

In this section, we present evidence of unadjusted disparities,
which rest on the assumption that all of the defendants are of equal
culpability and therefore would be equally likely to receive death
sentences and that the system is evenhanded with respect to the race
and SES of both the defendant and victim. 10 9 In such a system, therefore, one would expect to see the same proportion of black defendants at each stage in the process. One also would expect this result in
cases with nonblack victims and with victims having a low SES.
The data in Table 1 provide a basis for testing this hypothesis. 110
The data indicate the proportion of cases with different characteristics
108

Tables 11 and 12 and Tables HI and H2 (Appendix H) present these results. Later

stages of this research involve rankings by capital defense attorneys and a sample of the
death-qualified venire persons and jurors in the penalty-trial cases included in the Philadelphia research.
109 The universe consists of 78% black defendants (a small fraction of whom are Hispanic), 21% white defendants (47% of whom are Hispanic), and 1% Asian defendants.
110 When reading the Tables and Figures in this Article, the reader should be aware
that case counts (n's) for the same groups of cases in different tables and figures may vary
(usually plus or minus one case but up to a four case variation in Appendix H, Table H2)
because of rounding among constituent subgroups of cases. Rounding is required because
the sample does not include all life sentenced cases and the reported counts for those
cases include fractions of cases. Also, case counts may vary depending on whether the
analysis includes or excludes hung cases (n = 62). See Appendix C for a discussion of hung
cases, and four volunteers who presented no mitigating evidence and made no argument
that the jury find mitigation in his case (four were death sentenced at decision point 5,
Figure 1). Where applicable, the exclusion of the hung cases and volunteers is noted in
the footnotes of the Tables, Figures, and Appendices. The principal models reported in
this Article focus on the following decision points or combinations of decision points (with
applicable tables, figures, and appendices noted).
1. Jury death sentences imposed at decision point 5, Figure 1, for failure to find mitigation after finding statutory aggravation in the case (n =
234 without volunteers and hung cases and n = 294 with hung cases and
volunteers included): Tables: Table 1 (Rows 6 & 8); Table 2 (Row 5); Table
4 (Column B); Table 5; Table 7; Table 10 (Column B); Table 11; Figures:
Figure 2; Appendices: Appendix D (Table D1, Column B).
2. Jury death-sentencing weighing decisions at decision point 6, Figure
I (n = 175 without hung cases and n = 231 with hung cases included; there
are no volunteers at this decision point): Tables: Table 1 (Rows 7 & 8);
Table 2 (Row 6); Table 4 (Column C); Table 6; Table 8; Table 9; Table 10
(Column C); Table 12; Figures: Figure 3; Appendices: Appendix D (Table
D1, Column C).
3. Death sentencing among all jury penalty trials, reflecting the combined effects of decision points 4-6, Figure 1 (n = 318 without hung cases
and volunteers and n = 384 with hung cases and volunteers included): Tables: Table 3 (Row 1); Table 4 (Column D); Table 10 (Column D); Appendices: Appendix D (Table D1, Column D); Appendix E (Table El);
Appendix F (Figure Fl); Appendix G (Table GI); Appendix H (Table HI).
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before and after each of the key decision points at which a defendant
can avoid or greatly reduce the risk of a death sentence. Row 1 at
Column B indicates, for example, the representation rate of black defendants (.78) among all death-eligible cases in the study. Row 4 at
Column B indicates the representation rate of black defendants (.81)
among the cases that advanced to a jury penalty trial. This comparison shows an increase of 3 percentage points,"' indicating that blackdefendant cases were more likely to advance to a jury penalty trial
than cases with nonblack defendants. A similar comparison for the
cases with low-SES victims, shown in Column E, indicates that these
defendants were less likely than other defendants to advance to a penalty trial.
Comparing the proportion of black defendants among all deatheligible cases (.78), with their proportion among all defendants sentenced to death in ajury penalty trial (.85) (Row 8), provides a good
insight into the overall black defendant effect. This 7 percentage
point disparity suggests that, on average, black defendants are treated
more punitively than other defendants. A similar comparison focused
on nonblack-victim cases (Column C, Row 1 v. Row 6) suggests those
defendants are more likely to receive a death sentence because ajury
failed to find mitigation after finding an aggravating circumstance
present. As noted earlier, this decision results in a mandatory death
sentence. 112 A similar analysis (in Column D) holds for black defendants with nonblack victims. In contrast, the data suggest that defendants with low-SES victims (Column E) are less likely to receive a death
13
sentence than other defendants.
4. Jury death sentencing among all death-eligible cases (n = 600 without hung cases and volunteers and n = 666 with hung cases and volunteers
included): Tables: Table 3 (Row 3); Table 4 (Column E); Table 10 (Column E); Appendices: Appendix D (Table D1, Column E); Appendix E (Table E2); Appendix F (Figure F2); Appendix G (Table G2); Appendix H
(Table H2).
a"
The comparison is .78 (550/707) in pool 1 versus .81 (311/384) in pool 4.
112 See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Table 1 note f (explaining why we
deleted four death sentenced cases in which the defendant "volunteered" for a death
sentence).
113 Victims classified as follows were low SES: 1. Unskilled laborer; 2. Custodian; 3.
Unstable or extralegal: a. drifter; b. professional criminal (organized crime); c. prostitute
or pimp; d. thief (individual criminal); e. drug dealer; f. sporadic odd jobs, no particular
skill; g. chronically unemployed (includes recipient of public assistance); 4. Extralegal: a.
was a drug dealer as suggested by the file although not specifically indicated (e.g., D,
known drug dealer, killed Vbecause he interfered with D's drug business); b. lived in
home where drug deals were openly conducted, although not implicated in drug dealing;
c. was known drug user and murder was drug-related (e.g., killing over unpaid drug debt);
d. was identified as a gang member; e. had prior arrests and qualified for appointment of
counsel; f. had prior arrests for theft crimes (including robbery and burglary) or drug
dealing; g. was involved in ongoing illegal enterprise other than organized crime or drug
trade (e.g., illegal lottery, gambling, speakeasy); 5. Low socioeconomic status: a. lived in
public housing or in conditions clearly indicative of poverty (e.g., rat infested or dilapi-
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Table 2 sharpens the focus on the sources of these overall disparities by highlighting differential selection rates, by race of both the defendant and victim and by the victim's SES, at each stage in the
process at which a defendant can avoid or reduce the risk of a death
sentence." 4 Juries actually impose death sentences at decision points
5 and 6, making them the most important. Column C, Row 5 reveals a
14 percentage point race-of-victim disparity (.30 v. .16). This indicates
that, when the victim is nonblack, a death sentence is much more
likely because of the jury's failure to find mitigation after it has found
aggravation. The 11 percentage point disparity in Column B, Row 6
indicates that when the defendant is black, ajury is substantially more
likely to impose a death sentence in the weighing stage of its
deliberations.
The data in Column B, with the single exception of Row 5, reveal
a black-defendant disparity at each decision point. Column E also
reveals a pattern of consistent effects for defendants with low-SES victims, but in the opposite direction. Column C reveals a substantially
more punitive treatment of defendants with nonblack victims only at
the critical decision point (Row 5) when the jury's failure to find mitigation after finding aggravation results in a mandatory death
sentence.
Table 3 shifts the focus to three input-output models that present
an overview of the combined effects of two or more decisions in the
system. These models allow us to test a hypothesis that the disparity
documented at a later stage in the process might be compensated by a
countervailing disparity at earlier points in the process.1 1 5 These
models may provide a simplified overview of the impacts of the entire
system or of its important parts. However, for the purposes of inferring systemic purposeful discrimination at discrete stages in the process, we consider the input-output models of a multistage system to be
much less probative than the models that focus separately and exclusively on discrete stages of the decision-making process.
Row 1 of Table 3 presents an input-output penalty-trial model,
which reflects the impact of all three decision points injury penaltytrial deliberations. 11 6 It shows race-of-defendant (Column B) and
dated; low income neighborhood alone insufficient); b. apparently resided in public housing although not specifically stated in file (e.g., killed in common area of public housing);
c. spouse, paramour, or other immediate relative of individual known to be of low socioeconomic status; d. was high school dropout; e. was mentally retarded or identified in file
as low functioning.
114 As Figure 1, note a indicates, at decision point 5, the defendant's waiver of ajury in
favor of a bench trial sharply reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk of a death sentence.
115 We believe a cancellation effect of this type occurs rarely and only by coincidence.
116 Again, these are (1) finding statutory aggravation, (2) finding statutory mitigation,
and (3) weighing the two.
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race-of-victim (Column C) effects that are consistent with, but weaker
than, the disparities estimated at decision points 5 and 6 in Table 2.
Column E, however, suggests a strong victim-SES effect.
The input-output models in Rows 2 and 3 of Table 3 represent
the combined impact of both prosecutorial and jury perialty-trial decisions among all death-eligible cases in the study. The Row 2 disparities reflect all decisions leading up to and including jury death
sentences imposed for want of a finding of mitigation after a finding
of aggravation. Although the race-of-victim effect shown in Column C
is sharply lower than that observed at decision point 5 in Table 2,117
the victim-SES effect is still present.
The model in Row 3 reflects the combined impact of
prosecutorial and jury decisions leading to all 110 jury death
sentences.1 1 8 The race-of-defendant disparity in Column B is smaller
than its counterpart at decision point 6 in Table 2. This decline reflects the complete absence of a race-of-defendant effect at decision
point 5 as shown in Table 2, Column B. However, a black-defendant
effect is evident at all earlier stages in the process." 9 The victim-SES
effect remains strong, reflecting its salience at each step in the process
as illustrated in Table 3, Column E.
2.

Adjusted Race Disparities

As noted above, unadjusted race effects are merely suggestive, especially when some of the effects are small and fail to achieve statistical significance. 120 The key disparities in death-sentencing rates
shown in Table 2 imposing death for failure to find mitigation after
finding aggravation (Column C, Row 5) and imposing death in the
weighing stage (Column B, Row 6) are each substantial in size (14 and
11 percentage points, respectively). However, the latter effect is not
statistically significant (p = .18). Similarly, most of the disparities estimated in the input-output models reported in Table 3 were smaller
117 The race-of-victim effect in Column C is lower because there are no significant
race-of-victim effects at earlier stages in the system, except at the plea-bargaining stage, and
there defendants with nonblack victims are more likely to negotiate a plea with a waiver of
the death penalty.
118 As explained in Table 3, note a, this model excludes four defendants who volunteered for a death sentence. This model is the equivalent of the core model presented in
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987), which indicated that defendants with white
victims faced odds of receiving a death sentence that were 4.3 times higher than the odds
faced by similarly situated defendants with black victims. We conducted the logistic regression procedures reported in this Article with SAS program PROC LOGISTIC described in
SAS/STAT UsERS GUIDE (version 6, 1990). The results of an alternative approach are reported infra note 132.
119
The race-of-defendant effect is particularly strong in the prosecutorial decisions to
unilaterally waive the death penalty before trial, as Table 2, Column B; Row 2 shows.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
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and failed to achieve statistical significance. The overall model embracing all jury-imposed death sentences (Table 3, Column B, Row 3)
revealed a 7 percentage point disparity, significant only at the .09
level. However, the overall jury penalty-trial model (Table 3, Column
D, Row 1) revealed a 15 percentage point disparity in cases involving
black defendants with nonblack victims that was significant at the .03
level.
We estimated adjusted overall race and SES effects using four independent measures of defendant culpability. We summarize in Table 4 the estimated race effects in analyses that include non-penaltytrial cases and unanimously decided jury penalty-trial cases.12 1 Row 1,
Columns B-E, repeat four of the unadjusted disparities shown in Tables 2 and 3. Rows 2 and 3 report the disparities estimated with the
regression-based measures of culpability, while Rows 4-6 report the
disparities estimated after adjustment for the three supplemental
measures. Also, for comparative purposes, Column F presents selective results from the Georgia research that were used in McCleskey. In
the remainder of this section, we report the results summarized in
Table 4 in more detail.
a.

Race Effects Estimated with Logistic Regression Methods

i. Logistic Regression Coefficients and Odds Multipliers
The most commonly used method for estimating race effects after adjusting for defendant culpability levels is logistic multiple regression analysis. The logistic models for this research include all of the
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances and other conceptually important variables that added additional explanatory power to
the models in the expected direction. 12 2 Tables 5 and 6 present the
123
models estimated for the two key jury death penalty decision points.
Table 5 focuses on the jury death sentences imposed after the
jury has found one or more statutory aggravating circumstances present in the case, and further concludes that there is no mitigation present in the case. At item D2, the table reports a regression coefficient
of 1.4 for the race-of-victim variable that is not statistically significant
121 A comparable tabulation based on analyses that include the hung penalty-trial cases
is presented in Appendix D. A description of and rationale for our differential treatment
of the hung cases is presented in Appendix C.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 97-101 for a discussion of how we constructed

the models.
123 Again, these two points are: (1) when juries find aggravation, but no mitigation and
(2) when juries weigh aggravation and mitigation. The results of the diagnostic procedures we conducted on the regression analyses reported in this Article are reported infra
note 132.
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(p = .22).124 However, when the cases that hung at the weighing stage
are included in the analysis, the race-of-victim coefficient is 1.47, significant at the .03 level. 125 Moreover, for the reasons stated in section
D.1 below and in Appendix C (section C), we consider the latter results, which are based on an analysis that includes hung cases, to be
more reliable than the race-of-victim estimate based on the model that
excludes the hung cases.
Overall, therefore, these results suggest that defendants whose
victims are nonblack face an enhanced risk of receiving a death sentence at this stage in the process compared to defendants whose victims are black. However, because of the marginal significance of the
race-of-victim coefficient estimated in the analysis that excludes the
hung cases, the results of these regression analyses are only suggestive.
As a result, the race-of-victim effects estimated with our alternative
measures assume particular significance.

124 The core analysis reported in Table 5 is based on the aggravators found by thejury
and the mitigating circumstances found by the juries or present in the cases if the factor
was not found by the jury. When the variable for "Victim was killed at his/her place of
employment," which is highly correlated with the victim's race (r = .23, p = .0001), is excluded from the analysis, the race-of-victim coefficient rises to 1.7, significant at the .07
level.
As noted in Appendix C, we also conducted alternative analyses to the core models
reported in Table 5. In alternative model 1, which treats unknowns on aggravating circumstances as not found, the race-of-victim coefficient was 1.6 (.14), while in the model that
excluded altogether the 8 cases in which unknowns on aggravation were reported, the
coefficient was 1.2 (.33). There are no unknowns on statutory mitigation because the variables used in the model treat mitigation as found if it is present in the case but not found
by the jury. (The logistic regression model will not converge if the actual finding of the
juries are used at this stage in the process since each death sentence at this stage was based
on a failure to find any of the mitigating factors presented in the case.)
125
The inclusion of the hung cases enhances the race-of-victim effect because the
hung cases disproportionately include black-victim cases. This generally has the effect of
lowering the death-sentencing rate in the black-victim cases more than it lowers the rate in
the nonblack-victim cases, thereby increasing the disparity between the two rates. Also,
because the hung cases are disproportionately located among the midrange cases, in terms
of defendant culpability, the inclusion of the hung cases disproportionally affects the disparities in the midrange where they are particularly strong. See Figure 2 and Table 7 infra.
In our alternative analyses, the coefficient is 1.4 (.06) when the unknowns for aggravators are considered not found, and the coefficient is 1.1 (.37) when the cases with
unknowns on aggravators are deleted from the analysis. (This had the effect of deleting all
but six of the hung case from the analysis.) When the aggravators are coded as found if
they were either found by the jury or present in the cases the race-of-victim coefficient is
1.4 (.04).
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TABLE 5
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL OF JURY PENALTY-TRIAL DECISIONS THAT
RESULTED IN A MANDATORY DEATH SENTENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE
JURY To FIND STATUTORY MITIGATION AFTER FINDING ONE OR MORE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (PHILADELPHIA: 1983-1993)
(This model controls for the statutory aggravating circumstances that the jury
found and the mitigating circumstances that either were present in the case
or the jury found.)
A

B

Circumstance

Death-odds
multiplier

C
Adjusted logistic regression
coefficient (with level of
statistical significance)

A. Statutory aggravating circumstances (statutory section numbers in parenthesis)'
1. The victim was a police officer (dl)
2. Defendant was paid to kill or paid another
to kill (d2), or ransom or hostage victim
(d3)
3. Victim was a prosecution witness (d5), or an
informant (d1S)
4. Contemporaneous robbery, rape,
kidnapping or arson (d6), or the murder
occurred during the perpetration of a drug
trafficking crime (d3), or the victim was a
competitor in the illegal drug trade(d4)
5. Defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another (d7)
6. Torture involved (d8)
7. Defendant had a significant history of
violent felony convictions (d9)
8. Defendant serving a life sentence, etc. (dlO)
9. Multiple murder victims or defendant had a
prior murder conviction (dll), or a prior
conviction for voluntary manslaughter (d12)

0.03

2.0

-3.5 (.03)

0.69 (.85)

0.32

-1.1 (.25)

0.22

-1.5 (.02)

0.55
0.48

-0.60 (.50)
-0.74 (.53)

3.9
1.2

1.4 (.07)
0.19 (.85)

3.4

1.2 (.22)

B. Statutory mitigating circumstances (statutory section numbers in parenthesis)'
1. Defendant had no significant history of
prior criminal convictions (el)
2. Defendant under extreme mental or
emotional disturbance (e2)
3. Defendant's capacity to appareciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law was
impaired (e3)
4. The defendant's youth or advanced age
mitigated the offense (e4)
5. Defendant acted under duress or the
substantial domination of another person
(e5), or victim participated in the homicidal
acts (e6), or defendant's role was minor
(e7)
6. There were other mitigating aspects of the
defendant's character, record or the offense
(e8)

-2.5 (.01)
0.03

-3.4 (.002)

1.4

0.34 (.78)

0.17

-1.8 (.04)

0.02

-3.9 (.04)

0.0004

-7.7 (.0001)
Continued on next page

1998]

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN CAPITAL CASES

1687

Table 5-Continued
A

B

Circumstance

Death-odds
multiplier

C
Adjusted logistic regression
coefficient (with level of
statistical significance)

C. Nonstatutory aggravating circumstances
1. Multiple stabbings
2. Victim was kidnapped
3. Victim was killed at his or her place of
employment

11.9
36.4

2.5 (.01)
3.6 (.07)

97.0

4.6 (.001)

D. Race and socioeconomic status (SES) of the defendant and the victim
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Defendant was black
One or more victims was nonblack
Victim with low SES
Defendant with high SES
Defendant with low SES
Defendant SES missing
Victim SES missing

.87
3.9
0.28
1.1
1.7
1.1
1.4

-0.14 (.91)
1.4 (.22)
-1.3 (.14)
0.11 (.94)
0.51 (.53)
0.07 (.97)
0.32 (.79)

E. Time period of the caseb
1. 1986-89
2. 1983-85
(1990-93 is the comparison period)

2.2
5.1

0.77 (.26)
1.60 (.06)

N= 234 (59 death sentences imposed)
No-E: This analysis does not include 56 penalty trial cases that hung on the sentence. When
these cases are included in the analyses, the race-of-victim regression coefficient at item D.2 is
1.47 (p = .03) with an odds multiplier of 4.4. See Appendices C and D for detail on the
differential treatment of the hung and unanimously decided cases in this research. The
analyses also excludes four volunteers who presented no mitigation and did not argue in favor
of a jury finding of mitigation. Each volunteer received a death sentence at this stage in the
process. For an overview of the cases included in this Article's Tables and Figures, see supra
note 110.
The statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances are described in Appendix A. Items
A2, A3, A4, A9, and B5 in the table embrace more than one statutory factor. Without these
combinations, the logistic model would not run, i.e., it would not "converge" because of the
distribution of the outcome variable for the cases with these case characteristics. The odds
multipliers in Column B are calculated from the original regression coefficients rather than
the rounded coefficients reported in Column C.
There are no cases in the study implicating the d4 (airplane hijacking), the d16 (victim
under 12 years) aggravating factors.
Two variables to identify the time period of the cases are included in the regression to correct
for imbalances created in differential sampling between the time periods. In the sampling
scheme, a higher percentage of cases were sampled from the most recent time period, fewer
from the 1983-1985 time period, and the fewest from 1986-1989. In general, jury deathsentencing rates among all death-eligible cases have been decreasing: 23% in 1983-1985; 20%
in 1986-89; and 13% in 1990-1993.

The model for the jury weighing decisions presented in Table 6
reveals a strong statistically significant race-of-defendant effect. Specifically, the odds multiplier for the black-defendant variable is 29.0,
significant at the .01 level. No other racial or SES variable achieves
1 26
significance in the model.

126 The model reported in Table 6 excludes 56 cases that appear to have hung on the
weighing decision. In an alternative analysis, that includes hung cases, the odds multiplier
for the black-defendant variable was 13.5, significant at the 0.04 level, see Appendix D,
Table DI, Column C, Row 2.
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The race-of-defendant effects at the weighing stage remain strong
and stable when the hung cases are included in the analysis. Specifically, when hung cases are added, the race-of-defendant coefficient in
the core model is 2.6 with a 13.5 odds multiplier, significant at the .04
level. 12 7 These results strongly support an inference of systemic race128
of-defendant discrimination in the jury weighing decisions.
TABLE 6
LoGISTIc MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL OF JURY PENALTY-TRiAL
DECISIONS BASED ON A WEIGHING OF STATUTORY AGGRAVATING AND
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (PHILADELPHIA: 1983-1993)
(this model controls for the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances that
the jury found)
A

B

C
Adjusted logistic regression
Death-odds
coefficient (with level of
Circumstance
Multiplier
statistical significance)
A. Statutory aggravating circumstances (statutory section numbers in parenthesis)'
1. The victim was a police officer (dl)
350.4
5.9 (.02)
2. Defendant was paid to kill or paid another
to kill (d2), or ransom or hostage victim
(d3)
20.0
3.0 (.08)
3. Victim was a prosecution witness (d5), or
an informant (d15)
102.4
4.6 (.001)
4. Contemporaneous robbery, rape,
kidnapping or arson (d6)
4.2
1.4 (.04)
5. Defendant knowingly created a grave risk
of death to another (d7)
4.7
1.5 (.08)
6. Torture involved (d8)
15.2
2.7 (.02)
7. Defendant had a significant history of
violent felony convictions (d9)
10.4
2.3 (.01)
8. Defendant serving a life sentence, etc.
(dl0)
14.2
2.7 (.05)
9. Multiple murder victims or defendant had
a prior murder conviction (dlI)
11.6
2.4 (.002)
Continued on next page
127 The inclusion of the hung cases reduces the race-of-defendant effect somewhat
because the hung cases disproportionately include black-defendant cases which has the
effect of lowering the death-sentencing rate in the black-defendant cases vis-a-vis the rate in
the nonblack-defendant cases. Also the hung cases are disproportionately located in the
midrange of cases in terms of defendant culpability, where the race effects are strongest
when the analyses is limited to the unanimously decided cases.
In alternative analyses that included the hung cases, the race-of-defendant coefficient
was 2.3 (p = .02) when the unknowns were set to 0 and 1.9 (p = .08) when the 34 cases with
unknowns were deleted from the analysis. Also, in the analysis that treats a factor as present if it is either found or present, the coefficient was 3.1 (.0006).
128 In contrast to the jury penalty trial decisions, the bench (judge) penalty trial decisions reveal no significant race effects. The unadjusted overall bench trial death sentencing rates were as follows: black defendant cases = .03 (1/30) versus nonblack defendant
cases .27 (3/11) (p = .04); nonblack-victim cases = .18 (3/17) versus black-victim cases =
.04 (1/24) (p = .20). Because of the absence of significant race effects in the bench trial
decisions, when the jury and bench trials are analyzed together, the estimated race-of-victim and race-of-defendant effects are somewhat lower than those in our two core models.
Specifically, in the analysis of death sentences imposed for failure to find mitigation, as in
Table 5, the coefficient for nonblack victims is 1.2 (p = .25), while the black-defendant
coefficient estimated for the final weighing stage, as in Table 6, is 1.05 (p = .16).

1998]

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN CAPITAL CASES

1689

Table 6-Continued
A

B

Circumstance

Death-odds
Multiplier

10. A prior conviction for voluntary
manslaughter (d12)
11. Victim was a competitor in the illegal drug
world (d14)

C
Adjusted logistic regression
coefficient (with level of
statistical significance)

520.0
35.4

6.3 (.0005)
3.6 (.02)

B. Statutory mitigating circumstances (statutory section numbers in parenthesis)'
1. Defendant had no significant history of
prior criminal convictions (el)
2. Defendant under extreme mental or
emotional disturbance (e2)
3. Defendant's capacity to appreciate the.
criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the Iav
was impaired (e3)
4. The defendant's youth or advanced age
mitigaged the offense (e4)
5. Defendant acted under duress or the
substantial domination of another person
(e)
6. Victim participated in the homicidal acts
(e6)
7. Defendant's role was minor (e7)
8. There were other mitigating aspects of the
defendant's character, record, or the
offense (e8)

0.64

-0.44 (.47)

4.5

1.5 (.10)

0.42

-0.88 (.48)

0.68

-0.39 (.44)

0.006

-5.06 (.01)

15.0
0.24

2.7 (.08)
-1.4 (.12)

0.21

-1.5 (.01)

C. Nonstatutory aggravating circumstances
1. Previous assault on victim or victim a sex
rival
2. Victim mutilated or dismembered
3. Defendant committed additional crimes
after the homicide

66.2
549
14.8

4.2 (.0001)
6.3 (.0005)
2.7 (.10)

D. Race and socioeconomic status (SES) of the defendant and the victim
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Defendant was black
One or more victims was nonblack
Victim with low SES
Defendant with high SES
Defendant with low SES
Victim SES missing

29.0
1.1
.39
.44
.35
1.6

3.4 (.01)
.12 (.86)
-0.93 (.19)
-. 82 (.71)
-1.0 (.19)
.46 (.61)

E. Time period of the case b
1. 1986-89
2. 1983-85
(1990-93 is the comparison period)

.24
.99

-1.4 (.10)
-0.002 (.99)

N= 175 (51 death sentences imposed)
NoTE: This analysis does not include 56 penalty-trial cases that hung on the sentence. When
those cases are included in the analyses, the race of defendant coefficient (at item DI,
Column C) is 2.6 (p = .04) with an odds multiplier of 13.5. See Appendices C and D for detail
on the differential treatment of the hung and unanimously decided cases in this research. For
an overview of the cases included in this Article's Tables and Figures, see supranote 110.
The statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances are described in Appendix A- Items
A2 and A3 in the table embrace more than one statutory circumstance. Without these
combinations, the logistic model would not run, i.e., it would not "converge" because of the
distribution of the outcomes for the cases with these case characteristics. The odds multipliers
in Column B are calculated from the original regression coefficients rather than the rounded
coefficients reported in Column C.
Continued on next page
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Table 6-Continued

b

There are no cases in this analysis implicating the d4 (airplane hijacking), the d13
(murder during the perpetration of a drug trafficking crime), or the d16 (victim under 12
years) aggravating factors.
Two variables to identify the time period of the cases are included in the regression to correct
for imbalances created in differential sampling between the time periods. In the sampling
scheme, a higher percentage of cases were sampled from the most recent time period, fewer
from the 1983-1985 time period, and the fewest from 1986-1989. In general, jury deathsentencing rates among all death-eligible cases have been decreasing: 23% in 1983-1985: 20%
in 1986-89: and 13% in 1990-1993.

The input-output penalty-trial model that embraces all jury deathsentencing decisions estimated a black-defendant coefficient of 2.2
(with an odds multiplier of 9.3), significant at the .01 level (Table 4,
Column D, Row 2). None of the other racial or SES variables
achieved statistical significance. This model is presented in Appendix
E. 129 When the hung cases were added to the analysis, the race effects
declined somewhat, but remained substantial and statistically significant with a race-of-defendant coefficient of 1.3 (with an odds multiplier of 3.7), significant at the .05 level.' 3 0
Finally, the model embracing jury death sentences imposed
among death-eligible cases (which reflects the impact of both
prosecutorial and jury decisions) estimated a black-defendant coefficient of 1.1 (with a 3.1 odds multiplier), significant at the .02 level.
3
The model is also presented in Appendix E, Table E2.1 1
The race-of-defendant effects in this model remained strong and
stable when the hung cases were added with the core model reporting
a coefficient of 1.1 and odds multiplier of 3.0, significant at the .02
32
level.'
129 The analysis reported in Appendix E is based on the core variables. In alternative
analyses, the race-of-defendant effects remains stable and statistically significant. In the
alternative that sets unknowns to 0, the race-of-defendant coefficient was 2.0 (.007), while
in the analysis that deletes cases with unknowns, the coefficient was 1.9 (.02). In the analysis that treats factors as found if they were either found or present, the race-of-defendant
coefficient was 2.0 (.007).
130 In the alternative analyses, the model which treated unknowns as not found estimated a race-of-defendant coefficient of 1.7 (.02), and in the model that deleted cases with
unknowns, the estimate was 1.7 (.03). In the analysis which treats a factor as having been
found if it was either found by the jury or present, the coefficient was 1.5 (.03).
131
The model reported in Appendix E is based on the core variables. In alternative
analyses, the race-of-defendant effects are stable and statistically significant. In the alternative that sets unknowns to 0, the race-of-defendant coefficient was 1.2 (p = .02), and in the
model that deleted all cases with unknowns, the coefficient was .99 (p = .053). Finally, in
the model that treated statutory factors as found if they had either been found by the jury
or were present in the case, the coefficient was 1.5 (p = .01).
132 In the alternative analyses, the race-of-defendant effects are 1.2 (p = .01) in the
model that sets unknowns to 0 and 1.0 (p = .05) in the analysis that deletes all cases with
unknowns coded. In the analysis that treated a factor as found if it had either been found
by the jury or is present in the case, the race-of-defendant coefficient was 1.4 (p = .02).
The stagewise nature of the charging and sentencing system, see Figure 1, and the
complex sampling design used to select cases for inclusion in the data base preclude the
exact application of standard statistical procedures such as logistic regression. For the
analyses reported in this Article, we used methods which generally yield reliable approxi-
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Plots of Death-SentencingRates Correlated with Racial
Characteristicsand the Culpability of the Defendants

These logistic regression models allowed us to plot the estimated
probabilities of a death sentence as a function of different racial characteristics (after controlling for the measure of criminal culpability
estimated in the regression models). The scale markers on the horizontal axis (from 1-6) in Figures 2 and 3 correspond to the scale
marks in Tables 7 and 8 and Figures F1 and F2 (from 1-8) in Appendix F. The first plot (Figure 2) depicts the race-of-victim effects estimated in the model of jury decisions to impose death sentences for
failure to find mitigation (decision point 5). It reveals a strong association between the culpability level of the cases and the magnitude of
the estimated race-of-victim effects. Specifically, in terms of the arithmetic difference in death-sentencing rates, the race-of-victim disparimations to inferential statistics (p-values and standard errors); in particular, the "safe" standard errors, t-ratios, and p-values which we report are identical to those produced by
another approximation: the well-established Taylor expansion method described and implemented in the statistical package SUDAAN, which is designed for the analysis of complex samples. Lisa M. LaVange et al., SUDAAN: A Comprehensive Software Packagefor Survey
Data Analyses, in

STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECrION ON SURVEY RE-

761-66 (1988). Nevertheless, wishing even more confirmation of the accuracy of our analyses, we conducted an analysis by maximum likelihood.
Likelihood-based inference involves the calculation of a mathematical expression
(called the likelihood function) for the probability that the sampling method used in the
study would yield the data which was actually observed. See MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN &
BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAwYERs § 5.17 (1990). For the multi-stage charging and sentencing system and the complex endogenously stratified sampling plan, that expression is
quite complex. To obtain maximum likelihood estimates, logistic regression coefficients
are "optimized" by, in effect, trying all possible combinations of values for them until we
find a set that maximizes the likelihood function, i.e., maximizes the probability of obtaining the observed data. Standard errors are a byproduct of the optimization process.
We used a program called NMNL, "Nested Multinomial Logistic Choice Models Under
Exogenous and Mixed Endogenous-Exogenous Stratification," to do the maximum likelihood computations. See George Woodworth &Jordan J. Louviere, Nested MultinominalLogistic Choice Models Under Exogenous and Mixed Endogenous-Exogenous Stratification, in
SEARCH METHODS

AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC STATIS-

121-29 (1988).
Likelihood-based inference is a gold standard for most statisticians and therefore
agreement between likelihood-based estimates and other approximate modes of estimation strengthens our confidence in the approximate methods. The following table shows
the logistic regression coefficients (and their standard errors) for race of victim, race of
defendant and socioeconomic status of defendant and victim, controlling for statistically
significant and conceptually important nonracial variables at each stage of the charging
and sentencing tree. The models for decision points 5-6 are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
For each analysis, we report below the logistic regression coefficient (with the standard
error in parenthesis) for the race of the defendant (blacks) and the race of victims (nonblack victim) variables. A positive logistic regression coefficient for the race of defendant
or victim indicates that the presence of that factor increases the chances of the first named
outcome, while a negative coefficient signifies a reduction in those chances. Coefficients
greater than two standard errors (hence significant at about the .05 level) are marked with
an asterisk.
TICS SECTION
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1. Case Advances to Guilt Trial vs. Guilty Plea with Wa'ver of Death Penalty
BLACKD
.07
(.39)
NONBLVIC
-. 32
(.35)
2. Guilt Trial with Risk of a Death Penalty vs. Prosecutor Waives Death Penalty
Before Trial
BLACKD
1.34*
(.49)
NONBLVIC
.46
(.49)
3. Jury Penalty Trial vs. Bench Penalty Trial
BLACKD
-. 06
(.75)
NONBLVIC
-. 78
(.61)
4. Statutory Aggravator Found vs. No Statutory Aggravator Found with Life
Sentence Imposed
BLACKD
.20
(.74)
NONBLVIC
.14
(.67)
5. Statutory Mitigating Circumstance Not Found-Death Sentence vs. Mitigating
Factor Found
BIACKD
-. 31
(.81)
NONBLVIC
1.38*
(.69)
6. Aggravators Outweigh Mitigators-Death Sentence vs. Life Sentence Imposed
BLACKD
2.71*
(1.01)
NONBLVIC
.35
(.60)
For the four core models reported in Table 4, we conducted diagnostics for "multicollinearity" and "influence." The multicollinearity diagnostics are designed to identify extreme collinearity (statistical covariation between the "independent" explanatory variables,
which include both legitimate, illegitimate and suspect variables). Extreme multicollinearity is a concern because it can affect the size and stability of the standard errors and
thus the reliability and accuracy of estimates of the statistical significance of the affected
independent variables. See BALDus & COLE, supra note 51, § 8A.1; PAETzoLD & Wiu.aBoRN,
supra note 51, § 6.14.
Multicollinearity can be diagnosed through a variety of techniques. We analyzed working logits using the PROC REG procedure in SAS with the COLLIN option, 2 SAS/STAT
USER'S GUIDE 1416-17 (version 6, 1990). For all four models, the "condition index" value, a
flag for the existence of numerical instability, ranged between 16.95 and 25.04, which is
well below the recommended cutoff of 30 recommended as a general threshold. SeeDAVID
A. BELSLEY ET AL., REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS 153 (1980).
Influence analysis is designed to determine if the characteristics of individual cases in
the sample have significantly impacted the coefficients estimated for important variables in
the models, specifically coefficients for the race of victim and the race of defendant estimated in the core reported in Table 4. For this analysis, we used the SAS INFLUENCE
option and identified the top ten cases in terms of their influence on individual coefficients. None of the results suggested that influence was a concern with respect to any of
the estimated race effects in the core models.
Finally, before one can interpret the race of defendant and race of victim as having
independent (i.e., additive) influences on death-sentencing rates, one first needs to rule
out the possibility that the two "interact" with one another in a nonindependent (i.e.,
nonadditive) way. Specifically, in the models in which the race-of-defendant effects are
important (Table 6 and Tables El & E2, Appendix E), one needs to determine if the
magnitude of the race-of-defendant effects varies depending on the race of the victim. For
example, one's interpretation of the results could be influenced by a finding that all of the
black-defendant effects were concentrated in the black-victim cases and that no such effects were documented among the nonblack-victim cases. Similarly, in the model in which
the race of the victim is important (Table 5), one needs to determine if the magnitude of
the race-of-victim effects depends on the race of the defendant.
We first compared defendant death-sentencing rates, controlling for defendant culpability and the race of the victim. For the core jury weighing model (Table 6), after adjustment for defendant culpability, there was a 9 percentage point difference between (1) the
black versus nonblack-defendant disparity estimated among the nonblack-victim cases (18
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ties are heavily concentrated in the midrange cases in terms of the
culpability of the defendants. For example, Figure 2 shows that the
estimated disparity for a case with an average level of culpability is
approximately 40 percentage points (roughly .35 for the black-victim
cases versus .75 for the nonblack-victim cases), while the disparities
among the cases that are considerably more or less aggravated are
much less pronounced. However, in terms of relative risk, the disparities are greatest among the more mitigated cases. For example, at the
low end of the culpability scale, the difference between death-sentencing rates of .06 and .02 represents an arithmetic difference of only 4
percentage points but the relative ratio of the rates is 3.0 (.06/.02).
Figure 3 depicts jury decisions to impose death sentences after
weighing the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It
suggests a midrange disparity of about 55 percentage points between
the treatment of black and nonblack defendants (approximately .65 .10) at the average culpability level.
Figure F1 presents comparable data estimated with the input-output model for all jury penalty-trial decisions, while Figure F2 presents
the plot for jury death sentences imposed among all death-eligible
133
cases.
percentage points, .31 - .13), and (2) the black versus nonblack disparity estimated among
the black victim cases (27 percentage points, .33 - .06). However, in a logistic regression
analysis that controlled for defendant culpability and included a defendant/victim interaction term, the interaction effect was significant at only the .47 level, principally because of
the small sample sizes for the different defendant/victim racial combinations.
A similar analysis of all jury penalty trials also revealed a 9 percentage point difference
in the black-defendant disparities for the two victim racial subgroups, i.e., a .17 percentage
point disparity (.41 - .24) for the nonblack-victim cases versus a .26 percentage point disparity (.37 - .11) for the black-victim cases. A logistic multivariate analysis that controlled
for defendant culpability estimated an interaction effect significant at the .10 level. The
principal source of these interaction effects is the very low death-sentencing rate in the
cases involving nonblack defendants with black victims.
We conducted a similar analysis of race-of-victim effects estimated for death sentences
imposed for failure to find mitigation after controlling for defendant culpability (Table 5).
After adjustment for defendant culpability, the race-of-victim disparity was 8 percentage
points (.30 - .22) among the black defendant cases and 33 percentage points (.33 - .0)
among the nonblack-defendant cases. The principal source of this 25 percentage point
(.33 - .08) interaction effect is also the extremely low (.0) death-sentencing rate among
cases with nonblack defendants and black victims. (We were unable to test the statistical
significance of this interaction effect in a logistic regression analysis because no death
sentences were imposed in the cases involving nonblack defendants with black victims and,
as a consequence, the estimation procedure would not converge.)
Our conclusion is that at both key points in the Philadelphia system at which death
sentences are actually imposed, the race of the victim and the race of the defendant have
an influence that is generally independent of the race of the defendant or the race of the
victim, as the case may be. The one exception to this pattern is that the extremely low
death-sentencing rates in cases involving nonblack defendants and black victims disproportionately enhances both the race-of-defendant effect in the black-victim cases and the raceof-victim effect in the nonblack-defendant cases.
133 The models on which Figures F1 and F2 are based are presented in Appendix E.
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Race Effects Estimated with Regression-Based Scales

Another method used to estimate overall average race-of-victim
and race-of-defendant effects is to: (1) partition the cases into six to
eight levels based on the probability of each defendant's receiving a
death sentence that has been estimated on the basis of the legitimate
case characteristics included in the logistic regression analyses; (2) estimate overall death-sentencing rates for the two racial subgroups that
have been adjusted for the culpability level of the cases in each subgroup; and (3) calculate the arithmetic difference and ratio between
the two adjusted rates.
Table 7 presents such an analysis of the jury death sentence decisions based on a failure to find mitigation and reveals a 9 percentage
point race-of-victim disparity (.31 - .22) and a 1.4 (.31/.22) ratio of
the death-sentencing rates, significant at th .02 level.'8 4 Table 8
presents a similar analysis of the jury weighing decisions. It reports a
race-of-defendant disparity in death-sentencing rates of 21 points (.33
.12) and a ratio of 2.7 (.33/.12), significant at the .004 level.1 35
b. RacialEffects Estimated at the Weighing Stage Controllingfor
the Number of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
Found by theJuries
Our first supplemental measure of defendant culpability is the
number of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each
case. Table 9 presents the results for the penalty-trial weighing decisions. When the hung cases are excluded from the analyses, the overall estimated race-of-defendant effect is 19 percentage points (.30 .11), significant at the .37 level. When the hung cases are included,
the disparity is 14 percentage points (.23 - .09), significant at the .42
level. Table 9 also indicates that the race effects are concentrated in
the midrange of cases where the choice for the jury is difficult.

134

An identical analysis that includes the hung cases, with their case characteristics

estimated on the basis of the strength of the evidence in the cases, reveals a 14 percentage
point disparity (.30 - .16) and a ratio of 1.9 (.30/.16), significant at the .01 level.
135 An identical analysis that includes the hung cases reports a disparity of 11 percentage points and a ratio of 1.8, significant at the .18 level.
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Race Effects Estimated Controllingfor a Salient FactorsMeasure
of Defendant Culpability

The second supplemental measure of defendant culpability used
is the "salient factors" measure which controls for either thirteen case
categories that are based on the most prominent statutory aggravating
circumstances of each case or nineteen case categories which, when
sample sizes permit, further subdivide the cases according to the presence of additional aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 13 6 Table
10 (Column B, last row) indicates that the average race-of-victim effect
estimated for death-sentencing decisions imposed for failure to find a
statutory mitigating circumstance is 13 percentage points (.31 - .18)
after controlling for the nineteen level scale, significant at the .006
level. When the hung cases are included, the disparity is 17 percentage points (.31 - .14), significant at the .001 level.
The race-of-defendant effect for the jury weighing decisions (Column C, last row) is 24 percentage points (.33 - .09), significant at the
.01 level. When the hung cases are included, the disparity is 18 percentage points (.25 - .07), significant at the .05 level.
Table 10 reports similar results for all jury penalty-trial decisions
(Column D) and jury decisions imposed among all death-eligible
cases (Column E). For all jury penalty-trial decisions (Column D, last
row), the race-of-defendant effect is 14 points, significant at the .04
level (without hung cases) and 10 points, significant at the .22 level
(with hung cases included). For the jury death sentences imposed
among all death-eligible cases (Column E, last row), the race-of-defendant effect is 9 percentage points, significant at the .04 level (without
hung cases) and 6 percentage points, significaht at the .15 level (with
the hung cases included).

136 For each decision point, the adjusted rates for the respective racial subgroups and
the disparities between them are reported on the last row of data in Table 10.
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d. Race Effects Estimated with Controlsfor a Murder Severity Scale
The third supplemental measure is the murder-severity index.
This measure is based on rankings of separate groups of 15 cases on
the basis of the defendant's culpability. Table 11 presents the first set
of results from a pilot study that we conducted using law students to
rate the cases.1 37 It divides the cases into 12 levels based on the severity of the estimated culpability and reports race-of-victim effects for
jury death sentences based upon the jury's failure to find mitigation.13 8 Columns C, D, and E, which indicate the magnitude of the
nonblack-victim disparity at each level, reveal a consistent pattern of
effects. The overall average race-of-victim effect is 12 percentage
points, significant at the .05 level. When the hung cases are included,
the disparity is 11 percentage points, significant at the .03 level.
Table 12 presents the second set of results from the pilot study
for the jury weighing decision. Columns C, D, and E also reveal a
persistent pattern of race-of-defendant effects. The overall average
disparity is 15 percentage points, significant at the .17 level. When the
hung cases are included, the disparity is 10 percentage points, significant at the .30 level.
D.

Inferences, Possible Explanations, and Consequences

What do these adjusted disparities tell us about the likely influence of the race of the defendant and victim and victim SES in Philadelphia's death-sentencing system? How likely is it that the system is
treating similarly situated defendants differently because of both defendant and victim characteristics? What are the most likely explanations for the racial disparities observed in Philadelphia and elsewhere
in the United States? Finally, what is the practical significance of
those racial disparities?
137 The final scale will be based on the ratings of Philadelphia death-qualified venire
persons, those who served on a capital jury or were struck from the venire by the exercise
of a peremptory challenge. See supra note 84.
138 We purged the narrative descriptions used by the student raters of all references to
the race or SES of the defendant and of the victim. There is a risk, however, that the facts
of the cases suggested the race and SES, and thus may have subtly influenced the ratings.
To test for this possibility, we conducted a series of multiple regression analyses in which
we used the severity scores as the outcome measure. The statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances plus many other nonstatutory aggravators and mitigators, along with the
race and SES of the defendant and of the victim, were the independent explanatory variables. The coefficients estimated for the legitimate case characteristics were of both a magnitude and a direction that one would expect, and many were statistically significant. In
contrast, the coefficients estimated for the race and SES variables showed no statistically
significant relationship with the severity scores. In addition, the simple correlation between the severity score and the black-defendant variable was -. 06 (p = .44), and the relationship with the black-victim variable was .07 (p = .35). These results give us confidence
that the raters' perceptions of the race of the defendants and of the victims in the cases did
not bias their scores.
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1. Is There Differential Treatment in Philadelphia?
Among the unanimously decided cases, the race-of-defendant effects were substantial, consistent, and statistically significant, or nearly
so, in both the overall models of jury death-sentencing and in the
analyses ofjury weighing decisions. 1 39 In all of these analyses, the race
effects were strongest in the logistic regression analyses and the analyses based on the salient factors measure of defendant culpability. We
consider these to be highly probative measures of culpability. 140 Because of the independent basis of our four measures of defendant culpability-logistic regression, the number of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances found by the jury, the salient factors of the
139 For the results estimated in the overall analyses, see Table 4, Columns D & E, Rows
2-5, and Column C, Rows 2-5 for the results of the weighing analyses.
140 We used four kinds of analyses of discretionary decision making in this article: (1)
logistic regression, (2) salient factors, (3) murder severity scale, and (4) a frequency count
of statutory aggravating and statutory mitigating factors. Each method has its special
strengths-technical, legal, and interpretative. The results indicate a consistent and convergent pattern of systemic race effects across the four analyses.
Multiple logistic regression analysis is the generally accepted statistical methodology
for the analysis of discretionary decision making system of the type involved in this research. See PArzoLD & WILLBoRN, supra note 51, §§ 4.20, 11.05; BALDus & CoLE, supra
note 51, §§ 8.0-8A.4. Technically, logistic regression does not require restrictive assumptions about the distribution of the independent variables and is robust. And two interpretative advantages of logistic regression are that it has easily interpreted coefficients (odds
multipliers) and it is grounded in the actual decisions of prosecutors and jurors whose
decision making preferences are directly reflected in the culpability measures that it produces. Another strength of the regression approach is its capacity to finely differentiate
between subgroups of cases in terms of their relative culpability through the predicted
scores calculated for each defendant, which can range from ".00" to "1.0." For example,
Table 8, which sorts jury weighing cases into six subgroups of cases, reports a range of
death-sentencing rates from .0 to .87.
The strength of the salient factors measure (Table 10) is its intuitively and legally
grounded system of assessing relative culpability. It also exhibits a capacity to finely differentiate between subgroups of cases in term of their relative culpability. Column C of Table
10, for example, reports for the jury weighing decisions, a range of death-sentencing rates
(in categories with 5 or more cases) ranging from .0 (Row F6) to .78 (Row A2).
The results of the murder severity study are also intuitively understandable and reflect
a similar capacity for finely differentiating between subgroups of cases with differential
levels of culpability. Table 12, for example, reports a range of death sentencing rates on a
12 level scale from .05 to .75. Also, the comparability in the magnitude of the race effects
estimated with this measure and the regression measure, which is based on the decisions of
the actual prosecutors andjurors in the cases, is striking. Cf.Table 4, Columns C-E, Rows 3
& 6.
The count of aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the jury, in spite of
its intuitive and legal appeal, is much less discriminating factually. In addition, five cells in
the table have no nonblack defendant cases (and are statistically noninformative), and six
have only one or two. In fact, only two cells contain five or more nonblack defendants.
These small samples introduce instability in the tests of statistical significance therebyjeopardizing their reliability. It is for all these reasons that we place less weight on the results
estimated with this counting measure than we do on the results estimated with the other
three more discriminating measures. Nonetheless, the results in combination with the
other three measures provide one more cause for concern.
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cases, and the case rankings from the murder severity study-we are
particularly impressed with the consistency of the estimated race-ofdefendant effects.
When the hung cases are added to the database, the race-of-defendant effects were weaker but consistent, especially in the regression
analyses and the analyses based on the salient factors. 141 For reasons
described in more detail in Appendix C, we place less weight on the
analyses that include hung cases. Nevertheless, we believe that together the two sets of results (with and without the hung cases included) clearly support an inference that the race of the defendant is
a substantial influence in the Philadelphia capital charging and sentencing system, particularly in jury penalty trials.
The race-of-victim results are also substantial and statistically significant, or nearly so, across a range of analyses, but they are somewhat weaker than the race-of-defendant effects. Race-of-victim effects
are particularly prominent in the analyses that focus exclusively on the
principal source of those effects, the second stage of jury decision
making at which juries impose more than one-half of all death
sentences for failure to find a statutory mitigator present in the
case. 14 2 In contrast to the race-of-defendant analysis, the race-of-victim effects are enhanced when the hung cases are included. We be141 The results from the analyses that include the hung cases are reported above in
footnotes that parallel the results reported for the analyses of the unanimously decided
cases. These results are also summarized in Appendix D, which is a mirror of Table 4,
except that the reported analyses all include hung cases.
142 These results are also summarized in Table 4 (with hung cases excluded) and Appendix D (with hung cases included). The race-of-victim disparities are also substantial,
consistent, and statistically significant, or nearly so, across all of our principal measures.
The only exception concerning statistical significance is our more conservative regression
model, based on an analysis that excludes the hung cases. See Table 4, Column B, Row 2. It
reports a p-value of only .22. As we observed above in note 124, this diminished level of
significance is principally caused by the inclusion in the model of the variable for "Victim
was killed at his or her place of employment," which is more properly viewed as a measure
of victim SES than a factor contributing to the defendant's culpability. (The model also
includes a separate variable for low-SES victims.) In the absence of this variable, the raceof-victim coefficient is 1.7, significant at the .07 level, with an odds multiplier of 5.5 rather
than 3.9 as reported in Table 5 at item D.2 which includes the place of victim employment
variable. If these were our only results on this issue, it would be unclear the extent to
which the victim effect we see in the data should properly be attributed to the race or SES
of the victims. However, we also have available the results of an identical regression analyses that includes hung cases, which we consider a more reliable basis for inferring race-ofvictim effects at this stage in the jury decision making process. This judgment, which we
explain in more detail in Appendix C (Section C), reflects our belief that the analysis that
includes the cases that hung at the weighing stage is more appropriate than the analysis
that excludes all of the hung cases. (Our analysis of death sentences imposed for failure to
find mitigation reported in Table D1, Appendix D includes only the cases we estimate
hung at the weighing stage.) When those hung cases are included in the analysis, (Column B, Row 2 of Table DI) the race-of-victim effect is larger, a 4.3 odds multiplier, than it
was when they are excluded, and statistically significant at the .03 level. Finally, as a point
of comparison, we include in Table 4, Column F, Row 2, the 4.3 race-of-victim odds multi-
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lieve that both sets of results support the further conclusion that the
race of victim is a substantial influence in jury sentencing decisions
based on a failure to find mitigation in the case.
The evidence also indicates that overall, low victim SES status has
the substantial and statistically significant effect of reducing a defendant's likelihood of receiving a death sentence. 143 In contrast to the
race effects, which primarily emanate from jury decisions, the low-SESvictim effect appears to flow jointly from both prosecutorial and jury
decisions,'4 a conclusion that is initially suggested by the unadjusted
data in Table 2, Column E.
In light of these results and of our methodology, we consider it
implausible that the estimated disparities are either a product of
chance or reflect a failure to control for important omitted case characteristics. We can conceive of no legitimate factors omitted from our
analyses that correlate with both the death-sentencing outcomes and
the race or SES of both the defendants and victims in this study. 145 In
short, we believe it would be extremely unlikely to observe disparities
of both this magnitude and consistency if substantial equality existed
in this system's treatment of defendants.
2.

Empirically Testable Explanationsfor the PhiladelphiaRacial and
SES Disparities
a. ProsecutorialDecision Making vs. Jury Decision Making

The Philadelphia results are distinguishable from those estimated
in earlier studies in the South in that the principal source of the race
disparities in Philadelphia is jury, rather than prosecutorial, decision
making. The Philadelphia results showed no statistically significant
race-of-victim effects whatsoever in prosecutorial decisions (in conplier estimated in the McCleskey Georgia research, which is virtually identical to the race-ofvictim effect estimated in the Table D1 analysis that includes the hung cases.
143
The evidence supporting this conclusion is the very substantial and statistically significant regression coefficient for low-SES victim estimated in the analysis of jury deathsentencing rates among all death-eligible cases (Table E2, Appendix E, item D.3)-a coefficient of -1.30, with a .27 odds multiplier, significant at the .0005 level.
144 The victim SES effect in the model of all jury penalty trials (Table El, Appendix E,
item D.3) is distinctly weaker (b = -.96, p = .07) than its effect in the overall model noted
above. It is also weaker in the two jury models of the points at which death sentences are
actually imposed (Table 5, item D.3 & Table 6, item D.3). Although these data suggest a
probable impact in the jury decisions, the substantial size and significance of the victim
SES variable in the overall model, which reflects the impact of both prosecutorial and jury
decisions, is strong evidence of the important influence of victim SES in prosecutorial decision making.
145
As noted above, in the absence of such dual correlations, the inclusion of the omitted variable would have no impact on either the magnitude or the statistical significance of
the estimated race or of the SES effect.
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trast to the McCleskey research).1 46 Prosecutorial race-of-defendant effects are confined to the decision to waive a death sentence before
trial, 147 but the effects are much weaker than the comparable race-ofvictim effects documented in the McCleskey research.
b.

The Midrange Effect

The Philadelphia results are consistent with the results of earlier
studies that tested the "liberation hypothesis." This theory posits that
race and other arbitrary factors are likely to have the most profound
effect in midrange cases in which the decision maker is "liberated"
from the "grip of fact" that virtually compels a particular result when
the case is very clear cut.' 48 Although this midrange characteristic is

intrinsic to the logistic regression model, the hypothesis is independently confinned in the analyses based on supplemental measures of
defendant culpability that are wholly independent of the assumptions
and constructs of the logistic regression analysis.
c.

White, Asian, and Hispanic Effects

The core models discussed throughout this Article (and reported
in Table 4 and Appendix D) estimate race-of-defendant effects by contrasting the treatment of black defendants with the treatment of white
(both Hispanic and non-Hispanic) and Asian defendants combined.
Similarly, the race-of-victim effects are estimated by contrasting the
treatment of black-victim cases with the treatment of white-victim (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) and Asian-victim cases. Although there are
few cases with Asian defendants and/or victims, their treatment in the
system is somewhat different than the treatment of white defendants.
For this reason, we first conducted analyses that separate Asian defendants and victims from the categories in which they are subsumed
in our core models.
In analyses that compare separately the treatment of black defendants to white (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) and Asian defendants,
there is a larger gap between the treatment of blacks and Asians than
there is between the treatment of blacks and whites, although the
146 Recall that the principal finding of the McCleskey research was contained in an input-output model that combined jury and prosecutorial decisions. One core finding was
that the strong race-of-victim effects documented in the MCleskey research were primarily
the product of prosecutorial decisions to waive the death penalty before convening the
guilt trial. Although race-of-victim effects were apparent in the jury sentencing decisions,
particularly in rural areas, the prosecutorial decision making played the largest role.
147 These effects were suggested by the unadjusted disparities reported in Table 2,
Column B, Row 2, which indicated that before trial, prosecutors were less likely to waive
the death penalty unilaterally in black-defendant cases. In our adjusted analyses, the core
logistic regression model for the decision to unilaterally waive the death penalty before
trial yields a black-defendant odds multiplier of 3.4, significant at the .04 level.
148
See BALDus ET AL., supra note 59, at 145 (describing the liberation hypothesis).
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small number of Asians makes the results of this analysis only suggestive. 14 9 A comparable analysis of death sentences imposed for failure

of the jury to find mitigation, in which the treatment of black-victim
cases is compared separately to white-victim (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) and Asian-victim cases, revealed that the effects were stronger
1 50
for the white than for the Asian-victim cases.
Hispanics constitute 47% (70/148) of all white death-eligible defendants and 49% (34/69) of the white defendants whose cases advanced to a jury penalty trial. 15 1 We conducted further analyses of
jury penalty decisions to compare separately the treatment of black
defendants vis-a-vis the treatment of non-Hispanic white and Hispanic
white defendants. In both the analysis of all jury penalty trials and the
analysis of the jury weighing decisions, the contrast in the treatment
of these two groups versus the black defendants was more substantial

149 There are only eight Asians in the universe, five of whom advanced to a penalty
trial with two death sentences imposed. In the modified model ofjury death sentencing
among all death-eligible cases, as in Appendix E, Table E2, the white-defendant coefficient
was -1.1 (p = .03) and the Asian-defendant coefficient was -2.8 (p = .01).
One month after final submission of this Article for publication, we learned that our
Philadelphia data sources had classified as Hispanic two defendants who were black Hispanics. (These two defendants were involved as defendants in five separate murder cases.)
Following our protocol, under which black trumps Hispanic, we reclassified these defendants as black. Also, in a re-evaluation of our earlier race and ethnicity classifications
prompted by this earlier discovery, we learned that one white Hispanic defendant had
been incorrectly classified as black, that two victims previously classified as of unknown
race were white, and that one victim previously classified Hispanic was black. With these
adjustments made, we re-estimated the principal models reported in Table 4, Row 2. The
differences in the estimated race effects were trivial. The level of statistical significance of
each disparity remained the same. The magnitude of the regression coefficients for the
racial variables changed as follows: Column B (no change); Column C (no change); Column D (an increase to 2.3 from 2.2); Column E (an increase from 1.1 to 1.3) On the basis
of these analyses, we are confident that these misclassifications do not affect the accuracy
of the analyses reported in this Article.
150 See Table 5 for the model. There were only eight Asian-victim cases in the analysis,
three of which resulted in a death sentence. The coefficient was .07 (p = .96) for the Asianvictim cases and 1.63 (p =.20) for the white-victim cases.
151 The identification of Hispanic defendants and victims in our database is problematic for two reasons. First, none of our data sources classify ethnicity independently of
race. Cf. Directive No. 15. Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting, 43 Fed. Reg. 1926 (U.S. Office of Mgmt. and Budget 1978) ("[I]t is preferable to collect data on race and ethnicity separately."). Moreover, we have no information
on the precise criteria used by the sources of our data for classifying defendants and victims as Hispanic, i.e., the extent to which they are based on name, self-identification, langnage, neighborhood of residence, place of birth, or other considerations. See Michael
Omi, RacialIdentity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification, 15 J. LAw & INEQ. 7 (1997)
(surveying the problems associated with the racial and ethnicity classifications); Luis Angel
Toro, A People Distinct From Other Race and Identity in Federal Indian Law and the Hispanic
Classificationin OMB DirectiveNo. 15, 26 TEx. TECH L. Rxv. 1219, 1225-30 (1995) (critiquing
problems associated with Hispanic classifications).
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for the Hispanic white defendants than it was the non-Hispanic white
1 52
defendants.
The race-of-victim effects estimated in an analysis of jury death
sentencing for failure to find mitigation after finding statutory aggravation suggest comparable levels of treatment of defendants whose victims are non-Hispanic whites and defendants whose victims are
153
Hispanic whites.
d. DifferentialJury 'Tindings" and "Weighing" of Aggravating
and MitigatingCircumstances
One possible explanation for the Philadelphia disparities is that
the racial characteristics of the cases influence the willingness ofjuries
to "find" statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We style
this the "finding" hypothesis. An alternative, "weighing" hypothesis
states that after juries have found a series of statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, racial and SES considerations influence the
weight they place on them.
To test the finding hypothesis, we correlated findings of statutory
aggravation with the racial characteristics of the cases (controlling for
the strength of evidence measure, which indicated when the facts
152 In the analysis of all jury penalty trials, after adjustment for defendant culpability
with the applicable regression based scale, as in Table 4, Column D, Row 2, and the race of
the victim, the adjusted death-sentencing rates in the black-victim cases were as follows: .37
for black defendants (n = 207); .11 for non-Hispanic white defendants (n = 3), .0 for Hispanic white defendants (n = 7), with no Asian defendants in the analysis. In the nonblackvictim cases, the rates were .41 for the black defendants (n = 49); .33 for non-Hispanic
white defendants (n = 27); .14 for Hispanic white defendants (n = 23); and .11 for Asian
defendants (n = 2). In a comparable analysis of jury weighing decisions, as in Table 4,
Column C, Row 2, the adjusted rates in the black victim cases were as follows: .33 for black
defendants (n = 115); .13 for non-Hispanic white defendants (n = 3), .0 for Hispanic white
defendants (n = 6), with no Asian defendants in the analysis. In the nonblack-victim cases,
the rates were as follows: .31 for black defendants (n = 30); .25 for the non-Hispanic whites
(n = 9); .0 for the Hispanic white (n = 12); and .0 for the sole Asian defendant.
153 After adjustment for defendant culpability with the applicable regression based
scale and the race of defendant, the rates for the black-defendant cases were as follows: .31
in the non-Hispanic white-victim cases (n = 31) and .23 in the Hispanic white-victim cases
(n = 5). In the nonblack-defendant cases, the rates were .30 in the non-Hispanic white
victim cases (n = 19) and .22 in the Hispanic white victim cases (n = 12).
The findings reported above on the differential treatment of defendants in white Hispanic and white non-Hispanic victim cases are consistent with results reported elsewhere.
See Robert Garcia, Latinos and CriminalJustice,14 CHIcmco-I.rnNo LAw REV. 6, 14 (1994)
(reporting research in Fresno County, California by sociologist Richard Berk, which suggests that in death-eligible cases, defendants with Latino victims were much less likely to be
capitally charged). However, the results concerning the comparative treatment of white
Hispanic and white non-Hispanic defendants are inconsistent with evidence from California suggesting that Hispanic white defendants are treated more punitively than non-Hispanic white defendants. Id. These findings underscore the risk of generalizing the results
of empirical studies across historically and culturally distinct jurisdictions. The Philadelphia findings also call, especially because of the small samples of white defendants (both
Hispanic and non-Hispanic), for further study to better understand the race-of-defendant
and race-of-victim distinctions that we observe in these data.
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sufficed to support such a finding, and the level of defendant culpability).' 5 4 We found juries more willing to find statutory aggravation
present in black-defendant with nonblack-victim cases.' 5 5 We also
found that the willingness of the juries to find mitigation was significantly correlated with the victim's race although not with the race of
the defendant. Specifically, when the evidence supported such a finding,juries were much less likely to find the e4 (defendant's age) factor
and the e8 (catchall) factor when the victim was nonblack. 15 6 Furthermore, the failure to find mitigation in these cases had real consequences. In each of the 26 nonblack-victim cases that resulted in a
death sentence at this stage in the process (not including the volunteer defendants), the jury failed to find the e8 factor in spite of evidence that would have supported such a finding. Moreover, in 43%
(6/14) of the 14 nonblack-victim cases in which the jury failed to find
the age mitigator, the defendant was sentenced to death for failure to
find mitigation. These findings directly corroborate the more general
finding that when the victim was nonblack, juries were more likely to
impose death sentences for want of a finding of mitigation.
We also found that in cases involving low-SES victims, juries were
less likely to find aggravation when it was present in the case and more
154 Recent interviews with capital jurors indicate that the willingness of juries to find
mitigation may be dependent on the aggravation level of the cases. SeeWilliamJ. Bowers &
Benjamin D. Steiner, Choosing Life or Death: Sentencing Dynamics in CapitalCases, in AMERICAN'S EXPERIMENT wrrH CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT 309, 341 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1997)
("[O]bsession with the grotesque character of the crime... may generally trump consideration of mitigation.... ."). The control for defendant culpability was the overall model of
defendant culpability estimated with the model presented in Table E2, Appendix E, after
the race and SES variables had been purged from the model. The control for the strength
of evidence for each mitigator was whether the evidence supporting it was "strong" or
"sufficient." For the e8 factor, we found such evidence present for each case that did not
involve a volunteer. For the e4 factor, we treated it as present if the defendant was less
than 21 or greater than 55 years of age. Under this measure, the e4 factor was present in 21
of the 26 death-sentenced defendants whose victims were nonblack.
155 In cases with black defendants and nonblack victims, if the evidence supported a
finding of statutory aggravation, juries found the factor present 91% of the time but only
68% of the time in other cases (p= .001). This correlation did not hold, however, for black
defendants as a whole. Also, there was only a weak correlation between the race of the
victim and jury findings on statutory aggravation, i.e., .78 for nonblack-victim cases versus
.69 for black-victim cases (p = .13).
156 When the evidence supported the e4 factor, juries found the factor present 38%
(8/21) of the time in nonblack-victim cases and 75% (48/64) of the time in black-victim
cases (p = .002). After controlling for defendant culpability, the correlation between the
race of the victim and the finding of mitigation was -.45 (p = .0006). In a similar analysis,
the correlation between the SES of the victim and the finding of mitigation was .21 (p =
.06), with such a finding more likely in low-SES-victim cases. For the e8 factor, the finding
rates were 46% (25/55) for the nonblack-victim cases versus 64% (71/111) for the blackvictim cases (p = .03). After controlling for defendant culpability, the correlation between
the race of the victim and the finding of mitigation was -.16 (p = .05). In a similar analysis,
the correlation between the SES of the victim and the finding of mitigation was .16 (p =
.05), with such a finding more likely in low SES victim cases.
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likely to find mitigation when it was present. 157 However, because of
the fairly strong correlation between the race of the victim and the
SES of the victim, the extent to which this association reflects race-ofvictim effects or the impact of victim SES is not entirely clear. We
believe these findings support the conclusion that the race and SES of
-both defendants and victims influence jury findings on statutory aggravation and mitigation.
We tested the weighing hypothesis with multiple-regression analyses of jury weighing decisions that we limited, first to the black-defendant cases and, second, to the nonblack-defendant cases. We
conducted a similar analysis of the decision to impose death for failure to find mitigation that we limited first to the black-victim cases
and, second, to the nonblack-victim cases. However, in this second
pair of analyses, we did not consider statutory mitigation found by the
jury because in each death case at this stage, the jury's decision is
based on a failure to find any mitigation at all. Instead, we evaluated
the relative weight that the juries appear to place on the mitigation
that was present in the case (as well as the aggravation that was found).
We caution, however, that because of the relatively small samples of
cases involving nonblack defendants and nonblack victims, the results
58
of this inquiry are merely suggestive.'
The comparative analysis of the jury weighing decisions in the
black- and nonblack-defendant cases suggests that, with one exception, juries place comparable weight on the aggravating circumstances. The one exception is the d7 factor that involves the
defendants' creation of a "grave risk of death to another person in
addition to the victim of the offense." In the black-defendant cases,
the coefficient for this factor was positive, substantial (.20), and statistically significant (.01), while in the analysis of the nonblack defendants, the coefficient had a nonsignificant negative sign(-.39).
The most striking finding of the comparative analysis is the
weight placed on the mitigating circumstances. Recall that the logistic
regression model presented in Table 6 suggests that overall mitigators
have very little influence in the jury weighing decisions. Our comparative analysis suggests that what little influence the mitigators do have
157 On aggravation, the difference in finding rates was -18 points (.48 - .66) (p = .007).
On mitigation, the difference was 24 percentage points (.83 - .59) (p = .05) on the e4
(age) factor and 19 percentage points (.70 - .51) (p = .03) on the e8 (catchall) factor.
158 Because of small sample limitations, we were unable to use logistic regression and
used instead ordinary least squares models. In addition, the small samples meant that most
of the variables in the smaller subgroups failed to achieve statistical significance. As an
alternative, we focused on the magnitude of the coefficients even if they failed to achieve
significance statistically. Finally, because of the small samples, some of the less commonly
found aggravating and mitigating circumstances may have been very infrequently found
and entered into the weighing process.
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is found in the nonblack-defendant cases. Among the black-defendant cases, the only mitigator with a statistically significant impact is
e5, "defendant under duress or substantial domination of another
person." No other mitigator came even close to achieving statistical
significance, and the magnitude of most of the coefficients was very
low. For example, the e8 catchall factor appears to have no weight at
all among the black-defendant cases. In contrast, the results for the
nonblack defendants suggested considerably more impact from the
mitigators, especially the e8 catchall factor, although none of them
achieved statistical significance. These results suggest that the race-ofdefendant effects we see in the jury weighing decisions may reflect a
tendency of juries in black defendant cases to give less mitigative
weight to the mitigators they find than they do in the nonblack-defendant cases. 15 9
159 The literature supports three propositions that may explain the race-of-defendant
effects documented at the weighing stage in this research. First, perceived dangerousness
is an important factor in jury death sentencing even if dangerous is not explicitly implicated by a statutory aggravating circumstance. Juror consideration of defendant dangerousness as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance is constitutional even though it is not
designated as a statutory aggravating circumstance. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154, 162 (1994); William J. Bowers, The CapitalJuryProject: Rationale,Design, and Preview of Early Findings,70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1091 (1995) (noting that in states with dangerousness as a nonstatutory aggravator only, "three out of ten [capital jurors] thought that the
death penalty was required if they found that the defendant would be dangerous in the
future"); Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness:DifferentiatingBetween
Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21, 49-51 (1997) (noting
that the Court inJohnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993), "reasoned that the jury could assess
future dangerousness in light of how the defendant's age influenced his conduct"); William S. Geimer &Jonathan Amsterdam, Why JurorsVote Life or Death: OperativeFactorsin Ten
FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. CIum. L. 1, 40 tbl.3 (1987-1988) (noting that, although
not a factor under Florida law, the perceived dangerousness of the defendant was reported
as a factor by 11% of the jurors who voted for death.); Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital
Jurors Who Change Their MindsAbout the Punishment:A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines,70
IND. L.J. 1183, 1215-17 (1995) (noting that juror interviews indicate cross-overs to death
often are motivated by concerns about dangerousness and how long the defendant will
serve if not sentenced to death). The frequent requests of penalty-trial jurors for information about how long a defendant will remain in prison if not sentenced to death also reflects the importance that jurors place on dangerousness.
Second, in contemporary American culture much of the white community perceives
(often unconsciously) African Americans, particularly lower class young men, to be crime
prone and dangerous. -See Thomas L. Durm, The New Enclosures: Racism in the Normalized
Community, in READING RODNEY KING: READING URBaN' UPRISING 178, 190 (Robert GoodingWilliams ed., 1993) ("In the American version of normalized society, the least normal (and
most despised) group of people are young black men."); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the WhiteJury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1643-47 (1985) (summarizing the literature
demonstrating widely held perceptions of blacks as more likely to commit crime and as
more violent and dangerous than others); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal
Cases, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1739, 1750-60 (1993) (providing evidence of prosecutors' exploitation of the perception of "African Americans as more violent and more criminal than
whites") [hereinafter Racial Imagery].
Third, to some unknown degree, these negative perceptions of black men are shared
between both the white and black communities, especially its middle class, which could
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The analysis of the death-sentencing decisions based on the jury's
failure to find mitigation suggests that in both black-victim and nonblack-victim cases, the most significant aggravating circumstance is the
d9 factor, a "significant history of felony convictions involving the use
or threat of violence to the person." (This factor was large and statistically significant in each analysis, and no other statutory factor
achieved significance in either analysis.) Among the mitigators, the
e8 catchall factor is important and statistically significant in both
groups of cases. The el factor, "no significant criminal history," is
only important in the nonblack-victim cases, while the defendant's
age, the e4 factor, has a mitigating effect only in the black-victim cases.
This latter finding concerning the defendant's age mirrors the earlier
finding that jurors in black-victim cases were less likely to find the e4
age factor present in the case than when the victim was nonblack.
These results suggest that the race of the victim has an independent
aggravating effect. Since the jury is well aware that its failure to find
mitigation will result in a death sentence, the presence of a nonblack
victim simply enhances the average juror's perception of the
deathworthiness of the offense.
3.

TheoreticalExplanationsfor Race and SES Disparitiesin
Philadelphiaand Elsewhere

-The statistical analyses in the preceding section offer some insight into the most likely explanations for the racial and SES disparities that the Philadelphia data document. However, a considerable
160
body of psychological, sociological, and political science literature,
the reported experience of legal practitioners, 161 newspaper re-

explain why Philadelphia juries with substantial black representation may treat black defendants more punitively than similarly situated nonblack defendants. (Preliminary findings from our analysis ofjury racial composition in Philadelphia capital cases suggest that
black defendants are treated less punitively vis-a-vis nonblack defendants as the proportion
of blacks on the juries increases). See Adelbert H. Jenkin, PSYCHOLOGY AND AnRcXAN AMEPicANS 177-81 (1995) (noting that evolution of identity in the black community may include
identification with whites in order to minimize persecution and that some blacks view
other "[b]lacks in the same stereotyped way that racist [w]hites do"); Jennifer L. Hochschild, Middle-Class Blacks and the Ambiguities of Success, in PREJUDICE, POLMCS, AND THE
AMERICAN Dir.EmMA 148, 165-72 (Paul M. Shiderman et al. eds., 1993) (examining the anxieties that revolve around the issue of what it means to be a black in a predominantly white
society); Robert C. Smith & Richard Seltzer, RACE, CLASS, AND CULTURE 77, 109-11 (1992)
(emphasizing black victimization rates, fear of crime, especially on the part of black women, and support for the death penalty of over 50% outside the South with greater support among higher income blacks).
160 See GRoss & MAURO, supra note 69, at 109-17 (discussing and citing this literature).
161
See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination,Death and Denial: The Tolerance of RacialDiscrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 433 (1995).
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ports, 162 and common experiences suggest other possible explanations. In this section, we consider these theories and evaluate their
applicability in post-Furman Philadelphia.
a.

Overt, Conscious Racial Discrimination

One theory, particularly prominent in the pre-Furman South, is
that the observed racial disparities were likely the product of overt
racial animus-hostility toward black defendants. This animus appeared most fervently if the victim was a "more worthy" white. During
the post-Furman period, the level of overt racial animus appears to
have declined throughout the nation, including Philadelphia.
Although one cannot completely discount the possibility of overt conscious discrimination in Philadelphia, the mechanisms producing race
effects there and elsewhere in the country appear to be more
complex.
b.

Community Outrage

Conventional wisdom holds that community outrage is the most
important determinant of race disparities among similarly situated
cases. Community outrage pressures prosecutors, judges, and juries
to avenge highly visible murders. One often correlates high visibility
with racial composition of both the defendant and victim of the cases.
White-victim cases, especially if they are interracial cases, continue to
attract the most media coverage. This attention in turn influences
prosecutors to allocate their scarce resources to those cases, especially
if reelection or a run for higher political office is probable. Additionally, when the victim is white, some prosecutors are more solicitous of
a request by the victim's family to seek a death sentence. Moreover,
prosecutors consult the families of black victims less often, and when
they do, the families generally are less likely to seek a death
63
sentence.1
While the outrage theory may be salient in suburbs and rural
communities, both of which tend to have relatively small black populations, particularly in the South, it appears to have little applicability in
Philadelphia. Surely, the Philadelphia District Attorney supports and
aggressively pursues the death penalty, in part with an eye to its political implications in a community with a very high homicide rate. However, no evidence suggests that this support for the death penalty
produces the racial disparities documented in the Philadelphia
research.
162
See, e.g., Jim Henderson & Jack Taylor, Racist Justice: DiscriminationEven in Death,
DALLAS TAmEs HERALD, Nov. 17, 1985, at 1 (describing racial discrimination in Dallas's

death penalty and exploring the possible reasons for disparities).
163

See Bright, supra note 161, at 453-54.
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In Philadelphia, seventy-eight percent of the capital defendants
and sixty-seven percent of the victims are black. Very few of the Philadelphia victims were high-status whites murdered by black defendants.
The only cases that appear to produce an uncompromising,
prosecutorial hard line are those involving police victims. Indeed, in
virtually all other case categories, the Commonwealth is willing to negotiate a guilty plea in exchange for a penalty of life without possibility
of parole. Finally, there is little to support the idea that Philadelphia
prosecutors are more deferential to the wishes of family members concerning whether the death sentence should be sought in nonblackvictim cases.
c.

The Perceived Unimportance of Black-on-Black Murder Cases

The prevailing view in many communities, particularly in the
South and large cities, is that black-on-black homicides do not warrant
the resources required for capital trials, and therefore, plea bargains
with relatively light sentences are appropriate. These perceptions may
result in perfunctory investigations by law enforcement officials in
black-victim cases, which in turn may lead some prosecutors to believe
that the prospects of obtaining a death sentence are too low to justify
the cost. In addition, some prosecutors may believe that the black
community will provide a low level of cooperation in the investigation
of these cases, significantly reducing the chance of obtaining a capital
murder conviction at trial. This belief may encourage the acceptance
of a plea to a lesser offense. Furthermore, the black community's perception that defendants in black-on-black cases probably wili receive
light sentences and return to the streets in a relatively short period of
time may inhibit witnesses from coming forward with incriminating
evidence against the defendants.
None of this analysis appears applicable to Philadelphia. The District Attorney's office generally supports the death penalty across the
board even though sixty-seven percent of the murder victims and seventy-eight percent of the defendants are black.
d.

The Predominanceof White Control of the CriminalJustice
System

In many places in the United States, prosecutors, judges, and
penalty-trial jurors are predominantly white even though the defendants whose cases they hear are not.1 64 The conventional wisdom is
that white jurors are less likely to sympathize with black defendants or
to identify with black victims. Convincing evidence also suggests that
164

See RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN BLACK

WHITE: WHO LIVEs, WHO DIES, WHO DECIDES 19-21 (1998) (reporting the research of
Professor Jeffrey Pokorak, indicating that blacks constitute fewer than two percent of the
district attorneys (not including assistant district attorneys) in America).
AND
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many participants in the system, both black and nonblack, consider
young black males more deserving of severe punishment because they
are violence prone, morally inferior, and a threat to the community.
The danger for black defendants in the system is particularly acute
when the attorneys who represent them entertain racial stereotypes
that diminish the quality and vigor of their representation.
The risk of both race-of-defendant and race-of-victim discrimination is also enhanced when the jury selection processes result in the
serious underrepresentation of blacks on criminal trial juries. This
underrepresentation is a widespread problem. First, blacks are often
underrepresented on both the voter and automobile registration lists
from which most jury venires are drawn. Second, low-income citizens
are less likely to appear for jury service, and courts are more likely to
excuse them for hardship. Third, and most important, prosecutors
have the wide-ranging discretion to strike prospective jurors through
the exercise of "peremptory" challenges. The result is that many
black defendants receive sentences from juries with only a few or no
blacks. This problem is particularly acute when the attorneys assigned
to represent indigent defendants are inexperienced or indifferent,
making it easier for prosecutors to strike blacks because their strikes
are not effectively challenged.1 65 We are currently investigating the
levels of African American representation on the Philadelphia juries
referred to in this Article.
Finally, explicit prosecutorial references to the jury of the race of
the defendant or the victim (e.g., "'Can you imagine her state of mind
...
staring into the muzzle of a gun held by this black man?"') 166 as
well as racial slurs and other appeals to racial prejudice, such as the
use of animal metaphors in describing the defendant (e.g., "this
animal" who "shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on
him") 16 7 exacerbate the risk of racial discriniination. 168 Slurs of this
type have come from prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel. 169
E.

The Magnitude and Practical Consequences of Post-Furman
Race Disparities

A question of obvious importance concerns the "practical" consequences and the "impact" of the disparities researchers have docu165 See Bright, supra note 161, at 444-48.
166 Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F. 2d 1310, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990) (Heaney, J., concurring
and dissenting) (quoting the trial transcript).
167 Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180 nn.1I & 12 (1986).
168 SeeJohnson, RacialImagey, supra note 159, at 1750-65 (analyzing the prejudicial use
of racial imagery during criminal trials, especially by prosecutors).
169 See Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of CapitalPunishment: The Sacrifice of Fairnessfor
Executions, inAMERuCA'S EXPERIMENT wrrH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 117, 131 (James R. Acker et

al. eds., 1998).
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mented in Philadelphia and elsewhere. In this section, we consider
several ways of assessing these consequences.
1.

The Impact of Racial Disparitieson Death-Sentencing "Odds" and
"Probabilities"

One approach is to focus on the impact of the disparities on the
odds that the average member of the disadvantaged group wil receive
a death sentence (e.g., one can compare the odds of a death sentence
for black defendants to the odds faced by similarly situated nonblack
defendants). These effects are reflected in the "odds-multiplier"
measures reported earlier and in Table 4. For example, Table 4 (Row
2, Column D) indicates that, on average, black defendants in Philadelphia face odds of receiving a death sentence in a penalty trial that are
9.3 times higher than the odds faced by nonblack defendants with
170
comparable levels of culpability.
An alternative individually focused measure estimates the impact
of race on the probability that the average member of the disfavored
group will receive a death sentence. One may express this impact as
the arithmetic difference in death-sentencing rates for similarly situated members of the favored and disfavored groups. For example,
Table 4 (Row 5, Column D) reports penalty-trial death-sentencing
rates for black and nonblack defendants of .38 and .24 respectively,
after adjustment for the relative culpability of the two groups of cases
estimated with the salient factors measure of defendant culpability.
The arithmetic difference between those rates indicates that the average black defendant's probability of receiving a death sentence is 14
percentage points higher than a similarly situated nonblack
defendant.
The relative risk that individuals in the favored and disfavored
groups will be sentenced to death can also be expressed as a ratio. For
example, the ratio of the .38 and .24 rates referred to above indicates
that the average black defendant's probability of receiving a death
sentence is 1.6 (.38/.24) times greater than a similarly situated nonblack defendant. An advantage of the ratio as a measure of relative
risk is that it reflects a comparison of probabilities rather than odds.
(No matter how carefully presentations of odds multipliers are qualified to reflect their precise meaning, odds multipliers are almost invariably interpreted as ratios of probabilities rather than enhancements
of odds.) Compare for example, the 9.3 odds multiplier reported in
Table 4 in Row 2, Column D with the 1.6 ratio measure in Row 3,
Column D. Each of these measures controls for the same level of de170

For other examples of the use of this measure, see GRoss & MAURO, supra note 69,

at 43-94; Keil & Vito, supra note 70, at 26-27, 29.
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fendant culpability estimated in a single logistic regression analysis.
Each measure is accurate, but if the odds multiplier is mistakenly interpreted as a ratio of probabilities, they produce quite different impressions. Although the odds multiplier is to statisticians the
mathematically "natural" measure of association in a two-by-two table
and is the statistic to which the "p-values" of our significance tests refer, we feel that it may be easier for a lay audience to understand relative risks (ratios of rates) or changes in risk (differences of rates). In
addition, in small tables, it is not unusual for the odds multipliers to
be very large if not infinite. For these reasons we emphasize the rela171
tive risk as a descriptive statistic in this report.
2. Excess Death Sentence Rates and Death Sentences
But, what are the practical consequences of these disparities in
death-sentencing rates? On this issue, it is useful to focus first on the
extent to which the death-sentencing rate for the disadvantaged
group exceeds what one would expect in an evenhanded system. For
example, the decision point at which juries impose death sentences
for failure to find mitigation in the case, Table 4 (Row 3, Column B)
reports adjusted death-sentencing rates of .31 for the nonblack-victim
cases and .22 for the black-victim cases. If one views the rate for the
black-victim cases as the expected rate in an evenhanded system, the
observed rate for the nonblack-victim cases is 41% (.09/.22) in excess
172
of that rate.
Similarly, at the decision point in which juries impose death
sentences after weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
Table 4 (Row 3, Column C) reports an adjusted death-sentencing rate
of .33 for the black-defendant cases and .12 for the nonblack-defendant cases. If one views the rate for the nonblack-defendant cases as
the expected rate in an evenhanded system, the rate for the blackdefendant cases is 175% (.21/.12) in excess of that rate. 173
171

A drawback of this measure is its sensitivity to the magnitude of the overall death-

sentencing rate for the two groups of defendants. For example, a 5 percentage point disparity when the overall death-sentencing rate is low may produce quite a different ratio
estimate than it would when the overall rate is high. For example, rates of .10 and .05 will
produce a ratio of 2.0 (10/5), while rates of .55 and .50 will produce a ratio of 1.1 (55/50),
even though the deprivation in the average probability for the members of the disadvantaged group is identical.
172

The formula is:

Observed (OB) - Expected (EX)
Expected (EX)
As applied here: OB-EX _ .31-.22 = .09 = .41
EX
.22
.22
173 If one views the average death-sentencing rate as the expected rate in an evenhanded system, the rate for the black defendants is 14% (.04/.29) in excess of that rate.
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The excess death-sentencing analysis uses the same approach
when estimating the extent to which the number of death sentences
juries actually imposed on members of the disadvantaged group exceeds what one would expect in an evenhanded system. Using this
approach, the number of death sentences juries imposed for failure to
find mitigation in nonblack-victim cases is 31% (8/26) in excess of
what one would have expected if the rate for the black victim cases of
comparable culpability is the basis for the comparison and 19% (5/
26) if the average rate is the basis for the comparison.' 74 Similarly, at
the point in which juries weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the number of death sentences juries imposed is 63% (29/46)
in excess of what one would have expected if the rate for the nonblack-defendant cases is the basis for the comparison and 13% (6/46)
if the average rate is the basis for the comparison. 175 In Georgia and
1 76
NewJersey, the results were in the 30-40% range.
3.

Impact on the Community and Death Row Population

Some observers have noted that the principal beneficiaries of
race-of-victim discrimination are black defendants because the vast
majority of death-eligible cases involving black victims also involve
black defendants. Thus, if on average, the system treats black-victim
cases less punitively than nonblack-victim cases, black defendants will
be sentenced to death at a lower rate than would be the case in a
system that sentenced all cases at the white-victim rate. However, if a
system sentenced all cases at the black-victim rate, there would be no
increase in the number of black defendants sentenced to death, but
there would be a decline in the number of nonblack defendants sentenced to death. Nevertheless, it is clear that if an evenhanded policy
were applied to the black- and nonblack-victim cases (at the current
174 At this stage in the jury deliberations, there were 26 death sentences imposed in
nonblack-victim cases for failure of the jury to find mitigation present in the case. On the
basis of the data in Table 7, we estimate there would have been only 18 death sentences
imposed in these cases if they had been treated comparably to similarly situated blackvictim cases. Thus we estimate that 31% (8/26) of the death sentences were excess. Had
the overall average death-sentencing rate been applied to the nonblack-victim cases, there
would have been only five excess death sentences among those cases.
175 At this stage in the jury deliberations, there were 46 death sentences imposed in
the black-defendant cases. On the basis of the data in Table 8, we estimate that there would
have been only 17 death sentences imposed in these cases if they had been treated comparably to the nonblack-defendant cases. Had the overall average death sentencing rate been
applied to the nonblack-defendant cases, there would have been only five excess death
sentences.
In the Georgia research, the excess rate of death sentences associated with race-of176
victim discrimination statewide is in the 35-40% range. See BAuus Er AL., supra note 59, at
154 tbl.32 & 322 tbl.53. In the New Jersey research, the rate of excess death sentences
associated with race-of-defendant discrimination injury penalty trials is 37%. See Technical
Appendix, supra note 78, at 14a tbl.18.1.
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rate for either black- or nonblack-victim cases), the proportionof black
defendants on death row would increase.
In places that currently treat black defendants more punitively,
like Philadelphia, an evenhanded system would reduce the number of
black defendants sentenced to death. Moreover, an evenhanded system that applied the current death-sentencing rate for either black or
nonblack defendants would reduce the proportion of black defendants on death row.
4. Measures of the Importance of Race and SES injury Decision
Making
A useful measure of the degree of influence of both the race and
SES of the defendant and of the victim in jury decision making is a
comparison of the magnitude of the coefficients estimated for those
variables (in a logistic regression model) with the coefficients estimated for the variables for legitimate case characteristics in the same
model. For example, the coefficient for the black-defendant variable
estimated in the analysis of Philadelphia penalty-trial weighing decisions (see Table 6) is larger and more statistically significant than the
coefficients for seven of the statutory aggravating circumstances in the
analysis.
IV
JUDICIAL AND LEGIsLATIvE RESPONSES TO CiAIvS OF
RACIAL. DISCRVIMINATION

A. The United States Supreme Court

-

The Supreme Court did not directly address a constitutional
claim that states administer the death penalty in a racially discriminatory pattern until McCleskey v. Kemp.17 7 The Justices, however, have
been aware of the issue for decades. In fact, the Court has announced
many of the procedural protections that it has established in criminal
cases since the 1930s in capital cases involving black defendants in the
South. Moreover, although the Court was aware of empirical studies
suggesting racially discriminatory patterns, especially in southern
states, it has demonstrated a persistent reluctance to confront the race
question directly. In a number of capital cases between 1962 and
1986, the Court either declined requests to hear issues of racial discrimination by denying certiorari or resolved the case on other
78
grounds.
177 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
178 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (failing to address the race issue);
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (resolving the case by reference to an issue not
raised below and ignoring race in its disposition).
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A noteworthy example of the Court's diffidence on this issue is
Maxwell v. Bishop.179 Maxwell, a black male, received a death sentence
from an Arkansas jury for the nonfatal rape of a white woman.' s0 The
case received particular attention because Maxwell's attorneys supported their claim of a violation of equal protection rights with statistical evidence that Maxwell's death sentence was part of a racially
discriminatory pattern.' 8 ' Most telling were results from an Arkansas
study showing that, between 1945 and 1965, the probability that ajury
would give the death sentence to a black male convicted in Arkansas
of raping a white woman was about fifty percent, while the death-sentencing rate for cases involving conviction for any other defendant8 2 Maxvictim racial combination rape was only fourteen percent.
well's experts further established that nonracial factors, such as the
level of violence the crime involved or the defendant's prior criminal
record could not explain this disparity.' 8 3 Despite this evidence, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that Maxwell's statistics
were insufficient to invalidate his death sentence on equal protection
grounds. 8 4 The Supreme Court agreed to review, and ultimately vacated, the Eighth Circuit's decision on another constitutional ground,
but the Court pointedly declined to review Maxwell's statistically
85
based, equal protection claim.'
Two years after it decided Maxwell the Supreme Court again confronted claims of racial discrimination in Furman v. Georgia.'8 6 The
Court's brief per curium opinion did not directly address the claims
of racial discrimination that Furman and a companion case petitioner, both of whom were black, asserted. However, three concurring Justices and one dissenting Justice expressed, in separate
opinions, their concerns that the jury sentencing practices under scrutiny created a dangerous opportunity for racial discrimination. Justice
Thurgood Marshall's concurring opinion gave the question the greatest attention. He recited in detail the national statistics showing a disproportional overrepresentation of blacks among the people
398 U.S. 262 (1970).
180
See Maxwell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710, 711-12 (E.D. Ark. 1966), affd 398 F.2d 138
(8th Cir. 1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
See Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 141-45 (8th Cir. -1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262
181
(1970).
182 See id. at 145.
183 See id. at 143.
184
See id. at 147.
185 See Maxwell 398 U.S. at 267 (expressing no view on the race issue). The same data
'79

were brought to the Court's attention in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which challenged the death penalty for the crime of rape. The Court barred the use of capital punishment for rape on Eighth Amendment "excessiveness" grounds, but it pointedly made no
reference to the racial issue presented by the case.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
186
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executed in America from 1930 through 1970.187 Unfortunately, evidence on the issue from well-controlled studies was unavailable at the
time.
88 saw the publication of
The decade following Gregg v. GeorgiaM
more than two-dozen empirical studies, primarily in southern jurisdictions, that were designed to test the discrimination hypothesis in murder cases. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund ("LDF") commissioned
one of the largest of these studies in the early 1980s. This study, which
David Baldus, George Woodworth, and Charles Pulaski, Jr. conducted,
analyzed the relationship between sentencing outcomes and racial
characteristics in 2,484 homicide cases Georgia charged and sentenced from 1973 to 1979. The following unadjusted tabulation, from
what the courts have described as "the Baldus study," indicates how
death-sentencing outcomes correlated with the defendant/victim racial combination among all cases in the study:
Black Defendant/White Victim:
White Defendant/White Victim:
Black Defendant/Black Victim:
White Defendant/Black Victim:

21%
8%
1%
3%

(50/233)
(58/748)
(18/1443)
(2/60)

Those data suggest strong race-of-victim discrimination as well as
more punitive treatment of black offenders in white-victim cases. The
researchers further subjected the data to extensive multivariate statistical analysis, designed to estimate racial disparities after adjustment for
a large variety of legitimate case characteristics, such as the number of
victims, contemporaneous offenses such as rape or robbery, and the
defendant's prior criminal record.
Those results provided no evidence of systemic, statewide discrimination against black defendants. To be sure, in rural areas, blacks
were at greater risk of capital prosecution and death sentence than
similarly situated whites. But in urban areas, the opposite was the
case, and the two effects canceled each other out statewide. The statewide data did indicate, however, that among death-eligible cases, the
average defendant's odds of receiving a death sentence were 4.3 times
higher if the victim was white. The study also showed (1) that the
race-of-victim disparities were largest in the midrange cases, which
gave prosecutors and sentencing juries the greatest degree of discretion, and (2) that the observed race-of-victim disparities in death sentencing were primarily the product of prosecutorial, rather than jury,
decision making.
The Baldus study provided the basis for McCleskey, a federal
habeas corpus proceeding commenced in 1982 with the intention of
187
188

See id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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reversing McCleskey's death sentence. McCleskey was a black male
whom a jury had sentenced to death for killing a white police officer
in Atlanta. In the case, LDF attorneys alleged that the Baldus study
demonstrated a pattern of both purposeful and intentional discrimination in Georgia's capital-punishment system and that McCleskey's
sentence consequently violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 8 9 McCleskey's lawyers also claimed that the
Georgia study demonstrated a sufficient showing of arbitrariness and
of capriciousness in Georgia's administration of its capital statute to
violate the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments in the
Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by Furman.190
The Supreme Court rejected both of those constitutional claims
by a vote of five to four. The majority opinion, written by justice Lewis
Povell, declared that, because the Baldus study did not establish with
"exceptionally clear proof.., that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory purpose," McCleskey failed to
establish an equal protection violation. 191 Of particular importance
was the Court's unwillingness to apply the methods for proving discrimination, both systemic and in McCleskey's case, that courts commonly use in both jury- and employment-discrimination cases. 192 One
surprising effect of McCleskey, therefore, is that courts now subject
equal protection claims of purposeful racial discrimination in deathsentence cases to a far heavier burden of proof than they apply to
evaluate claims in ordinary jury- and employment-discrimination cases
and in claims of discrimination by white voters challenging racially
193
motivated legislative redistricting.
In response to McCleskey's Eighth Amendment arbitrariness
claim, Justice Powell's opinion accepted the validity of his data but
rejected his claim that his sentence was excessive because racial considerations may influence capital-sentencing decisions in Georgia.
Justice Powell reasoned that the statistical evidence McCleskey offered
failed to establish "a constitutionally significant risk" that racial factors
had, indeed, infected Georgia's death-sentencing process. 19 4 There is
U.S. 279, 286, 291 (1987).

189
190

See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481

191

Id. at 297.
The dissenting opinions ofJustices Blackmun and Stevens are of particular interest

192

See id. at 299.

because they perceived the remedy for the discrimination in McCleskey to be a limitation of
the Georgia death sentencing system to the most aggravated cases in which no race effects
were apparent.
193 See Hon. Julian A. Cook, Jr. & Mark S. Kende, Color-Blindnessin the Rehnquist Court:
Comparing the Court's Treatment of DiscriminationClaims by a Black Death Row Inmate and White
Voting Rights Plaintiffs, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 815 (1996) (comparing the Court's analysis
in McCleskey with its analysis in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), in which the Court
addressed white plaintiffs' claims of discrimination in redistricting).
194 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313.
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some intimation in the Court's opinion that statistical evidence might
support an Eighth Amendment claim of excessiveness, but only if the
proven disparities were much more severe than those documented by
McCleskey. The opinion also suggests that since "[s] tatistics at most
may show only a likelihood that a particular factor entered into some
decisions," statistical proof can never provide a sufficient base for inferring a constitutional risk of excessiveness in an individual case. 195
The opinion further suggests that when "constitutional [procedural]
guarantees are met," empirical evidence is irrelevant to a claim of excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment. 19 6 The Court underscored
this point by failing to specify in any way why McCleskey's proof was
1 97
not "constitutionally significant."'
Justice Powell couched his opinion largely in terms of McCleskey's failure of proof. However, he also addressed and alluded to several concerns that do not fit within any recognizable legal categories,
but appear to have been important to the decision. One factor working against McCleskey's equal protection argument may have been
that his case did not as heavily implicate the principle of racial equality underlying the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as would another, more typical civil-rights case. As a convicted
murderer, McCleskey did not enjoy the same status of an "oppressed
minority" as would a blameless claimant seeking equal access to housing, to employment, or to schools. In addition, McCleskey's claim
primarily pointed not to discrimination on the basis of his race (over
which he had no control), but rather to discrimination on the basis of
the victim's race. As noted earlier, 198 it was McCleskey who "chose"
his victim, a fact that weakened the moral appeal of his claim.
At one level, it may come as a surprise to see the Court reject a
claim of arbitrariness in the face of the strong empirical evidence
presented by McCleskey. On several earlier occasions, the Court has
invalidated death sentences on the ground that the record indicated
an unacceptable "risk" of arbitrariness in the case, when in fact, unlike
in McCleskey, there was little beyond the Justices' hunches and intuition to support such an inference. This preference for hunches and
intuition may very well reflect an insecurity about the Justices' own
abilities to properly assess statistical evidence of the type the defendant presented in McCleskey. The Court may fear that if it bases its
findings on empirical data, subsequent analyses could demonstrate
that it incorrectly interpreted the empirical data on which it based its
findings. One can understand why judges, relatively untrained in sta195
196

Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
Id. at 313.

197

Id.

198

See supra text accompanying note 39.
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tistics and confronted with conflicting opinions about the validity of
the data, might have greater confidence in their intuitively derived
conclusions than in the pronouncements of statisticians.
It is likely that the Court was even more concerned that a finding
of unconstitutional discrimination in McCleskey's case would have
had a significant disruptive effect on the criminal justice system of
Georgia and of other states. Justice Powell alludes to this possibility
when he suggests that a finding in favor of McCleskey could throw
"into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal
justice system."1 99 Such a ruling, he explained, could validate under
the Eighth Amendment, not only claims of racial discrimination but
also claims of discrimination based on sex, or on such allegedly arbitrary factors "as the defendant's facial characteristics, or the physical
attractiveness of the defendant or the victim, that some statistical study
20 0
indicates may be influential in jury decision making."
Even more important in the Court's thinking may have been a
concern that its recognition of a racial claim in a death case would
discredit the death penalty and enhance public perceptions that the
Court was responsible for the "failure" of the death penalty in the
post-Furman period. Justice Scalia underscored this concern in a
memorandum while McCleskey was pending in the Court. Addressing
the entire Court, he stated his belief that racial discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty is "'real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable."' 20 1 From this perspective, any
effort by the Court to cure the effects of discrimination could obviously have significant potential repercussions for the future of the
death penalty in America.
If the purpose of McCleskey was to provoke closure, it certainly was
successful in the federal courts. The decision has largely eliminated
the federal courts as a forum for the consideration of statistically
based claims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing. We know
of only one case since McCleskey in which a federal district court has
granted a hearing on a claim of racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty, and the court dismissed the claim for failure
202
to meet the McCleskey burden of proof.

Another effect of McCleskey has been to stimulate an alternative
focus in academic research on the death penalty. In addition to statistical evidence, several important projects now also focus on extended
199

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315.
Id. at 317-18 (footnotes omitted).
See Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 371 n.46 (quoting Memorandum from Antonin
Scalia, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Conference of the Justices, U.S. Supreme Court
(Jan. 6, 1987) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)).
202 See Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1572, 1575-79 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd,963 F.2d
1403 (11th Cir. 1991).
200
201
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interviews with jurors who have participated in the life-and-death decision making of penalty trials. The early results indicate that this research will shed substantial light on the extent to which jurors both
understand the facts and the law that underlie their decisions and fol203
low the instructions the court gives them.

MCleskey has drawn considerable criticism. Numerous commentators have expressed serious concern about the Court's placement of
an implicit imprimatur on racial discrimination in such an important
area of the criminal law.20 4 Particularly offensive to blacks is the per-

ception, based upon MCleskey, that the Constitution authorizes prosecutors and jurors to provide minority communities with less
protection than it provides white communities. 20 5 In spite of these
criticisms, however, McCleskey is still the law.
B.

Congressional Reform Efforts

Although McCleskey has, for the time being, largely closed down
federal-court discussion of race in capital cases, it did not block further congressional consideration of the issue. Indeed, Justice Powell's
opinion in McCleskey suggested that one should present claims of discrimination for corrective action to legislatures.
In McCleskey's wake, congressional concerns stimulated a formal
assessment of the scope of the problem in American capital-charging
and sentencing systems. This assessment produced the previously
mentioned GAO report, which clearly suggested that a problem existed, especially with respect to race-of-victim discrimination. 20 6 Continuing congressional concerns led to a series of efforts to bypass
MCleskey by relying on the legislative power the Enabling Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress. 20 7 The two resulting
proposals were known as the Racial Justice Act 20 8 and the Fairness in
Death Sentencing Act. 20 9 Neither addressed the specific situation in

Georgia or in any other state. Nor did they specifically seek to impose
structural remedies on the states that would limit the exercise of both
prosecutorial and jury discretion to the most highly aggravated cases
203
See Symposium, The CapitalJury Project 70 IND. L.J. 1033 (1995) (presenting some of
the early academic research on how juries function in death penalty cases).
204 See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 442-43
(1988) (comparing McCleskey to Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and indicat-

ing that "[when the Supreme Court places its imprimatur upon a horror, as it did in
Korematsu, the horror becomes a constitutional tragedy").
205 See id. at 443 (noting that the Court allowed for "racialism [to] be responsible not
only for the disproportionate execution of murdererswho happen to be black, but for inadequate protection of murder victims who happen to be black").
206
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
207
See Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 377.
208 S. 1696, 101st Cong. (1989); see Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 378.
209 H.R 2851, 102d Cong. (1991); see Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 378-79.
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in which no race effect was apparent, which Justices Blackmun and
Stevens suggested in MCleskey. Instead, Congress designed the measures to give offenders the right to challenge their individual death
sentences as racially motivated, just as individuals who can claim dis210
crimination under federal employment and housing laws.
Under the two proposals, a black defendant or a defendant
whose victim was white could establish a prima facie case by showing a
racially discriminatory pattern of death sentencing, presumably after
adjustment for the leading aggravating circumstances. The State
could rebut this showing by demonstrating, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that identifiable and pertinent nonracial factors persuasively explain the observable racial disparities comprising the pattern.
Absent such a rebuttal by the State, defendants would be entitled to
relief from their death sentences if their cases fell within a category of
cases in which a racial disparity existed to their disadvantage.
The U.S. House of Representatives adopted the second proposal,
the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, in 1990 and again with only
slight modification, in 1994. In each instance, however, the Senate
rejected it in a House-Senate Conference Committee.2 11 On both occasions, the measure attracted strong opposition from state Attorneys
General and from prosecutors in death-penalty states. They argued,
on the one hand, that racial discrimination did not exist and therefore the act was unnecessary, and, on the other hand, that the provision would necessarily result in either the use of quotas or the de facto
abolition of capital punishment in America. They premised the latter
argument on claims that racial discrimination in the use of the death
penalty was inevitable and impossible to prevent, detect, or remedy.
Thus, we would be left with the choice between quotas or abolition.
Although we consider those arguments spurious red herrings, they
had considerable force with legislators, who feared that their constituents might perceive a vote in support of the Act as an action that
2 12
could lessen the viability of the death penalty in their states.
C.

State Court Claims

Although McCleskey does not bind state supreme courts and they
are free to entertain claims of racial discrimination under their state
constitutions, the idea is distinctly unappealing to nearly all such
courts. The reasons are quite clear. Most important among these rea210 See Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 378-79.
211
See id. at 404 & n.173.
212 Racial Justice Act provisions have also been presented without success in the Maryland legislature.
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sons is the power of the death penalty as a symbol in contemporary
American life, especially in the South.213
Indeed, many judges are reluctant to vacate death sentences even
on "technical" legal grounds when the Constitution clearly calls for
such action. Elected judges are familiar with the unpleasant fate of
some of their colleagues whom the public perceived to be resistant or
unsympathetic to the death penalty.2 1 4 The idea of upsetting even a

single death penalty on racial grounds, particularly in the South,
2 15
would carry unacceptable risks for most judges.
It is no surprise, therefore, that the two state supreme courts
(Connecticut, New Jersey) and the one state legislature (New York)
that thus far have expressed a possible interest in the issue are located
in northeastern jurisdictions with strong traditions of concern about
racial discrimination.2 1 6 Moreover, the members of the only supreme
court actually to have heard a race claim (NewJersey) enjoy the protection of life tenure until retirement at age seventy. In the first New
Jersey case, State v. Marshall2 17 the court rejected the McCleskey approach and ruled that, under the equal protection clause of the New
Jersey constitution, claims of both race-of-victim and race-of-defendant discrimination are cognizable. It also recognized the standing of
a white defendant to present "a structural challenge to the constitutional fairness" of New Jersey's death-sentencing system as the state's
prosecutors and juries actually apply it.218 The operative test asks
whether the race of either the victim or the defendant "played a significant part in capital-sentencing decisions" in New Jersey.2 19 The Marshall case focused on the constitutional legitimacy of the system as a
whole, rather than on the risk that race might adversely have influenced the decision of either the prosecutor or the jury in an individual case.
The NewJersey court barely developed potential remedies in the
Marshallopinion because the court did not find evidence of unconstitutional discrimination. The court did state, however, that if it found discrimination to exist, it would "seek corrective measures"2 2 0 whose impact the court could observe through judicial oversight. The most
213
See David Baldus, Wen Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of the ComparativeProportionalityReview of Death Sentences, 26 SarON HALL L. REv. 1582, 1582-85 (1996).
214
See Stephen B. Bright & PatrickJ. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rgv. 759 (1995).
215
See M.B. Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54J. PoL.
427 (1992).
216
See supra note 2 (describing the Kentucky Racial Justice Act).
217 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992).
218 Id. at 1109.
219 Id. at 1110.
220 Id.
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likely possibilities would be the following: (1) a limitation on the class
of death-eligible cases or (2) the promulgation of more objective and
detailed standards to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The court further stated that if the corrective measures failed to correct the discrimination, it "could not ... tolerate" such a system and
would presumably declare it unconstitutional. 2 2 ' However, in spite of
the New Jersey court's willingness to consider race claims, it has re-

222
jected all of the claims it has heard thus far.
CONCLUSION

The century's history of race discrimination and the death penalty has been a tale of both denial and avoidance by both state and
federal courts, by Congress, and by state legislatures. As a result, the
civil-rights movement, which hardly has touched the American criminal justice system in general, almost has completely by-passed the core
discretionary decisions of the American capital-sentencing system.
Given the importance of the death penalty as a symbol in American
life and the perceived political risk to public officials who appear unsympathetic to the use of the death penalty, this record comes as no
great surprise. Nevertheless, for a nation with a historical commitment to equal justice under the law, the story is a disappointment. In
particular, the empirical findings from Philadelphia and New Jersey
reported in this Article, 223 indicate that the problem of arbitrariness
and discrimination in the administration of the death penalty is a matter of continuing concern and is not confined to southern jurisdictions. We also believe that the record of the last twenty-five years
demonstrates that the issue of racial discrimination in the use of death
penalty is as susceptible to identification, to adjudication, and to correction as are practices of discrimination in other areas of American
life that the civil rights movements and the law have addressed for
more than 30 years.

221 Id.
222 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, an abolitionist state, has also rejected McCleskey,
in the context of noncapital sentencing, see State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 n.2
(Minn. 1991), as did a three-person minority of the seven-member Florida Supreme Court
in 1992, see Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 465 (Fla. 1992) (Barkett, CJ., joined by Shaw
and Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Connecticut high court
agreed in principle to hear a race claim in 1995, State v. Cobb, 663 A.2d 948, 961 (Conn.
1995).
223 The recent findings from Philadelphia are presented supra Part III.C and summarized in Table 4, while the findings from New Jersey are summarized supra note 79.
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APPENDIX A
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTORY AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING
224
CIRCUMSTANCES

A.
dl.

d2.

d3.
d4.
d5.

d6.

d7.
d8.
d9.
dlO.

dll.

d12.

The Statutory Aggravating Circumstances
The victim was a firefighter, peace officer, public servant concerned
in official detention, (relating to escape),judge, the Attorney General
of Pennsylvania, a deputy attorney general, district attorney, assistant
district attorney, member of the General Assembly, Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Auditor General, State Treasurer, State law
enforcement official, local law enforcement official, Federal law
enforcement official or person employed to assist or assisting any law
enforcement official in the performance of his duties, who was killed
in the performance of his duties or as a result of his official position.
The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted
to pay or be paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be
paid by another person for the killing of the victim.
The victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward, or
as a shield or hostage.
The death of the victim occurred while defendant was engaged in the
hijacking of an aircraft.
The victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony
committed by the defendant and was killed for the purpose of
preventing his testimony against the defendant in any grand jury or
criminal proceeding involving such offenses.
The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a
felony.
In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a
grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the
offense.
The offense was committed by means of torture.
The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving
the use or threat of violence to the person.
The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State
offense, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue,
for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable or
the defendant was undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment for
any reason at the time of the commission of the offense.
The defendant has been convicted of another murder committed in
any jurisdiction and committed either before or at the time of the
offense at issue.
The defendant has been convicted of voluntary manslaughter,
committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.

224 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711. Listed in order of statutory section designations (i.e., dl, d2).
Aggravating circumstances d17 and d18 were not applicable during the time period of this
study (1983-93).
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d13.

d14.

d15.

d16.
d17.
d18.

B.
el.
e2.
e3.

e4.
e5.

e6.
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The defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice in the
killing, while in the perpetration of a felony under The Controlled
Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and punishable under the
provisions of 18 PA. CODE § 7508 (relating to drug trafficking
sentencing and penalties).
At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been involved,
associated or in competition with the defendant in the sale,
manufacture, distribution or delivery of any controlled substance or
counterfeit controlled substance in violation of The Controlled
Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or similar law of any other
state, the District of Columbia or the United States, and the
defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing
as defined in 18 PA. CODE § 306(c), and the killing resulted from or
was related to that association, involvement or competition to
promote the defendant's activities in selling, manufacturing,
distributing or delivering controlled substances or counterfeit
controlled substances.
At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been a
nongovernmental informant or had otherwise provided any
investigative, law enforcement or police agency with information
concerning criminal activity and the defendant committed the killing
or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 PA. CODE
§ 306(c), and the killing was in retaliation for the victim's activities as
a nongovernmental informant or in providing information
concerning criminal activity to an investigative, law enforcement or
police agency.
The victim was a child under 12 years of age.
At the time of the killing, the victim was in her third trimester of
pregnancy or the defendant had knowledge of the victim's pregnancy.
At the time of the killing, the defendant was under a court order
restricting the defendant's behavior toward the victim.
The Statutory Mitigating Circumstances
The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.
The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance.
The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was substantially impaired.
The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
The defendant acted under extreme duress, although not such
duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution under 18 PA.
CODE § 309 (relating to duress), or acted under the substantial
domination of another person.
The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal acts.
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The defendant's participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and
record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.
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B

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF RACE-OF-DEFENDANT AND RACE-OF-VICTIM
ADMINISTRATION OF
DISCRIMINATION IN THE POST-Fu&Ai
THE DEATH PENALTY

Each death penalty state in which researchers have reported empirical findings for any period of time since 1973 has an entry below.
The entry "

" means no findings have been reported for the state or

the sample size is too small to support an estimate.
If the race effect is statistically significant, the entry is marked
with an "S." If the race effect is practically, but not statistically significant, the entry is marked with an "NS." We consider a race effect to
be practically significant if (1) the ratio between the death-sentencing
rates (or the prosecutorial capital-charging rates) for the two racial
groups (for example, the rates in white-victim versus black-victim
cases) is 1.5 or larger or .67 or smaller, and there is a sample size of at
least ten cases in each group, or (2) an applicable logistic regression
coefficient is larger than .50 or smaller than -.50. Racial disparities of
this magnitude may indicate a risk of arbitrariness and discrimination,
even if they are not statistically significant. "NRE" for "no race effects"
indicates that some results have been reported, but the disparities are
neither practically nor statistically significant.
If the observed race effects are not in the direction normally observed, i.e., if the rates are (1) lower for nonblack victim and black
defendant cases and/or (2) higherfor black victim and non-black defendant cases, the S or NS is preceded by a

"-"

sign.

The reported race effects may relate to racial disparities (1) in
prosecutorial decisions to seek death sentences, (2) in jury decisions
to impose death sentences, or (3) in overall death-sentencing rates
that reflect the combined effects of both prosecutorial and jury
decisions.
Finally, the studies vary considerably in terms of how well they
control for nonracial factors.
State

Dates of study

Race-of-defendant

Race-of-victim

effects

effects

Alabama

1977-1984a

NS

S

Arizona

1977-1984a

NRE

NS

Arkansas

1 976-19 8 0

1977-1984

NRE
NRE

S
NS

California

b

1977-1984c

NRE

NRE

1 9 7 7 - 1 9 8 6d

NRE

S

1977-1984a
1990-1994c

S
S
NS

Colorado

1 9 7 9 -1 9 8 4

g

NRE
NRE
NRE

Connecticut

1 9 7 3- 1 9 94 h

NRE

S

Delaware

1977-1984a

NS

-NS

f

Continued on next page
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Continued
State
Florida

Georgia

Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
NewJersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia

Race-of-defen dant
effects

Race-of-victim
effects

NRE
NRE
NRE
NRE
-S
NRE
NRE
NRE
NRE
NRE

S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

1977-1980 b
1976-1980
1977-1984a
1977-1984a

NRE
NRE
-NS
NS

S
S
S
NS

1976-19910
1977-1984a
1979-1984P
1977-1984
19 7 6 -19 8 2 q
1977-1984a
1976-1982
1977-1984 b
1976-1980
1977-1984 "

NRE
NRE
NRE
-NS
NRE
NS
NS
NRE
NRE
NRE

S
NS
NS
NS
S
S
S
S
S
S

1977-1984
1977-1984

-NS
NRE

NRE

1982-1986'
1982-1996'

NRE
S

S
S

1977-1978vb
1976-1980
1977-1984
1973-1977'
1977-1984a
1976-1980
1977-1984

NRE
NRE
NRE
-NS
NRE
NRE

S
S
NRE
S
NRE
S
NS

1977-1984
1983-1993W
1977-1981 x
1977-1984

-NS
S
NS
NRE

NRE
S
NS
NS

1977-1984
1976-1982Y
1977-1984

-S
NRE
S

S
S
S

1976-1980 b
1977-1984a

NRE
-NS

Dates of study
1973-1977; 1976-1977'
1972-1978ik
1973-1977 I
1973-1977
1977-1984Pb
1976-1980
1973-1980
1973-1979m
1974-1984ab
1976-1980
n

NS
S
Continued on next page
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Continued
State
Washington
Wyoming

Dates of study
1977-1984a
-

Race-of-defendant
effects

Race-of-victim
effects

NS

NS

NoTE: In the Federal System, .59 (78/133) of the federal defendants prosecuted
capitally since 1988 have been black. However, a race of defendant effect cannot
be estimated because no reliable data indicating the proportion of blacks among all
federal death-eligible crimes exist. The Death Penalty Information Center of
Washington, D.C. reported on November 1, 1998, that in 133 federal capital
prosecutions that the Attorney General approved since 1988, there were 78 black
defendants, 32 non-Hispanic white defendants, 17 Hispanic defendants, and six
Asian/Indian defendants. Of the 19 inmates on federal death row, 13 are black,
four are non-Hispanic white, one is Hispanic, and one is Asian. See E-mail from
Richard Dieter, Executive Director, Death Penalty Information Center, to author
(Nov. 2, 1998) (on file with author).
a See Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination, supra note 69, at 159-60, 163-64
(presenting state-by-state estimates among cases involving a contemporaneous
felony with race of defendant effects estimated among white-victim cases (Table 2)
and race-of-victim effects based on a comparison of white- and black-victim cases
(Table 3)).
b See GROSS & MAURO, supra note 69, at 43-63, 88-94 (reporting multivariate statistical
analyses, controlling for from one to five legitimate case characteristics).
c See Klein & Rolph, supra note 69, at 38, 43. For an evaluation of the Klein and
Rolph article, see supra note 80.
d See Klein et al., supra note 69 (stating in the text that there are no race-of-victim
effects, while indicating in the data of Table 7 that a statistically significant race-ofvictim effect exists). Dr. Harriet Ganson, Assistant Director of Tax Policy and
Administration in the GAO, has also noted that Stephen Klein's study indicated
statistically significant race-of-victim effects. See Conference, supra note 70, at 341
(remarks of Harriet Ganson); supra note 80 (evaluating Klein and Rolph article).
See Rohrlich & Tulsky, supra note 70.
See BALDUs ET AL., supra note 59, at 148-78, 262-63 (Colorado); id. at 315-40
(Georgia).
g See Anderson, supra note 70, at 9-16.
h See State v. Cobb, 663 A.2d 948, 964 (Conn. 1995).
See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 69, at 590-629.
See Foley, supra note 69, at 457.
k See Radelet & Pierce, supra note 70, at 20-29; Radelet & Pierce, supranote 69, at 598615.
See Zeisel, supra note 69, at 459-61.
, See Barnett, supra note 69, at 1347-52.
See Murphy, supra note 69.
0 See Keil & Vito, supra note 70, Gennaro Vito & Thomas Keil, Capital Sentencing in
Kentucky: An Analysis of the FactorsInfluencing Decision Making in the Post-GreggPeriod,
79 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 483, 496-503 (1988) (estimating in the regression
analysis that race-of-victim effect is limited to a coefficient for black defendant with
white victim cases; although suggesting in cross-tabulations that primary influence
is race-of-victim rather than race-of-defendant discrimination); Ralph Dunlop, A
Three-Part Series on Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky, COURMR J. (Louisville),
Dec. 31, 1995, Jan 1-2 1996 (reporting wide-ranging interviews and analysis of data
that reveal race-of-victim and race-of-defendant discrimination that is pervasive but
"rarely admitted").
P See Klemm, supra note 69.
q See Smith, supra note 69, at 281-85.
Continued on next page
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Continued
' See Berk & Lowery, supra note 69. For a summary of the results published in this
manuscript, see Baldus et al., supra note 69, at 258-59.
' See Baldus et al., supra note 69; Jonathan I- Sorenson & Donald H. Wallace, Capital
Punishmentin Missouri: Examiningthe Issue of RacialDisparity,13 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 61,
67-79 (1995).
t See Bienen et al., supra note 69, at 27.
U See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1073 (NJ. 1992); supra note 78-79 (describing
recent research); Baldus et al., supra note 44, at 411-12.
See NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 69, at 70-150.
See supra Part III and Table 4 for a description and summary of the 1983-1993
research.
See Paternoster & Kazyaka, supra note 69, at 285-88.
y See Ekland-Olson, supra note 69.
V
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APPENDIX C
PROCEDURES FOR ESTIMATING UNKNOWN PROCEDURAL VARIABLES IN

JURY PENALTY-TRIAL CASES AND RELATED ISSUES

A.

Introduction

In this Appendix, we first describe the number and proportion of
penalty-trial cases in which there are "unknowns" for important case
characteristics. In one group of cases, the unknowns relate to the procedural posture of life-sentenced cases (i.e., it is unknown if the decision turned on the issue of whether there was statutory aggravation
present in the case or the case was decided at the weighing stage). In
a second group of cases, the unknowns relate to the jury's finding of
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
We next explain our treatment of life-sentenced cases that
"hung" as distinguished from life cases that are based on a unanimous
decision. Third, we describe the methods used for estimating the procedural posture ofjury penalty-trial cases when it is unknown. Fourth,
we describe the methods used for imputing jury penalty-trial findings
on statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, when a jury
finding on one or more of these factors is unknown. Fifth, we describe a coding protocol that focuses on the statutory aggravating and
mitigating factors that were present in penalty-trial cases, as contrasted
to the factors that the jury found to be present. Finally, we describe
the research strategies that we used to estimate the possible impact of
unknowns on the validity of our core findings.
B.

The Number and Proportion of Penalty-Trial Cases in Which
the Procedural Posture of the Jury's Decision and/or the
Jury's Findings on Statutory Aggravation and
Mitigation Are Unknown

Hung Decisions. Our sample of 346 jury penalty-trial cases in225
cludes 16% (54/346) in which the jury reported a hung decision.
In 100% of these 54 cases, the procedural posture of the case is unknown, i.e., it is unknown whether the jury hung on a threshold finding of aggravation or hung on the weighing decision. Also, the jury
findings on statutory aggravation and mitigation are unknown in 89%
2 26
(48/54) of these cases.
225 This count includes one case, 427, classified as hung because it is unknown
whether the case hung or was unanimously decided. The aggravation or mitigation, if any,
found by the jury is also unknown. All case counts reported in this Appendix are unweighed, i.e., they refer to the number of cases in the sample as distinguished from the
universe. See supra note 90 and accompanying text for a description of the sampling plan.
226 In five hung cases 664, 969, 1025, 1026, and 1027, the jury reported findings on
both aggravation and mitigation, and in case 1134 aggravation is known but mitigation is
unknown.
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Unanimous Decisions. Among the 292 unanimously decided
cases, there are 7 life-sentenced cases in which the procedural posture
of the case is unknown.2 27 The jury findings on aggravation and mitigation are also unknown in all of these cases. Thus among the unanimously decided cases there are unknowns on jury findings of
aggravation in 3% (10/292) of the cases (all life sentenced) and
unknowns on jury mitigation findings in 12% (35/292) of the cases
(32 with life and 3 with death sentences).
Among the entire sample of 346 jury penalty-trial cases, therefore, the procedural posture of the case is unknown in 18% (61/346)
of the cases (all life sentenced). In addition, the jury findings on aggravation are unknown in 17% (58/346) of the cases (all life sentenced) and the jury findings on mitigation are unknown in 24% (84/
346) of the cases (all but 3 life sentenced).
All of these unknowns exist because of gaps in the judicial
22 8
records that we consulted for this research.
C.

Differential Treatment of Hung and Unanimous Decisions

Our core analyses and models are limited to penalty-trial cases
that were unanimously decided. However, the hung cases are included in supplemental analyses designed to test the robustness of
these results estimated from the unanimously decided cases. Also with
respect to jury decisions to impose death sentences for failure to find
mitigation, from a legal and analytic standpoint, we consider the
analyses that include the cases that hung at the weighing stage to be
sounder than those that exclude those hung cases. The reason is simply that those cases did not hang at this stage in the process. Indeed,
a hung case at this stage is legally impossible since if only a single juror
finds statutory mitigation, the case advances to the weighing stage.
The results from these supplemental analyses are routinely reported
along with the results from the core analyses. In addition, the results
from the analyses that include the hung cases are summarized in Appendix D in the same format that they are presented in Table 4, which
reports the results based on the unanimously decided cases. The basic difference between the two sets of results is that the race of victim
effects associated with the failure of the jury to find mitigation after
finding aggravation are enhanced when the hung cases are included,
while the race-of-defendant effects documented in the jury weighing
22 9
decisions are reduced when the hung cases are included.
For the cases decided at the penalty-trial weighing stage, we place
greater weight on the unanimously decided cases for three reasons.
227
228

229

Cases 716, 922, 491, 510, 753, 1030, 1373.
See supra note 92 for detail on the source of these gaps.
The likely reasons for these changes are explained, supra note 125.
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First, a principal goal of this research is to evaluate the legitimate and
illegitimate factors that appear to influence jury decision making. In
contrast to a unanimous jury verdict for life or death, a hung verdict at
the weighing stage is a nondecision because a jury could not achieve
consensus. Moreover, a hung verdict may reflect the judgment of only
a small minority of the jurors or even a single juror-with respect
either to the presence or absence of statutory aggravating circumstances or the ultimate judgment of the defendant's deathworthiness.
Second, in the 48 hung cases that advanced to the weighing stage,
aggravating and mitigating circumstances were found, but the precise
factors found are known in only six of the cases, i.e. 87% (42/48) are
unknown. While in the unanimously decided cases, the findings on
aggravation are unknown only 3% (10/292) of the time and the findings on mitigation are unknown only 12% (35/292) of the time.
In spite of these concerns about the hung decisions, there is a
compelling case for not ignoring them completely. First, since the
cases that we estimate hung at the weighing stage represent 24% (48/
206) of those cases, they represent a significant body of evidence on
the values of sentencingjuries. Moreover, the court instructs Philadelphia juries that a hung verdict will result in a life sentence. 23 0 The
jury decision to cease deliberations and report a hung verdict, therefore, represents a vote for life even though it is not unanimous.
Second, cases that hang at the weighing stage have the same consequences for the affected defendants as do unanimously decided life
sentence decisions. A life sentence based on a hung verdict is no less
final than a life sentence based on a unanimous verdict. (In contrast
to a hung verdict at the guilt trial, the Commonwealth may not retry a
hung verdict at the penalty trial unless the original guilt-trial verdict is
reversed on appeal and the Commonwealth retries the case. 23 1 ) Also,
from the standpoint of uniform treatment of similarly situated defendants, arbitrariness flowing from the imposition of life sentences based
on hung verdicts is no less problematical than arbitrariness produced
by the imposition of life sentences based on unanimous decisions.
Third, we are not totally ignorant about the probable basis of the
hung decisions. Indeed, as we explain below, we can, on the basis of
our strength of evidence measures, make reasonably valid estimates of
both the procedural posture of the decision and the findings on aggravation and mitigation that were probably influential with the
jurors.
As noted above, in the analyses of death-sentencing decisions
based on the jury's failure to find mitigation, we consider it more ap230
231

42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(c) (1).
See Commonwealth v. Martorano, 634 A.2d 1063, 1072 (Pa. 1993).
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propriate to include in the analyses the cases that hung at the weighing stage. To be sure, juries do not report whether they hung on the
finding of aggravation, (decision point 4, Figure 1) or on the weighing decision (decision point 6, Figure 1). Nevertheless, we believe
that our strength of evidence measures provide a reliable basis for estimating when aggravation was found in the hung cases. See section E
below. And, if aggravation is found in a case and a death sentence is
not imposed for failure to find mitigation, we know the case advanced
to the weighing stage. However, because of the uncertainty on this
issue, throughout this Article, we report initially and in Table 4, the
results for this decision point from analyses in which all of the hung
cases have been excluded. On balance, however, we consider these
estimates to be conservative and we place primary reliance on the
analyses that include the cases that hung at the weighing stage. Another alternative we explored was to view the death sentencing results
as a three level outcome: Life (unanimous), Hung, and Death (unanimous). In a logistic regression analysis of jury death sentences imposed among all death-eligible cases using this three level outcome
variable the coefficient for the race of defendant variable was .87 (with
23 2
a 2.4 odds multiplier), significant at the .04 level.

D.

Estimating the Procedural Posture of Jury Penalty-Trial
Decisions When it Is Unknown

As indicated above, the data base includes 54 hung cases that resulted in a mandatory life sentence and 7 unanimously decided lifesentenced cases in which the procedural basis of the jury's decision is
unknown. For 6 of the hung cases, the jury reported findings of aggravating circumstances. As noted above, this finding is strong evidence that the jury did not hang on the "no aggravation" issue and
that the case advanced to the weighing stage. (This inference is especially strong in 5 of these cases in which the jury reported findings of
mitigation.)
For the remaining 48 hung cases, we estimated the procedural
posture of the case on the basis of the strength of the evidence on the
statutory aggravating circumstances. When the evidence for one or
more aggravators was judged to be "strong," the case was classified as a
weighing case, while the cases with weaker strength of evidence on the
aggravators were classified as no aggravation found cases.2 33 The as232 This analysis indicates that the black-defendant cases were more likely to result in a
hung rather than a unanimous life sentence and more likely to result in a death sentence.
In contrast, in the analyses with a life/death outcome, the black-defendant coefficient/
odds multiplier was 1.1/3.0 with hung cases included and 1.1/3.0 with the hung cases
excluded (both statistically significant).
233 See infra note 11 for the strength-of-evidence codes for the statutory aggravating
circumstances.
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sumption here is that ajury finding that an aggravator was present was
quite likely when the evidence on it was strong. Moreover, since we
know that a death sentence was not imposed in any of these cases for
failure of the jury to find mitigation, it is more likely than not that
such cases advanced to the weighing stage. This procedure had the
effect of transferring 6 of the remaining 48 hung cases to the no aggravation found category and 42 cases to the weighing stage.
We applied the same protocol to the 7 unanimously decided
cases in which the procedural posture of the case was unknown. This
protocol had the effect of classifying 2 of the cases as no aggravation
found decisions and 5 as weighing decisions.
E.

Imputing Jury Findings on Statutory Aggravation and
Mitigation

The procedure for imputing findings of statutory aggravation and
mitigation builds upon an underlyingseries of variables that reflect all
of the unknowns in the original database. For each of the statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we used these recoded variables to build a series of core variables and two alternative series of
variables. (These imputation procedures apply only to the penaltytrial cases since the non-penalty-trial cases involve no jury penalty-trial
decisions and therefore contain no unknowns concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances).
1.

Statutory Aggravation

The Underlying Variables. The underlying recoded variables for
the aggravators are coded "1" if the procedural variable in the DCI
indicates the factor was "found by fact finder."2 3 4 The recoded variable is coded 0 if the DCI indicates that the factor was considered and
234 The procedural and evidentiary codes for the statutory aggravating circumstances,
enumerated in Appendix A, are as follows:
Procedure. 1-Factor found by fact-finder; 2-Factor presented at penalty hearing but not found by fact-finder, 3-Factor alleged in 352 or comparable
notice but not pursued at penalty hearing; Blank-Factor not alleged or no
notice filed; 5-Unknown if factor presented, but penalty hearing held and

facts support; 6Factor presented and verdict reached, but unknown if
found; 7-Factor presented, but unknown if found because jury did not
reach a unanimous verdict; 9-Unknown if notice filed.
Strength of Evidence: I-Strong-Elements clearly made out and no issue as to
reliability of evidence; 2-Legally sufficient-Facts are legally sufficient to establish the aggravating factor, but a reasonable fact-finder, in exercise of
discretion, could find or not find the circumstance present in the case; no
issue of reliability of evidence; 3-Sufficient, with evidentiary issue(s)-Facts
are legally sufficient to establish the aggravating factor, but such a finding
rests on acceptance of evidence that is controverted or of questionable reliability; 4-Insufficient-Some evidence of the aggravating factor, but even if
accepted, it would not survive a sufficiency challenge; Blank-Not applicable.
No indication that factor may be present.
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rejected by the jury, or the aggravation question was not presented to
the jury. If an aggravator is coded 5, 6, or 7 in the DCI, for unknown,
it is designated unknown in the underlying series of recoded variables.
The Core and Alternative Variables. With one exception, the
"core" recoded variables equal the underlying recoded variables, i.e.,
they reflect what the jury found. The exception is that unknowns are
coded as having been found if the strength of evidence is "strong."
We believe that this imputation procedure has a reasonable level of
validity since Philadelphiajuries find an aggravator present in the case
87% of the time when the strength of evidence is coded as strong; in
contrast, aggravating circumstances are found to be present only 44%
of the time when the evidentiary code is less than "strong."
The first alternative series of recoded variables modifies the core
series by recoding unknowns (5, 6, or 7) in the underlying series as 0
(not found), while the second alternative series deletes from the analysis entirely penalty-trial cases in which there is an unknown coded for
one or more aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
2.

Statutory Mitigation

35

The Underlying Variables. The underlying recoded variables are
coded 1 if the procedural code in the Data Collection Instrument
(DCI) indicates the factor was "presented and found." The recoded
variable is coded 0 if the procedural code in the DCI indicates that the
factor was either rejected or not considered by the jury. It is coded
unknown if the DCI procedural code is 7 or 9, indicating it is unknown whether the factor was presented to the jury or, if presented,
whether it was found or not found by the jury.
The Core and Alternative Variables. The core recoded variables
reflect what was found by the jury, but when a jury finding is unknown, the core recoded variables impute ajury finding on the mitigating circumstance from the strength of the evidence measures.
Specifically, for variables el-e7 (the statutory mitigating circumstances
other than the e8 catchall factor), the unknown factor is coded as
285 The procedural and evidentiary codes for the statutory mitigating circumstances,
enumerated in Appendix A, are as follows:
Procedure: 1-Presented and found; 2-Presented and not found; 3-Presented
but not reached because no aggravating circumstance found; 7-Unknown if
presented but penalty hearing held and facts support; 9-Presented, but
unknown if factor found; Blank-Inapplicable, no penalty trial or no
indication factor presented.
Strength of evidence: -Strong-Strong evidence of the presence of the factors;
2-Sufficient-Sufficient evidence for fact-finder to find factor by the
preponderance of the evidence; 3-Questionable-Some indication of factor
but either derives from questionable source or is of questionable relevance
or validity as mitigating factor; judge's failure to charge on factor would
likely be upheld; Blank-No indication the factor may be present.
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found when the strength of evidence code is strong or sufficient;
otherwise, it is coded as either not found or not presented. This procedure is also used to code mitigation in the non-penalty-trial cases.
We believe this imputation procedure has a reasonable level of
validity because in the 265 cases in which we know both the strength
of the evidence and the jury findings, the jury found the mitigating
circumstances el-e7 present in the case 81% of the time when the
evidentiary measure is coded "strong" or "sufficient,"2 6 while it found
mitigators present only 37% of the time when the strength of evi2 37
dence was weaker than that.

When the e8 catchall procedural variable is unknown, the
recoded e8 variable in the core series of variables is coded strong if
either V538 (the principal e8 strength of evidence measure) or one or
more supplemental e8 measures is coded 1 (strong). However, if one
or more of those variables is only coded sufficient, the recoded core
e8 variable in the core series is coded 0. This differential weighting of
a "sufficient" evidentiary coding on the e8 variable (as contrasted to
the coding of the el-e7 variables) reflects the fact that Philadelphia
juries find the e8 factor present 87% of the time when the e8 evidence
is ranked as strong. However, juries find the e8 factor present only
49% of the time when the strength of evidence is coded "sufficient."
(This coding procedure for e8 unknowns in penalty-trial cases is also
used for the e8 factor in the non-penalty-trial cases for whom the presence of the statutory factors is based exclusively on the strength of the
evidence.)
The first alternative series of recoded variables modifies the core
recoded variables by coding all unknown values as 0, for not found or
not presented. The second alternative deletes all cases in which one
or more mitigating or aggravating factors is coded unknown (7 or 9).
(We did not create codes that treated all unknown aggravators and
mitigators as having been found to be present by the jury as we believe
this scenario implausible.)
F.

Penalty-Trial Variables for Statutory Aggravation and
Mitigation Based on the Strength of the Evidence Rather
than Jury Findings

We also created an alternative series of variables that focus on
whether statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances were present in the penalty-trial cases rather than whether they were found by
the jury. With one exception, therefore, these variables apply to the
236 When the evidence supporting the mitigator was rated as "strong," the jury found it
present 90% of the time; when it was rated as "sufficient," it was found 75% of the time.
237 All of the cases in the study were rated as having evidence on the e8 factor that was
either strong (1) or sufficient (2).
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penalty-trial cases the same coding rules that are used in the non-penalty-trial cases, i.e., an aggravator is considered present if the strength
of the evidence is "strong" and a mitigator, except for e8, is considered present if the strength of the evidence is "strong" or "sufficient."
The one exception to this coding protocol is that a statutory aggravator or mitigator "found" by the jury is coded as present, regardless of the strength of the evidence supporting it. The assumption
here is that if the jury found the factor present it should be so considered, even if the evidence was not strong (in the case of the aggravators) or was less than strong or sufficient (in the case of the
mitigators).
This series of variables permits us to evaluate the impact of aggravators that were strongly present in the cases but either not
charged by the Commonwealth or charged but not found by the jury.
The series similarly enables us to evaluate the impact of mitigators
that were present in the cases but either not presented to the jury or
presented and not found by the jury.
These variables also enable us to evaluate jury findings of aggravation (at the first "no-aggravation found" stage of the process) and
findings of mitigation (at the second "no-mitigation found with
mandatory death" stage of the process), while controlling for the
strength of the evidence on the aggravators and mitigators that were
charged to the jury. Also, to the extent thatjury decisions finding or not
finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances may have been affected by race or other arbitrary factors (which is subject to independent empirical verification), analyses based on this alternate series of
variables permit us to estimate the extent to which the analyses of the
jury weighing decisions that are based on jury findings of aggravation
and mitigation may be masking race effects that are packed in those
8
findings. 23
G. Research Strategies to Estimate the Possible Impact of
Unknowns on the Core Results
Our primary strategy is to utilize the information that we have on
all of the cases in the sample, filling in the "unknown" gaps with the
imputation procedures described above. We place the greatest weight
on the results estimated with the imputation procedures we consider
most plausible. (This approach applies whether the analysis is limited
to the unanimously decided cases or also includes the hung cases).
Accordingly, we place primary reliance on the "core" variables
when the focus is on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
238
See Article Part III.D.2(d) for a discussion of how the race of defendant and victim
and the socioeconomic status of the victim correlate with jury findings of statutory aggravation and mitigation.
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found by the jury. However, when the focus is on jury findings of
aggravation (at the no aggravation found stage in the process) orjury
findings of no mitigation present (at the no mitigation found/
mandatory death sentence stage of the process), we place primary reliance on the alternative series of variables that focus on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are present in the cases.
For all of these analyses, we also supplement the core findings
with the results estimated using the variables in the two alternative
series described above. On the basis of these alternative analyses, we
are able to estimate the extent to which it appears that the coding
protocols for handling "unknown" codes may have influenced the
race effects estimated in the Philadelphia capital charging and sentencing system. Because of the stability and relative consistency of the
results in the alternative analyses, we believe that our treatment of
unknowns in the case models introduced no bias in the estimation of
race effects.
In another series of supplemental analyses, we estimated race effects in the two input-output models reported in Appendix E, after
deleting from the sample 71 unanimously decided penalty-trial cases
(representing 83 cases in the universe) in which the jury found no
statutory aggravation present in the case.2 39 (In our analyses of deci-

sion points 5 and 6 in Figure 1, presented in Tables 5 and 6, the "no
aggravation" cases are not included since they are no longer under
consideration at those two decision points.) In our core analyses, we
treat these cases as death eligible with the defendant having been at
risk of a death sentence (even though the jury found no aggravation
present) since there was sufficient evidence in each case to support a
finding of the presence of statutory aggravation if such a finding had
been returned by the jury. However, one can argue that the no aggravation findings of the juries are strictly factual, that they do not reflect
a deathworthiness judgment, and that accordingly the no aggravation
cases should be excluded from the database as not death eligible.
While we find this argument unpersuasive, it is the rationale for excluding those cases from models in which they would otherwise have
been included.2 40 A more plausible assumption is that the failure to
find statutory aggravation was a "factual" determination only when the

239
Figure 1, Row 4 (Box 4B) reports 90 cases with no aggravation found. This includes six cases that we estimated hung at this stage in the process.
240
In analyses that exclude both hung cases and the 90 cases in which no aggravation
was found, the race-of-defendant coefficient estimated for all penalty-trial cases was 1.9 (p =
.04) versus 2.2 (p =.01) when the 90 no aggravation cases were included. In the model of
jury death sentencing among all death-eligible cases, the race-of-defendant coefficient was
.87 (p =.08) versus 1.1 (p = .02) when the 90 no aggravation cases were included.
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strength of the evidence was less than "strong" on all of the statutory
24 1
aggravators.

241
When we exclude only cases with less than strong evidence on aggravation, the
race-of-defendant coefficient in the analyses of all jury decisions is 2.1 (p = .03) and among
all death-eligible cases the coefficient is 1.0 (p = .08).
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D

RACE-OF-VICTIM AND RACE-OF-DEFENDANT DISPARITIES ESTIMATED IN
ANALYSES THAT INCLUDE HUNG CASES

TABLE

D1

SUMMARY OF UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED SYSTEMIC RACE-OF-

DEFENDANT AND RACE-OF-VICTIM DISPARITIES IN ANALYSES THAT
INCLUDE HUNG PENALTY-TRIAL CASES IN THE PHILADELPHIA CAPITAL
CHARGING AND JURY SENTENCING SYSTEM (1983-93)
Race-of-victim
disparity
A

Measure of defendant culpability

Race-of-defendant disparities

B

C
Jury death
sentence imposed
after weighing
aggravating and
mitigating
circumstances

D
All death
sentences
imposed at
jury penalty trial
(decisions in
Columns B & C
combined)

Jury decision to
impose a death
penalty for failure
to find mitigation

Death sentences
imposed byjury
among all deatheligible cases

.22 (51/231)

.29 (110/380)

.17 (110/662)

.20 (59/290)

Average Rate
1. Unadjusted estimated disparity

NBV .30 (26/87)

(without volunteers and without
adjustment for defendant culpability)

BV

.16 (33/203)

Diff. 14 pts.
Ratio 1.8
(.l)l
2. Adjusted regression coefficient/
odds multiplier'

BD

.24 (46/193) BD .30 (94/310) BD .18 (94/519)
NBD .12 (16/143)
NBD .23 (16/70)
NBD .13 (5/38)
Diff. 11 pts.
Ratio 1.8
(.18)

1.47/4.3
(.03)

3. Adjusted disparity estimated in a

NBV .30

scale based on logistic regression
model

BV

E

2.6/13.5
(.04]

1.1/3.0
(.02)

BD .30
NBD .22

BD .18
NBD.11

Duff. 13 pts.
Ratio 2.2
(.04)

Diff. 8 pts.
Ratio 1.4
(.10)

Diff. 7 pts.
Ratio 1.6
(.03)

BD .25
NBD .07

BD .31
NBD .21

BD .19
NBD .13

Diff. 17 pts.
Ratio 2.2
(.001)

Duff. 18 pts.
Ratio 3.6
(.05)

Diff. 10 pts.
Ratio 1.5
(.22)

Diff. 6 pts.
Ratio 1.5
(.15)

6. Disparity estimated with a

NBV .28

BD .23

scale based on the results of the
murder severity study

BV

.17

NBD .13

BD .31
NBD .24

BD .18
NBD .12

Diff. 10 pts.
Ratio 1.8
(.30)

Diff. 7 pts.
Ratio 1.3
(.37)

Diff. 6pts.
Ratio 1.5
(.14)

Diff. 14 pts.
Ratio 1.9
(.001)
4. Adjusted disparity esimtated with

.24

1.3/3.7
(.05)

Diff. 7 pts.
Ratio 1.6
(.09)

NBD.11

.16

BD

Diff. 7 pts.
Ratio 1.3
(.25)

BD .23
NBD .09

a scale based on the number of
aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in the case

Diff. 14 pts.
Ratio 2.6
(.42)

5. Adjusted disparity estimated with

NBV .31

a scale based on the salient factors
of the case

BV

.14

Diff. 11 pts.
Ratio 1.6
(.03)

Continuedon mit page
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Table Dl-Cntinued
NoTE The estimates are based on analyses that include life-sentence cases that resulted in a hung verdict at penalty trial. The
results with the hung cases excluded are reported in Table 4. The rationale for differential treatment of hung and unanimously decided cases is presented in Appendix C. Except for the odds multipliers reported in Row 2, all of the disparities reported
below are percentage point differences or ratios between death sentencing rates that have been adjusted for defendant culpability (with the measures indicated in Column A), either (black-defendant rate versus nonblack-defendant rate) or (nonblackvictim rate versus black-victim rate), as the case may be. For an overview of the cases included in this Article's Tables and
Figures, see supranote 110.
The Average rates in the first row of the Appendix and the "unadjusted" adjustment disparities reported in Row 1, exclude four volunteers who presented no mitigating evidence and no argument that mitigation should be found. In each such
case, thejusy failed to find mitigation and imposed the death sentence as required by law. The analyses reported in Rows 1-6
exclude the cases of these four volunteers.
The level of statistical significance of the reported disparity is in parenthesis.
The odds multipliers reported in this Row indicate, on average, the factor by which the odds of receiving a death sentence are
enhanced when the defendant is black or the victim is nonblack, as the case may be.
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APPENDIX E
LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS ESTIMATED FOR ALL PENALTY TRIALS AND FOR
JURY DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED AMONG ALL DEATHELIGIBLE CASES

The model in Table El reflects the impact of all three stages of

the jury decision-making process, decision points 4-6 in Figure 1. The
model in Table E2 reflects the combined impact of all prosecutorial
and jury decisions taken at decision points 1- 6 in Figure 1.
TABLE

El

LOGISTIC MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL OF ALL JURY PENALTY-TRIAL
DECISIONS IN PHILADELPHIA (1983-93)
(this model controls for the statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances found by the jury)

A.

A

B

Circumstance

Death-odds
multiplier

C
Adjusted logistic
regression coefficient
(with level of statistical
significance)

Statutory aggravating circumstances (statutory section numbers in parenthesis)'

1. The victim was a police officer (dl)
2. Defendant was paid to kill or paid another to kill
(d2), or ransom or hostage victim involved (d3)
3. Victim was a prosecution witness (d5), or an
informant (d15)
4. Contemporaneous robbery, rape, kidnapping or
arson (d6)
5. Defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another (d7)
6. Torture involved (d8)
7. Defendant had a significant history of violent
felony convictions (d9)
8. Defendant serving a life sentence, etc. (d10)
9. Multiple murder victims or defendant had a
prior murder conviction (dI1)
10. A prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter
(d12)
11. Victim was a competitor in the illegal drug world
(d14)

27.60

3.30(.08)

43.30

3.80(.09)

234.10

5.50(.0001)

13.50

2.60(.001)

8.50
9.90

2.10(.003)
2.30(.05)

33.40
43.70

3.50(.0001)
3.80(.001)

18.50

2.90(.002)

123.30

4.80(.001)

30.10

3.40(.02)

B. Statutory mitigation circumstances (statutory section numbers in parenthesis)'
1. Defendant had no significant history of prior
criminal convictions (el)
0.43
-0.83(. 15)
2. Defendant under extreme mental or emotional
disturbance (e2)
2.10
0.76(. 39)
3. Defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was impaired (e3)
0.72
-0.33(. 81)
4. The defendant's youth or advanced age
mitigated the offense (e4)
0.50
-0.70(2 20)
5. Defendant acted under duress or the substantial
domination of another person (e)
.006
-5.20(. 001)
6. Victim participated in the homicidal acts (e6)
2.30
0.84(. 53)
Continued on next page
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Table El-Continued
A

B

Circumstance

Death-odds
multiplier

7. Defendant's role was minor (e7)
8. There were other mitigating aspects of the
defendant's character, record, or the offense
(e8)
C.

0.16

-1.80(.09)

0.15

-1.90(.0003)

16.60

2.80(.001)

6.30

1.80 (.08)

Nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances

1. Prior assault on victim or sex motive
2. Defendant committed additional crimes after the
homicide
3. Victim mutilated or dismembered one or more
co-perpetrators involved
D.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

C
Adjusted logistic
regression coefficient
(with level of statistical
significance)

0.17

-1.80(.01)

Race and socioeconomic status (SES) of the defendant and the victim
Defendant was black
9.30
2.20(.01)
One or more victims was nonblack
1.40
0.36(.60)
Victim with low SES
0.38
-0.96(.07)
Defendant with high SES
0.47
-0.75(.66)
Defendant with low SES
0.56
-0.57(.28)
Victim's SES missing
1.10
0.14(.85)
Defendant's SES missing
9.20
2.20(.02)

E. Time period of the caseb
1. 1986-1989
2. 1983-1985
(1990-1993 is the comparison period)

0.53
0.79

-0.64(.24)
-0.24(.68)

N= 318 (110 death sentences imposed)
NoTm: This analyses does not include penalty-trial cases that hung on the sentence and four
cases in which the defendant presented no mitigating evidence and no argument that the jury
should find mitigation. When hung cases are included in the analyses, the race of defendant
coefficient (at item DI, Column C) is 1.3 (p=.05) with an odds multiplier of 3.7. See Appendix
C for detail on the differential treatment of the hung and unanimously decided cases in this
research. For an overview of the cases included in this Article's Tables and Figures, see supra
note 110.
The statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances are described in Appendix A. Items
A2 and A3 in this table embrace more than one statutory circumstance. Without these
combinations, the logistic model would not run, i.e., it would not "converge," because of the
distribution of the outcomes for the cases with these case characteristics. There are no cases in
this analysis implicating the d4 (airplane hijacking), the d13 (murder in a specific type of drug
trafficking), or the d16 (victim under 12 years) aggravating factors.
b Two variables to identify the time period of the cases are included in the regression to correct
for imbalances created in differential sampling between the time periods. In the sampling
scheme, a higher percentage of cases were sampled from the most recent time period, fewer
from the 1983-1985 time period, and the fewest from 1986-1989. In general, jury deathsentencing rates among all death-eligible cases have been decreasing: 23% in 1983-1985; 20%
in 1986-89; and 13% in 1990-1993.
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E2

LoGISTIC MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL OF JURY

DEATH

SENTENCES IMPOSED AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE
CASES IN PHILADELPHIA (1983-93)
(this model controls for the statutory aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that were found by the jury in penalty-trial
cases or were present in non-penalty-trial cases)
A

B

Circumstance

Death-odds
multiplier

C
Adjusted logistic
regression coefficient
(with level of statistical
significance)

A.

Statutory aggravating circumstances (statutory section numbers in parenthesis)'
1. The victim was a police officer (dl)
41.80
3.70(.004)
2. Defendant was paid to kill or paid another to kill
(d2)
4.40
1.50(.02)
3. Ransom or hostage victim (d) or victim under
12 years of age (d16)
0.02
-4.10(.001)
4. Victim was a prosecution witness (d5), or an
informant (dlS)
77.50
4.30(.0001)
5. Contemporaneous robbery, rape, kidnapping or
arson (d6), or the murder occurred during the
perpetration of a drug trafficking crime (d13)
1.90
0.63(.10)
6. Defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another (d7)
2.60
0.97(.01)
7. Torture involved (d8)
10.20
2.30(.001)
8. Defendant had a significant history of violent
felony convictions (d9)
8.30
2.10(.00001)
9. Defendant serving a life sentence, etc. (dlO)
5.60
1.70(.001)
10. Multiple murder victims or defendant had a
prior murder conviction (dlI)
5.40
1.70(.01)
11. A prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter
(d12)
19.60
3.00(.01)
12. The victim was a competitor in the illegal drug
trade (d14)
20.70
3.00(.03)

B.

Statutory mitigating circumstances (statutory section numbers in parenthesis)'

1. Defendant had no significant history of prior
criminal convictions (el)
2. Defendant under extreme mental or emotional
disturbance (e2)
3. Defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was impaired (e3)
4. The defendant's youth or advanced age
mitigated the offense (e4)
5. Defendant acted under duress or the substantial
domination of another person (e5)
6. Victim participated in the homicidal acts (e6)
7. Defendant's role was minor (e7)
8. There were other mitigating aspects of the
defendant's character, record or the offense (e8)
C.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Nonstatutory aggravating circumstances
Execution or mutilation
Prior assault of victim or victim a sex rival
Victim was killed at his/her place of employment
Defendant resisted arrest

0.58

-0.55(.18)

2.30

0.85(.20)

0.39

-0.94(.16)

0.18

-1.70(.0006)

0.05
8.50
0.05

-3.00(.01)
2.10(.09)
-3.00(.01)

0.84

-0.18(.66)

4.10
3.60
3.00
2.60

1.40(.01)
1.30(.02)
1.10(.17)
0.94(.03)
Continued on next page
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Table E2-Continued
A

B

Circumstance

Death-odds
multiplier

5. Defendant committed additional crime after the
murder
D.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

C
Adjusted logistic
regression coefficient
(with level of statistical
significance)

5.40

1.70(.003)

Race and socioeconomic status (SES) of the defendant and the victim
Defendant was black
One or more victims was nonblack
Victim with low SES
Defendant with high SES
Defendant with low SES
Defendant SES missing
Victim SES missing

3.10
1.10
0.27
2.00
1.30
0.92
0.61

1.10(.02)
0.11(.79)
-1.30(.0005)
0.70(.50)
0.27(.45)
-0.09(.97)
-0.50(.32)

E. Time period of the case"
1. 1986-1989
2. 1983-1985
(1990-1993 is the comparison period)

2.20
2.50

0.78(.04)
0.93(.03)

N= 600 (110 death sentences imposed)
Nom-: This analysis does not include penalty-trial cases that hung on the sentence. When these
cases are included in the analyses, the race of defendant regression coefficient (at item D.1
Column C) is 1.09 (p=.02) with an odds multiplier of 2.9. See Appendix C for detail on the
differential treatment of the hung and unanimously decided cases in this research. The
analysis also excludes four volunteers who presented no mitigation and did not argue in favor
of ajury finding of mitigation. Each volunteer received a death sentence at this stage in the
process. For an overview of the cases included in this Article's Tables and Figures, see supra
note 110.
'The statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances are described in Appendix A. Items
A4 and A5 in the table embrace more than one statutory factor. Without these combinations,
the logistic model would not run, i.e., it would not "converge," because of the distribution of
the outcome variable for the cases with these case characteristics. There are no cases in this
analysis implicating the d4 (airplane hijacking), or the d13 (murder in a specific type of drug
trafficking), aggravating factors.
b Two variables to identify the time period of the cases are included in the regression to correct
for imbalances created in differential sampling between the time periods. In the sampling
scheme, a higher percentage of cases were sampled from the most recent time period, fewer
from the 1983-1985 time period, and the fewest from 1986-1989. In general, jury deathsentencing rates among all death-eligible cases have been decreasing: 23% in 198-1985; 20%
in 1986-89; and 13% in 1990-1993.
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F

PLOTS OF THE MODELS IN APPENDIX

E,

CONTROLLING FOR THE

DEFENDANT/VICTIM RAciAL COMBINATION

This appendix presents plots based on the two logistic regression
models in Appendix E. Figure Fl is based on the model in Table El
while Figure F2 is based on the model in Table E2.
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G

RACE-OF-DEFENDANT DIsPARiES ESTIMATED WITH REGRESSION-BASED
ScALES DERIVED FROM THE MODELS IN APPENDIX E

This appendix presents estimates of race-of-defendant effects
based on the logistic regression models presented in Appendix E. The
scale underlying Table G1 is based on the model in Table El while the
scale underlying Table G2 is based on the model in Table E2.
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APPENDIX
RACE-OF-DEFENDANT

DISPARITIEs

H

ESTIMATED FOR ALL PENALTY-TRIAL

OUTCOMES AND FOR JURY DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED

AMONG ALL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CASES, CONTROLLING
FOR DEFENDANT CULPABILITY ESTIMATED
IN A MURDER SEVERITY STUDY

Table HI estimates race-of-defendant effects injury penalty trials
controlling for a culpability scale based on the murder severity study,
while Table H2 presents a similar analysis of all jury decisions imposed

among all death-eligible cases.
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